Microeconomic Theory Seminars Spring 2024

Fridays, 2:00-3:20 pm
In-Person Seminars will be held in Sproul 2206.
Zoom meeting ID’s will be emailed out before each seminar.

Questions? Contact Urmee Khan

When available, the papers may be downloaded as pdf files, which can be read or printed using the Acrobat Reader.

DATE NAME TITLE OF PRESENTATION
4/05/2024
*Sproul 2206
Charles Sprenger (Caltech) Connecting Common Ratio and Common Consequence Preferences
4/12/2024
*Zoom
Alexander Jacobsen (Northwestern) Revealed Persuasion
4/17/2024
*Sproul 2206
*Wednesday
Efe OK (New York University) Measuring Stochastic Rationality
4/26/2024
*Sproul 2206
Fahad Khalil (U of Washington) Rewarding Success and Failure: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Strategic Experimentation
5/03/2024
*Sproul 2206
Scott Tyson (U of Rochester) Relying on Repression
5/10/2024
*ZOOM
Marcin Peski (U Toronto) Bargaining with Mechanisms and Two Sided Incomplete Information
5/24/2024
*Sproul 2206
Chris Shannon (UC Berkeley) Random Rationalizability
5/31/2024
*Sproul 2206
Ali Khan (Johns Hopkins) On Game-Theoretic Underpinnings of the Gale-Nikaido-Kuhn-Debreu Lemma: Generalized Formulations
6/07/2024
*Sproul 2206
Dayang Li (UCR) Attention Formation: Triggers and Blockers