Microeconomic Theory Seminars Spring 2024
Fridays, 2:00-3:20 pm
In-Person Seminars will be held in Sproul 2206.
Zoom meeting ID’s will be emailed out before each seminar.
Questions? Contact Urmee Khan
When available, the papers may be downloaded as pdf files, which can be read or printed using the Acrobat Reader.
| DATE | NAME | TITLE OF PRESENTATION |
|---|---|---|
| 4/05/2024 *Sproul 2206 |
Charles Sprenger (Caltech) | Connecting Common Ratio and Common Consequence Preferences |
| 4/12/2024 *Zoom |
Alexander Jacobsen (Northwestern) | Revealed Persuasion |
| 4/17/2024 *Sproul 2206 *Wednesday |
Efe OK (New York University) | Measuring Stochastic Rationality |
| 4/26/2024 *Sproul 2206 |
Fahad Khalil (U of Washington) | Rewarding Success and Failure: Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Strategic Experimentation |
| 5/03/2024 *Sproul 2206 |
Scott Tyson (U of Rochester) | Relying on Repression |
| 5/10/2024 *ZOOM |
Marcin Peski (U Toronto) | Bargaining with Mechanisms and Two Sided Incomplete Information |
| 5/24/2024 *Sproul 2206 |
Chris Shannon (UC Berkeley) | Random Rationalizability |
| 5/31/2024 *Sproul 2206 |
Ali Khan (Johns Hopkins) | On Game-Theoretic Underpinnings of the Gale-Nikaido-Kuhn-Debreu Lemma: Generalized Formulations |
| 6/07/2024 *Sproul 2206 |
Dayang Li (UCR) | Attention Formation: Triggers and Blockers |