Microeconomic Theory Seminars Winter 2022
Wednesdays, 2:00-3:20 pm
In-Person Seminars will be held in Sproul 2206.
Zoom meeting ID’s will be emailed out before each seminar.
Questions? Contact Siyang Xiong and Hiroki Nishimura
When available, the papers may be downloaded as pdf files, which can be read or printed using the Acrobat Reader.
| DATE | NAME | TITLE OF PRESENTATION |
|---|---|---|
| 1/05/2022 *Zoom |
Seungjin Han (McMaster) | A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Analysis in Competing Mechanism Games. |
| 1/12/2022 *Zoom |
Fei Li (UNC) | Global Manipulation by local Obfuscation |
| 1/19/2022 *Zoom |
Rene Saran (Cincinnati) | A Dynamic Optimization Approach to Delegation with an Application to Volunteer Contracts. |
| 1/26/2022 *Zoom |
Dayang Li (UCR) | Additive Utility Representation under Idempotent Attention |
| 2/2/2022 *Zoom |
Harry Pei (Northwestern University) | Robust Implementation with Costly Information |
| 2/09/2022 *Zoom |
Weijia Li (Monash University) | Hobbesian War and Democracy |
| 2/16/2022 *Zoom |
Marcus Pivato (CY Cergy Paris Universite) | Preference aggregation under uncertainty |
| 2/23/2022 *Zoom |
Natalia Lazzati (UC Santa Cruz) | An ordinal approach to the empirical analysis of games with monotone best responses |
| 3/02/2022 *Zoom |
Victor H. Aguiar (University of Western Ontario) | A Rationalization of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference |
| 3/09/2022 *Zoom |
John Rehbeck (Ohio State University) | Revealed Statistical Consumer Theory |