

Education and Partisanship

Daniel Firoozi*

Version: March 23, 2026

Abstract

Education weakens the historical link between income and partisanship across democracies, challenging classical models of political economy. Using administrative data on millions of voters exposed to discontinuities in compulsory schooling laws and college admissions in Florida and California, I show that both the extensive margin of years of high school education and the intensive margin of college selectivity can reduce Republican Party affiliation. Effects generalize across generations (1969 to present), settings, and institutions. Results are consistent with peer socialization shaping sociocultural attitudes alongside career-path mechanisms, rather than deliberate instructor-driven persuasion.

Keywords: Party Systems, Education Expenditure, Education

JEL Codes: D72, H75, I20

*Claremont McKenna College, Robert Day School of Economics and Finance. Email: dfiroozi@cmc.edu. I thank Damon Clark, David Neumark, David Autor, Luca Braghieri, Zach Bleemer, Chris Walters, Matt Freedman, Robert Ainsworth, Raul Sanchez de La Sierra, Ricardo Perez-Truglia, Kelly Bedard, Andrew Johnston, David Broockman, Josh Goodman, David Shor, and Jeremiah Cha as well as seminar and conference participants at UC Irvine, UC San Diego, UC Merced, SDSU, CSU Long Beach, LSU, the University of Delaware, the RAND Corporation, and Claremont McKenna College for advice and feedback. This paper originally circulated as “The Effect of Selective Colleges on Student Partisanship”. The conclusions of this paper are mine alone and do not represent the views of any other person, entity, or organization.

1 Introduction

Political systems across democracies have been upended by right-wing populists that campaign against elites and institutions (Gethin et al., 2021a; Economist, 2025). A striking feature of this realignment is the displacement of income by education: many high earners with elite degrees now favor left-wing parties, while many low earners with less education now favor the right (Kitschelt and Rehm, 2019; Steel, 2024; Gennaioli and Tabellini, 2025). This inversion of party coalitions challenges classical models of political economy that predict economic self-interest and redistribution as the main axis of political conflict (Romer, 1975; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). It also carries risks that trust in research declines, ideological siloing rises, and politicians intervene in academic affairs (Marietta and Barker, 2019; Parker, 2019; Zhang, 2023; Bender, 2025; Bender and Saul, 2025). Using several regression discontinuity designs and administrative data on millions of people treated by high schools and colleges in Florida and California, I show that multiple margins of education can reduce Republican Party affiliation across generations, settings, and institutions.

The erosion of the class-based political cleavage predicted by economic theory has spurred a broad literature identifying three compounding reasons why education now defines party coalitions (Gethin et al., 2021b). The first is moral universalism and the rise of identity politics related to race, gender, and religion, which can determine partisanship independently of income (Kuziemko and Washington, 2018; Enke, 2020; Enke et al., 2022, 2023, 2024; Bonomi et al., 2021; Apfeld et al., 2022; Cappelen et al., 2025). The second is a shift in left-wing parties economic priorities toward green industries, immigration, and international trade, alienating blue-collar workers and trade unionists who once saw them as agents of their redistributive interests (Cavaille and Marshall, 2019; Autor et al., 2020; Kuziemko et al., 2023; Angrist et al., 2024; Choi et al., 2024). The third is education shapes the demand for parties and candidates, amplifying polarization between high-earning graduates and less-educated social outsiders (Gethin et al., 2021b; Dal Bo et al., 2023).

We know little about the magnitude, duration, or causes of education’s partisan ex-

ternalities at either the extensive margin of years of schooling or the intensive margin of institutional quality.¹ For many, even the direction of effects is uncertain: for example, 53 percent of American adults expect that college has no effect on ideology, are unsure, or believe it shifts students rightward, while 47 percent believe it moves students leftward (Orth, 2022). To date, empirical work in economics has not estimated the aggregate partisan externalities of K-12 schooling, 4-year college attendance, or elite college access, in part because educational institutions are cautious about sharing administrative data for politically sensitive questions. Research from other disciplines uses matching methods and surveys to address the challenge, reaching no consensus (Marshall, 2016; Campbell and Horowitz, 2016; Marshall, 2019; Scott, 2022; Simon, 2022).² While these approaches offer valuable insights, they struggle with unobserved endogenous selection into schooling and limitations to the generalizability of their findings, leaving the causal question unresolved.

I estimate the impact of multiple margins of education on partisanship with administrative data on millions of people in California and Florida who were exposed to discontinuities in college admission rules and compulsory schooling laws. First, I use compulsory schooling laws (CSLs) in Florida and California that bind on exact birthdate to identify the impact of the extensive margin of an additional year of late-high school education on partisanship for 5 million voters near the discontinuity (Dobkin and Ferreira, 2010; McCrary and Royer, 2011). Second, I link the universe of 220 million voters from all 50 American states to a sample of roughly 250,000 University of California applicants who were evaluated under the Eligibility in the Local Context (ELC) policy, which granted admission to students in the top four percent of their high school cohort. This enables estimates of the effect of attending selective colleges on party affiliation in a system that accounts for more than one eighth

¹The former matters because it speaks to the long term effects of rising educational attainment, while latter is consequential because of the disproportionate power that graduates of elite colleges exert over political, cultural, and economic institutions. Recent work by Bell et al. (2024), for example, demonstrates that the intensive margin of college selectivity is empirically relevant for students' voter turnout beyond the binary of 4-year college attendance.

²These papers use fixed effects, sibling comparisons, or compare birth cohorts and generally find that education shifts students to the right or has no impact.

of elite Association of American University enrollment in the United States (Atkinson and Pelfrey, 2004; Bleemer, 2024). I split the sample by safety school admission offers and use alternative admission thresholds to distinguish effects between students treated on the extensive margin of 4-year college enrollment and students treated on the intensive margin of college selectivity. The combination of these approaches identifies effects across two distinct education treatment margins and two states with 37 million voters and a 34-point partisan gap, ranging from a Republican +14 pp to a Democratic +20 pp advantage.

I find that education substantially affects partisanship across treatment margins, policies, and settings. Each additional year of compulsory late-high school education reduces later life Republican registration by roughly 2 to 3 percentage points, which is over half of the association between schooling and partisanship in the United States (Kuziemko et al., 2023). These effects persist to at least age 50 and are noticeably larger in Republican-leaning Florida than in Democratic-leaning California. College data show a parallel pattern. Republican registration again falls by 2 to 3 percentage points per year completed at a highly selective UC campus, with corresponding increases in independent and Democratic affiliation as well as meaningful heterogeneity across treatment margins. Among UC applicants without a safety school admission offer, who are mostly on the extensive margin of 4-year college enrollment, treatment substantially increases voter registration, and virtually the entire gain accrues to Democratic Party registration. By contrast, UC applicants with fallback offers and at other admission thresholds, who are treated almost exclusively on the intensive margin of college selectivity, shift from Republican affiliation to non-partisan registration.

Recent work highlights three mechanisms that may explain education’s impact on partisanship. Roommates and classmates socialize students into their political views and identity.³ Faculty, curricula, and instruction can shape these outcomes as well (Cantoni et al., 2017; Goldstein and Kolerman, 2025). The long-run effects of education on earnings, career, and

³Exogeneous variation in peer exposure changes attitudes toward diversity (Carrell et al., 2019; Alan et al., 2021; Corno et al., 2022), support for redistribution (Mendelberg et al., 2017; Londono-Velez, 2022), as well as ideology (Billings et al., 2021; Braghieri, 2021; Strother et al., 2021; Kaplan et al., 2025).

residence may also matter over time (Finan et al., 2021; Cantoni and Pons, 2022).

I find evidence consistent with peer socialization as the primary mechanism, with a secondary role for later-life career paths. Students induced to enroll in more selective colleges live in peer-dense residential settings, spend less time with family, and engage with classmates from more liberal, secular, and nationally diverse backgrounds. In-sample surveys confirm that students at elite colleges perceive peers, rather than faculty or parents, as the dominant influence on their political views, and that campus social environments vary sharply by college selectivity. Parallel patterns emerge in the compulsory-schooling setting: effects are twice as large among students born after 2002, for whom CSLs increased in-person peer exposure just before COVID-era disruptions. By contrast, I find little support for deliberate instructor persuasion. Elite college faculty are research-focused, their teaching methods involve less interpersonal engagement with students, and their ideology is either negatively or not associated with their students' eventual policy views and partisanship. While treated students earn more and complete more schooling, career paths reinforce earlier effects by reducing party switches at the threshold.

This paper makes contributions to empirical and theoretical work in labor economics, the economics of inequality, and political economy. Empirically, it is the first to use administrative data and several natural experiments to show that multiple margins of education can reduce Republican Party affiliation, highlighting partisan externalities embedded in the returns to education that are largely overlooked. Theoretically, these findings challenge classical models of political economy, which predict that higher earnings reduce demand for redistribution and shift voters to the right. Instead, I find that education moves students toward the political center and left while raising earnings, eroding income-based partisanship and supporting recent models of political economy that stress issue salience and identity politics (Bonomi et al., 2021; Gennaioli and Tabellini, 2025). These findings contribute to our understanding of how education produces partisan externalities in a changing landscape of economic inequality and democratic conflict.

2 Data, Methods, and Policy Context

2.1 Data

This paper uses two primary data sources: the nationwide universe of roughly 220 million registered U.S. voters from 2012 to 2024 and administrative records on over 250,000 University of California (UC) applicants between 2007 and 2011. The voter file is used independently to estimate the political externalities of compulsory schooling. These sources are then linked at the individual level using full name and exact date of birth to estimate the impact of elite colleges on long-run partisanship. Matching frictions generally reduce precision and are discussed in Appendix B.

The voter registration data are drawn from L2 Inc.’s VM2 database, a commercially maintained, nonpartisan voter file used widely by researchers and political campaigns in the United States. The file includes each registrant’s political party affiliation as well as their vote history in all primary and general elections since 2012.⁴ These data are supplemented with commercial, demographic, and geographic information from all 50 states and Washington, D.C.

The UC applicant data were provided by an anonymous campus, referred to herein as “UC San Andreas”. The dataset includes all first-time applicants to that campus between 2007 and 2011. Because of the UC common application, the majority of California residents apply to UC San Andreas, making this a close proxy for the broader UC applicant pool. The dataset includes detailed applicant information not available in centralized UC records. Individual records were de-identified and matched to the voter file on name and birthdate. Postsecondary enrollment is verified using the National Student Clearinghouse and augmented with institutional characteristics from IPEDS, Opportunity Insights, and the College Scorecard.

⁴In states that do not explicitly record party affiliation, L2 generates a variable for modeled party affiliation. This is not especially empirically relevant in this manuscript, because my samples focus on two states with explicit party registration and only a small proportion of UC students (roughly 5 percent) go on live in a state that does not have party registration.

To examine mechanisms, I merge survey data on college students and faculty from the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) at UCLA’s Higher Education Research Institute (HERI). Student-level ideology, religiosity, and issue preferences come from more than 4 million full-time freshmen surveyed at over 1,000 colleges between 2000 and 2010. Faculty characteristics are drawn from HERI’s triennial surveys (1989 to 1998)⁵, which cover career goals, views, and teaching practices across more than 1,000 institutions and 80,000 respondents.

Finally, I fielded a proprietary online survey in the Spring 2022 of 1,105 in-sample UC San Andreas applicants, collecting self-reported political views, civic engagement, and retrospective experiences. The survey instrument replicates wording from Pew Research surveys to facilitate comparison to national benchmarks. Appendix Table A.1 shows the survey sample is demographically similar to the full population of UC applicants. Full question text appears in Online Appendix A.

2.2 Florida and California’s Compulsory Schooling Laws

I use compulsory schooling laws (CSLs) in Florida and California that create sharp variation in years of schooling based on birthdate to identify the impact of an additional year of compulsory high school on partisanship.⁶ In both states, minimum school entry ages are enforced by date-of-birth cutoffs: children must turn five on or before September 1st in Florida or December 2nd in California to enroll in kindergarten that academic year.⁷ Those born after the cutoff must delay entry by one year, which means that they begin schooling one year older than their counterparts born a day earlier. These entry laws, coupled with compulsory attendance requirements that prevent high school dropout until a student reaches a given

⁵Later years are not publicly available to protect the identity of faculty members responding to the survey.

⁶I choose these states because they are the first and third most populous American states. Other large states like Texas either do not record voters’ party affiliation in their state records, do not report voters’ exact date of birth, or do not have a sharp birthdate cutoff paired with a school leaving age embedded in their compulsory schooling laws.

⁷Florida’s September 1st cutoff binds for birth cohorts dating back to 1978. California’s December 2nd cutoff is used for cohorts dating back to 1969, consistent with previous work.

age (usually 16 to 18), generate clear jumps in educational attainment on the order of 0.15 to 0.20 years of schooling (Dobkin and Ferreira, 2010; McCrary and Royer, 2011). I define a normalized running variable in days, with zero set at the cutoff, and estimate intent-to-treat (ITT) effects on long-run outcomes and note that estimates may be scaled up by a factor of 5 for a conservative calculation of treatment effects per year of late high school attainment.

CSLs in these contexts satisfy the key assumptions for causal inference with a regression discontinuity design. Birthdate is as-good-as-random within narrow windows around the threshold and is not manipulable by parents or their children. Although induced births and cesarean deliveries respond to seasonality and holidays, there is no evidence that parents time births around the specific CSL cutoff dates in these states (LaLumia et al., 2015; Jacobson et al., 2020). To the extent that proximity of the Labor Day holiday reduces births and shifts partisanship near the threshold in Florida, I find that it slightly biases estimates toward zero (See Appendix Figures D.10 and D.11 as well as Table D.6). Moreover, because birthdate is assigned at birth, it is determined prior to any decisions about education or politics and is not subject to measurement error in administrative records. These features support the exclusion restriction that the cutoff affects outcomes only through its impact on schooling.

Because I observe people conditional on being registered to vote, discontinuities in the number or demographics of people around the cutoff would reflect treatment effects of education on voter registration, rather than differences in birth patterns across the threshold that would threaten the identification strategy. Perhaps surprisingly given the large literature on education’s civic externalities, there is no discernable discontinuity in the density of observations around the threshold, suggesting no impact of high school education on voter registration (Figure 1). Likewise, covariate balance tests show smooth trends in composition of the sample by race and sex at the threshold (Figure 2 and Appendix Table D.7).⁸ These tests are consistent with previous work using birthdate discontinuities in CSLs and validate the design in this context.

⁸For each of these test I use local linear estimates with a 70 day bandwidth, uniform kernel, and 90 percent confidence interval. Evidence of balance remains the same at narrower bandwidths.

The near-threshold estimation sample includes over 5 million registered voters born within 70 days (10 weeks) of the cutoff dates in Florida and California, drawn from a total of 37 million registrants in the two states. My baseline specification takes the following form:

$$Outcome_i = \alpha + \beta \cdot BornBefore_i + f(Birthdate_i) + \mathbf{X}'_i \Omega + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where $Outcome_i$ is an outcome for individual i , $BornBefore_i$ is an indicator for being born on or before the entry cutoff date, $f(\cdot)$ is a flexible control for the running variable, \mathbf{X}_i includes controls for sex, race, birth year, and state of registration, and ε_i is the error term. For robustness, I vary the order of the polynomial control for the running variable, the bandwidth used for inference, and the inclusion of pre-treatment covariate controls.

2.3 University of California Admissions

California’s higher education system includes one quarter of all Americans enrolled in open-access community colleges, half a million students in teaching-focused California State Universities (CSUs), and one eighth of all Americans enrolled at elite AAU research universities in the University of California (UC) campuses. While this paper links applicants to voter registration outcomes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia, more than 80 percent of in-sample registrants reside in California, which has the highest rate of college student retention in the U.S (Van Dam, 2022). Importantly, party affiliation recorded in these data are a strong predictor of actual party and ideological preferences (See Online Appendix A).

The University of California system enrolls over a quarter million students across nine undergraduate campuses and is one of the largest selective public higher education systems in the world. Mirroring university systems in other countries and American states, elite colleges in California have more left-leaning students than their less selective counterparts (Kerr et al., 2001; Gethin et al., 2021a,b; Firoozi and Geyn, 2025; Acton et al., 2025). Among in-sample students attending UC campuses, 60 percent are registered Democrats

and 8 percent are Republicans, which is similar to highly selective peer institutions outside California such as the University of Michigan (56 percent to 10 percent), the University of Texas (56 percent to 17 percent), and NYU (70 percent to 5 percent). These patterns remain consistent in national data independently of institutional control, sector, or region, supporting the generalizability of results beyond California (Acton et al., 2025).

To estimate the causal effect of highly selective colleges on partisanship, I exploit a natural experiment generated by the UC’s Eligibility in the Local Context (ELC) policy. Introduced in 2001 after the implementation of Proposition 209, which banned race-based affirmative action, the ELC program granted an admissions preference to California high school students who ranked in the top 4 percent of their cohort by a version of GPA that included additional weight for college-preparatory courses taken in the sophomore and junior years. Eligibility thresholds were calculated internally by the UC Office of the President based on transcript data submitted by participating high schools, which accounted for over 90 percent of in-state UC applicants. The “reweighted GPA” rankings and cutoff values were never disclosed publicly, but students were notified of their eligibility for the policy via formal letter. Admissions offices at individual UC campuses were also informed of each applicant’s eligibility and given discretion to incorporate this information into their decentralized admissions decisions. This policy varies both the extensive margin of 4-year college enrollment and the intensive margin of college selectivity, which I explore in greater depth in Section 3.

ELC lends itself to a credible regression discontinuity design (RDD). The running variable, reweighted GPA, is continuous and centrally calculated. Students lacked access to their reweighted GPA percentile or their respective cutoff, precluding manipulation. Eligibility affected college admissions and enrollment, but was not disclosed publicly or used for other policies like financial aid. These features satisfy the key requirements for an RD design: a relevant instrument, continuity of expected outcomes around the cutoff, and imperfect control of the running variable.

The primary threat to the identification strategy’s validity comes from the risk that a

subset of applicants who were made aware of their eligibility for the top percentile policy selected into UC San Andreas application differentially across the GPA threshold. Notably, there were students who were contacted about their eligibility for the ELC program that selected into application for some UCs, but this does not meaningfully bias estimates of the labor market returns to UC campuses (Bleemer, 2023, 2024).

I use several approaches to validate the design and address the risks of selection into sample. McCrary density tests show no discontinuous jump in the distribution of observations at the cutoff (Figure 3), and I fail to reject the null hypothesis of smooth density (McCrary, 2008; Cattaneo et al., 2018, 2019). Covariate balance tests in Tables D.1 through D.5, Figure 4, and Appendix Figures D.1 through D.4 show no discontinuities in 16 predicted outcomes or 18 baseline demographic and academic variables using local linear estimation with a 0.3 GPA bandwidth at a 90 percent confidence interval. Across multiple bandwidths and specifications, the rejection rate for covariate continuity is consistent with random chance (see Figures D.5 through D.9). I also re-estimate results conditional on voter registration to improve balance and find substantively identical treatment effects to my main results (Tables D.3 and F.1).

To distinguish between the extensive margin of 4-year college enrollment and the intensive margin of college selectivity, I use heterogeneity tests in Section 3 and I extend my findings using two additional GPA-based admissions thresholds at highly selective UC campuses. These campus-specific policies introduced undisclosed thresholds for admission priority based on reweighted GPAs. The thresholds are located at different points in the GPA distribution than the ELC policy (around the 39th and 89th percentiles among applicants)⁹, were unknown to applicants, and created sharp changes in admission probabilities. McCrary and covariate balance tests confirm the credibility of these alternative RDDs (see Figures E.1 through E.8 and Tables ?? and ??). These two alternative admission rules vary a distinct margin of treatment – the intensive margin of college selectivity – across different

⁹The ELC cutoff was generally around the 79th percentile of applicant GPA for perspective.

types of institutions and student populations to confirm the robustness of the main findings.

My ITT RD specifications take the following form:

$$Outcome_i = \alpha + \beta \cdot Eligible_i + f(GPA_i) + \mathbf{X}_i' \Omega + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where $Outcome_i$ is an outcome for student i , GPA_i is the normalized reweighted GPA (with the cutoff set to zero), $Eligible_i$ is a binary indicator for ELC eligibility, $f(\cdot)$ is a flexible function of the running variable, \mathbf{X}_i is a vector of covariates, and standard errors are clustered at the high school-cohort level. I vary the order of a polynomial control for the running variable, include an expansive set of controls, change the bandwidth used for inference, and estimate bias-aware confidence intervals to demonstrate the robustness of my estimates (Calonico et al., 2014; Kolesar and Rothe, 2018).¹⁰ I also scale my estimates using eligibility for the policy as an instrument for expected years of enrollment at a highly selective college or university and discuss the interpretation of this approach at length in Section 3.

3 Results

3.1 Compulsory Schooling Laws in Florida and California

3.1.1 Partisanship

I use compulsory schooling laws (CSLs) in Florida and California that mandate minimum years of education based on exact birthdate to estimate the effect of a year of compulsory high school education on partisanship. These laws increase the extensive margin of years of late high school attainment by enabling children born on or before the state-specific cutoff,

¹⁰The controls I use include parental years of schooling, self-reported income, and ISIR family income, as well as indicators for female, underrepresented minority status, Cal Grant eligibility, first generation college student status, FAFSA filing, application year, county education level, high school quality, being a primary income earner as a student, and missing covariate information. I use the bounded second derivative method from Kolesar and Rothe (2018), deriving bounds based on a heuristic rule offered by the authors that makes assumptions on the maximum plausible difference between the CEF and a straight line between the CEF values at the endpoints of an interval of a fixed length in the support of the running variable.

September 1st in Florida and December 2nd in California, to enter school a year earlier, which in turn requires completion of an additional year of schooling before reaching the legal dropout age.

In the compulsory schooling design, the estimand is the effect of compelling marginal students to remain in school an extra year at the late high school dropout margin, rather than exiting one grade earlier. The relevant counterfactual is, therefore, earlier transition into adult environments like right-leaning, blue collar workplaces and more time spent with family as opposed to time spent in school with peer networks within a homogenous age cohort. This margin is policy-relevant, given CSLs and dropout-prevention policies operate precisely at this level, and it is conceptually meaningful because late adolescence and early adulthood are when partisan identities and registration decisions first form. To benchmark magnitudes, prior work finds CSL cutoffs in similar settings increase schooling by roughly 0.15 to 0.20 years on average (Dobkin and Ferreira, 2010; McCrary and Royer, 2011). Scaling my intent-to-treat results by a factor of about five therefore provides a conservative “per-year” reference point for late high school attainment. I emphasize that this scaling is only a benchmark because the first stage is not observed directly in the voter file and may vary by cohort and subgroup. However, it helps put the CSL magnitudes on an interpretable scale and keeps the estimand grounded in the late high school dropout margin that the design identifies.

Figure 5 visualizes these effects. The top two panels pool both states using 70-day and 21-day bandwidths, while the bottom panels disaggregate by state at the narrower bandwidth. In every specification, students born just before the cutoff, who remain in school longer, are less likely to register as Republicans. The discontinuities are clear and consistent across settings and bandwidths, providing compelling evidence of late high schools’ causal effects.

Table 1 reports reduced-form intent-to-treat estimates for party registration across six columns. Because registrants are by definition observed conditional on registration, all in-sample individuals self-select into either the Republican Party, the Democratic Party, or

independent registration. Columns 1 and 2 pool both states, 3 and 4 show results for Florida, and 5 and 6 do the same for California. Odd-numbered columns show results without covariate controls whereas even-numbered columns add controls for birth year, state, sex, and race. Across all specifications and samples, Republican registration falls among those who complete more secondary schooling. Independent registration is not significantly effected and, in both Florida and the pooled sample, Democratic registration rises.

Comparisons of magnitudes are informative in this context. In California, where birthplace is recorded on the voter file, I restrict to in-state births to ensure CSL exposure. I do this because, for these policies to bind, a person must have been located in the state at both the relevant school entry date and their legal dropout age. In Florida, birthplace data are unavailable, but census data on interstate migration suggests roughly half of registrants were born in-state. Thus, a simple point of comparison between states would entail doubling Florida’s treatment effects when benchmarking with California. Even absent that adjustment, Florida shows larger treatment effects of high school on partisanship than California, suggesting that schooling has stronger effects in more conservative political environments despite Republicans’ power to shape curriculum.

Given that I observe roughly 0.28 to 0.50 percentage point declines in Republican registration at the cutoff, back-of-the-envelope calculations imply that one full year of additional compulsory schooling in late high school reduces Republican registration by approximately 1.4 to 2.5 percentage points. These effects are similar in magnitude to those found for UC admissions,¹¹ suggesting that multiple margins of treatment and different types of education can reduce Republican affiliation across settings, institutions, and student populations. Moreover, this estimated treatment effect is between half and four fifths the size of the raw association between years of schooling and party affiliation in the United States (Kuziemko et al., 2023).

I confirm the validity of the design in several ways. First, I demonstrate robustness

¹¹The UC estimates are scaled per year of highly selective or elite college attainment, with a counterfactual of enrollment at either less selective colleges or no 4-year college enrollment.

to more flexible controls for the running variable in Table F.5. Second, I show that point estimates are similar at narrower bandwidths around the cutoff in Figure F.9. Third, in Table F.6, I re-estimate the main specifications from Table 1 on a placebo sample of foreign-born registered voters in California who were unlikely to have been subject to these schooling laws. As expected, I find no discontinuities, supporting the interpretation that the observed effects reflect true exposure to compulsory schooling laws rather than an abrupt change in birth patterns around the cutoff.

3.1.2 Heterogeneity by Generation, Sex, and Race

Heterogeneity across generations, sex, and race can offer insight into the mechanisms and scope of education’s political effects. I begin by dividing the sample into three generational cohorts in Table 2: Generation X (born 1969 to 1980), Generation Y or Millennials (1981 to 1995), and Generation Z (1996 and later). Across all three cohorts, I find statistically significant reductions in Republican registration, which is surprising given the positive association between education and Republican affiliation in the 20th century (Gethin et al., 2021a; Kuziemko et al., 2023). There is no consistent effect on independent registration, but Democratic registration rises among Millennials and Generation Z. Point estimates are largest for Generation Z, a result which remains robust at narrower bandwidths. The consistency of directional effects across cohorts is notable given that the naive association has flipped over time. Even among Gen X voters, the partisan effects of additional compulsory schooling nudge students toward the left. To the extent that treatment effects are changing over time, they appear to be growing. Among Generation Z voters born after 2002, the estimated reductions in Republican registration are twice as large as for older Gen Z cohorts.

I next explore heterogeneity by sex in Table 3. Schooling induced by CSLs reduces Republican registration for both men and women, with corresponding increases in Democratic affiliation. Point estimates are larger for men, potentially reflecting their higher baseline Republican affiliation or their greater likelihood of dropping out of high school in the absence

of binding school-leaving laws.

Finally, I test effects by race and ethnicity in Appendix Table C.4. The largest partisan effects are among White voters, who are significantly less likely to register Republican and more likely to register as Democrats when exposed to additional schooling. Among voters of color, effects on Republican registration are about one-half the size of those for White registrants and are not significant for Democratic registration. These patterns may reflect either the higher rates at which White voters typically register to vote as Republicans or the high share of recent immigrants among non-White Floridians, many of whom would not be subject to the state’s CSLs and thus attenuate ITT estimates.¹²

Overall, these results demonstrate a consistent pattern of education reducing Republican registration and, to a lesser extent, increasing Democratic registration across states, generations, sexes, and racial and ethnic groups. Where heterogeneity emerges, it is directionally consistent with partisan convergence toward the left and concentrated among populations with greater baseline Republican support like men and White voters. Larger effects among the youngest voters suggest that the partisan externalities of education may be growing stronger over time.

3.2 University of California Admissions

3.2.1 First-Stage

Eligibility for the University of California’s top percentile admissions policy (ELC) substantially increased marginal students’ access to and enrollment in highly selective UC campuses. Consistent with [Bleemer \(2024\)](#), I find a sharp discontinuity in UC admissions at the eligibility threshold. Students just above the 96th percentile of GPA were admitted to approximately 0.4 more UC campuses than otherwise similar students just below the threshold, relative to a mean of roughly three. This admissions effect is stable across bandwidth

¹² Importantly, larger treatment effects among White voters also has implications for generalizability. Given that Florida and California are much more racially and ethnically diverse than the national average, the effects of education on partisanship may be even larger in Whiter states across the Midwest and Northeast.

choices, polynomial controls for the running variable, and covariate controls (Online Appendix Tables B.1 and B.2).¹³ Put differently, the first stage meaningfully changes the set of campuses from which students receive admissions offers.

More importantly for interpretation, the policy generates a mixed first stage that shifts students along both an extensive margin of treatment (whether or not to enroll in a 4-year college) and an intensive margin of treatment (the selectivity and environment of their 4-year college). The extensive margin enrollment effect is modest in the full sample, as crossing the threshold increases 4-year enrollment by 1.32 to 1.74 percentage points across specifications. By contrast, the intensive margin shift is larger. ELC eligibility increases enrollment at Barron’s “Highly Selective” and “Elite” 4-year institutions by 5.88 to 8.34 percentage points and reduces enrollment at less selective 4-year colleges by 4.56 to 6.60 percentage points. This distinction matters because only a highly selective subset of UC campuses participated in ELC, so the policy reallocates some students from less selective 4-year colleges into a highly selective or elite UC campuses even though overall UC enrollment changes by a smaller magnitude.

To make the counterfactual clearer, I decompose enrollment changes using administrative data. Of the induced increase in highly selective college enrollment, roughly one half reflects substitution away from California State Universities, about one quarter reflects substitution away from less selective UC campuses (including nonparticipating UCs), and the remaining quarter reflects substitution away from 2-year colleges or non-enrollment at 4-year institutions (Table B.2). Thus, the control group just below the threshold is not strictly a “no college” group, given that many enroll in 4-year colleges that are on average less selective. This counterfactual mix is central for interpreting partisan externalities, because the induced shift in college environment is sizable along dimensions relevant to both labor market and political outcomes. For example, the highly selective UCs that participated in the program have higher instructional expenditures per student, lower acceptance rates, higher measured

¹³Full first-stage enrollment effects, covariate balance tests, and alternative bandwidth results for the ELC policy are presented in Online Appendix B.

peer academic achievement, and stronger earnings outcomes after graduation (Appendix Table B.3).

In the section that follows, I begin by interpreting effects as a bundle of increased 4-year college enrollment and reallocation toward more selective colleges. I use instrumental variables specifications to aid magnitude interpretation. Specifically, the results are scaled estimates per “expected years of enrollment at highly selective or elite institutions”, which is constructed from IPEDS-based completion measures interacted with Barron’s College Guide selectivity categories. In the subsequent results, I use subsample heterogeneity and alternative admission policies to distinguish between treatment effects from the extensive margin of 4-year college enrollment and the intensive margin of college selectivity.

3.2.2 Voter Registration and Partisanship

Figure 6 presents the core reduced-form effects on eight voter registration outcomes, plotted against students’ normalized GPAs. The top six panels show the total fraction of students who register to vote, as well as unconditional registration shares by party: Republican, non-Republicans¹⁴, Democrat, no party preference, and third party. The final two panels track changes in major party registration over time. Visual inspection reveals clear discontinuities. Eligibility for the top percentile admission policy lowers Republican registration and switching into the Republican Party, while increasing the probability of registering as a third party, a Democrat, or no party preference.

Table 4 formalizes these findings across three panels, scaling treatment effects per year of expected enrollment at a highly selective university. Because the counterfactual enrollment patterns of students differ between less selective colleges and non-enrollment at 4-year colleges, this instrumental variables approach is meant to provide an interpretable magnitude for benchmarking treatment effects, rather than literal estimates of the effect of a year

¹⁴This is defined as registered to vote, but not registered with the Republican Party. I use this as an outcome to remain consistent with national youth surveys and in-sample polling, which show that young college-educated independents overwhelmingly support Democrats and left-leaning policy positions (see Figure A.2, Tables A.2, A.3).

of college. Intent-to-treat estimates as well as instrumental variables approaches using the number of college admissions offers are available in Appendix Tables C.1 and C.2.

Panel A of Table 4 shows a noisy increase in overall registration, consistent with past research on the civic returns to higher education (Firoozi and Geyn, 2025). Panel B presents the main effects on partisanship. Across specifications, affiliation with the Republican Party falls by 2.49 to 2.94 percentage points per year of expected enrollment at a highly selective college or university. This treatment effect is roughly in line with the magnitude found for the extensive margin of late high school education in the compulsory schooling design and is between four fifths and the full magnitude of the association between years of schooling and partisanship in the United States (Kuziemko et al., 2023). The reduction in Republican affiliation is paired with a sharp increase of between 5.79 and 8.04 percentage points in the rate at which students are registered to vote as either an independent, Democrat, or a member of a third party. Most of this effect, between 3.72 and 5.28 percentage points per year of expected enrollment at a highly selective college, is driven by significant increases in the rate at which students register to vote without a stated party preference.

Panel C examines partisan conversion. The L2 voter file flags individuals who switch their party registration between major parties. While I find no significant shift in conversions to the Democratic Party, eligibility for UC admission may reduce conversion to the Republican Party, suggesting that the effect of education on partisanship could grow into adulthood.

I test the robustness of these results in four ways using the intent-to-treat estimates as a common point of comparison. First, I re-estimate all outcomes conditional on voter registration, motivated by the strong balance documented in Table D.3 and find stronger and directionally identical effects in Table F.1. Second, I demonstrate robustness to bias-aware confidence intervals (Calonico et al., 2014; Kolesar and Rothe, 2018) and high-dimensional high school-year fixed effects in Tables F.2 through F.4. Third, I vary bandwidths, covariate sets, and functional forms in Figures F.1 through F.8, showing that results are stable across a wide range of specifications.

Finally, I implement falsification tests based on placebo cutoffs. I simulate “synthetic” discontinuities across the GPA distribution, excluding a 0.05 GPA window around the true ELC threshold, and compare the resulting t-statistics to those from the actual policy cutoff (Appendix Figures G.1 through G.3).¹⁵ The real effects on Republican registration, Democratic/independent registration, and partisan conversion all fall above the 95th percentile of this synthetic distribution, strongly suggesting the observed discontinuities represent real treatment effects.

3.2.3 Extensive and Intensive Treatment Margins

Eligibility for the ELC policy raises enrollment at highly selective UC campuses, but the relevant counterfactual is a mix of less selective 4-year colleges and non-enrollment in a 4-year college. Because the UC policy bundles treatment effects from both extensive and intensive margins of college enrollment, I report additional evidence that separates these margins within the UC setting.

First, I restrict to a subsample of students with fewer outside options (who are flagged as having attended “low quality” high schools) and then split the students based on whether they received an admission offer from a fallback non-ELC, less selective UC campus in Table 5. In Panel A, among applicants with a less selective UC fallback, the policy operates almost entirely through the intensive margin of raising college selectivity while keeping total 4-year enrollment fixed. In this group, enrollment at a highly selective UC reduces Republican registration, with impacted students registering as either independents or Democrats. By contrast in Panel B, among applicants without a less selective UC fallback, the policy mostly operates through the extensive margin of 4-year college enrollment, and the resulting political effects can be described as higher rates of overall voter registration with more than the whole of the increase attributable to Democratic registration.

¹⁵Feasible points refers to each point between -1.24 and +0.27 relative to the true cutoff on the normalized reweighted GPA index, which allows the 0.3 GPA bandwidth to span the range of roughly the 1st to 99th percentiles of this normalized index. I use a 0.3 GPA bandwidth consistent with my preferred specification for a more direct comparison.

Second, to strengthen generalizability, I replicate these findings using two undisclosed GPA-based admission thresholds at highly selective UC campuses in Appendix Section E.¹⁶ These alternative policies primarily vary the intensive margin of college selectivity, and bind for distinct applicant pools. In both cases, inducing students to substitute into more selective universities reduces Republican Party registration and increases independent affiliation. The results hold across campuses, specifications, and student profiles, suggesting that the partisan effects of UC enrollment are not driven by a single institution.

The combination of these approaches provides a better understanding of the estimand for the UC admission policy. The UC admission discontinuity identifies the effect of reallocating marginal applicants toward highly selective universities, relative to a counterfactual bundle of CSU enrollment, less selective UC enrollment, and non-enrollment. The extensive margin of 4-year college enrollment explains the marginal increases in voter registration and Democratic affiliation, whereas the much larger increases in the intensive margin of campus selectivity explain the decisive reduction in Republican affiliation and the rise in registration without a stated party preference. Hence, I interpret the overall treatment effects as the joint consequence of changes in the college environment and total exposure, rather than as a pure “years of schooling” effect.

3.2.4 Heterogeneity by Gender, Family Income, and Urbanicity

I examine heterogeneity in the UC RD estimates along three pre-college dimensions: gender, childhood family income, and county of origin. A key distinction is between origin characteristics measured prior to college entry (childhood family income and location in adolescence) and adult characteristics realized later in the electorate (eventual income and adult residence), which shift substantially for UC students given high rates of geographic mobility and upward earnings mobility. Because adult income is unobserved in the voter file, the heterogeneity results below are best interpreted as variation by pre-college back-

¹⁶Full first-stage estimates, effects, and robustness checks are reported in Online Appendix Section E.

ground rather than as “controlling for” endogenous adult outcomes. Two patterns stand out. First, the estimated reduction in Republican registration is larger for men than for women (Appendix Table C.5). This gender heterogeneity in treatment effects mirrors results from the compulsory-schooling design and is consistent with larger baseline Republican affiliation among men and their greater scope for movement away from the GOP among treated compliers.

Second, the destination of the partisan outcomes varies systematically by childhood income (Appendix Table C.6). Among lower-income students, who have lower baseline registration rates, the treatment primarily increases political participation and Democratic registration. By contrast, among higher-income students, who have higher baseline Republican registration, the treatment produces larger declines in Republican affiliation, with most of the offset absorbed by non-partisan registration rather than the Democratic Party. This income gradient in treatment effects is consistent with a channel in which college exposure shifts sociocultural views more than economic views (Apfeld et al., 2022), leaving economically right-wing treated students “cross-pressured” and therefore more likely to exit the Republican Party without sorting into Democratic registration.

Finally, I examine heterogeneity by county of origin to speak to the urban-rural divide (Appendix Table C.7). The point estimates for students flagged as originating from rural, low-college counties are directionally larger but very imprecise, reflecting the fact that relatively few rural applicants lie near the relevant admissions thresholds at roughly 7 percent of the near-threshold sample. Consequently, the location results should be interpreted as suggestive rather than definitive about urban-rural heterogeneity in causal effects.

3.2.5 Voter Turnout

In Appendix I, I evaluate the impact of UC campuses on voter turnout and political participation using eight different measures. Admission to UC campuses raises voter turnout in Democratic presidential primaries, with null effects on other types of election. Robustness

checks and falsification tests confirm these results across various RD specification choices.

4 Discussion

I consider three plausible mechanisms for education’s partisan externalities: peer socialization, exposure to instructors or curricula, and longer-run changes in earnings, occupation, or residence. Results from both selective universities and compulsory schooling suggest that peer and long-run mechanisms are more consistent with the evidence than direct persuasion by instructors or curricula.

4.1 Peer Socialization

Peer socialization appears to be a central mechanism linking education to partisanship across settings and institutions. Importantly, both the extensive margin of education and the intensive margin of education may operate through a peer effects mechanism. Along the extensive margin of education (years of schooling), students have greater exposure to other people of a similar age group with relatively more liberal policy views than their counterfactual engagement with older adults in the blue collar workforce or their families. Along the intensive margin of education (college selectivity), students at more selective institutions spend more time living on campus and spend more time engaging with peers who are more liberal on social issues in particular and who are more religiously and nationally diverse.

The UC’s ELC policy not only shifts the composition of students’ peers, but also increases the intensity and duration of their exposure to those peers (See Tables [A.4](#) through [A.10](#)). Students who attend more selective UC campuses are more likely to live in student housing, spend less time with family, and engage with ideologically liberal classmates from diverse racial, religious, and socioeconomic backgrounds. These social environments differ sharply from the more moderate home settings many students would otherwise remain in

as commuters, and they appear to produce lasting political effects. In-sample UC students who attend selective universities themselves cite peers, rather than professors, teachers, or parents, as the dominant influence on their political views. They also state that they discuss current events with college classmates and friends more frequently than their family and have more liberal friends compared to peers at less selective campuses. Each of these traits are associated with holding left-wing views on economic issues and progressive attitudes on social issues.

The UC's ELC policy changes the types of peers students see in the classroom alongside the amount of time they spend with them. Figure H.1 shows that UC eligibility increases exposure to peers who are affluent, Asian American, or international students, and are less likely to be White or Hispanic.¹⁷ Table H.1 confirms these patterns, including a 3,000 dollar increase in median peer household income and a 1.2 percentage point increase in exposure to students from the richest 5 percent of families. Figures H.2 and H.3 as well as Tables H.2 and H.3 show that students at highly selective UCs are more likely to interact with liberal, secular, and left-leaning peers, and are less likely to interact with Republicans, moderates, or Christians.^{18,19}

¹⁷These patterns mirror the differences in survey data between incoming UC students and their counterparts at counterfactual colleges and universities in Table J.7. I note that the racial composition numbers are likely lower bounds on the true point estimate, because the racial composition data from Opportunity insights lag behind the time period I study.

¹⁸In Table J.1, a large-scale survey demonstrates that entering UC students are more likely to self-identify as liberal or far-left than entering students at private colleges, CSU campuses, and community colleges. The ideological and religious gaps between UC students and their counterparts at less selective Californian colleges mirror the nationwide gap between students of more selective research universities and less selective teaching colleges (See Tables J.8 through J.9). This higher rate of left-liberal self-identification maps to both left-wing economic policy and progressive sociocultural values (See Tables J.2 through J.6).

¹⁹To test differences in peer ideology and religious views across the threshold, I impute these characteristics at the campus level using a mix of voter registration records and CIRP surveys from HERI. Using data available in the CIRP survey, I match summary data on entering freshmen to colleges based on their membership in one of the following groups: UCs, private Californian research universities, CSUs, private Californian teaching colleges, two year Californian colleges or no college enrollment, public out-of-state research universities, private out-of-state research universities, public out-of-state teaching colleges, private out-of-state teaching colleges, and two year out-of-state teaching colleges. Note that the method of imputation I use will likely understate the ideological gap because (1) these surveys exclude sophomores, juniors, and seniors, (2) this method treats college non-enrollees as two year college students and (3) this method homogenizes peer characteristics across broad categories of colleges and, therefore, fails to capture intra-system changes in enrollment.

Tables 6 and 7 use the linked student survey to relate students' own party registration and issue ideology to the perceived ideology of the people who may influence them to highlight descriptive evidence consistent with peer socialization. A student's own party registration and policy views are more strongly correlated with the reported ideology of their friends than their own families in Table 6. Table 7 reinforces this comparison by restricting the sample to students who name each group as their single most influential source of politicization. Among those who cite friends, the friend-ideology gradient is larger than even the gradient among those who cite family as their primary political influence, reaffirming that students' views track peers often more strongly than their own family.

Findings from compulsory schooling laws reinforce the peer socialization mechanism. The largest partisan effects are observed among students born after 2002, cohorts that had little time for labor market returns to education to materialize. This suggests that the rapid, observable partisan externalities stem from mechanisms operating during schooling itself. For these cohorts, being born before the cutoff also increased the amount of in-person peer exposure prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and the shift to remote learning, which may help explain the larger treatment effects during this period. Evidence from CSLs therefore underscores that peer environments, not just peer composition, are central to education's political externalities.

4.2 Instructors and Curricula

Instructors and curricula are frequently proposed as mechanisms underlying the political effects of education. Using rich data from HERI surveys and a proprietary poll of in-sample students, I find limited support for this hypothesis. While faculty at UC campuses are more left-leaning than at less selective institutions, they are less focused on shaping students' values or political beliefs because they prioritize research and have less face-to-face time with students. In-sample students report peers to be far more politically influential than instructors and the ideology of faculty and teachers are, if anything, negatively associated

with students’ eventual partisanship and policy views. These patterns, coupled with my findings from compulsory schooling laws, suggest that persuasion by instructors and curricula are unlikely to be the primary drivers of the partisan externalities identified in this paper.

I begin with HERI survey data to estimate faculty ideology using the same imputation strategy from Section 4.1. Table K.1 shows that UC faculty are more likely to self-identify as liberal or far-left than their counterparts at CSU campuses and private teaching-focused colleges.²⁰ Table K.3 shows that this ideological gap persists across both STEM and non-STEM fields. Figure H.4 and Table H.4 confirm a discontinuous increase in students exposure to liberal faculty at the ELC policy threshold.

Despite these ideological differences, UC faculty express significantly less interest in using their roles to shape student values or political behavior. As Table K.2 shows, UC faculty are less supportive of prohibiting speech they deem racist or sexist. Table K.4 shows that UC faculty rank “obtaining recognition” and “becoming an authority” in their field as primary career goals, and assign less importance to changing social values, promoting racial understanding, or influencing government and public policy. Similarly, Table K.5 indicates that UC instructors place less emphasis on developing students’ morals, citizenship, or appreciation of other races and ethnicities.

Institutional priorities reinforce this pattern. UC faculty report greater commitment to promoting intellectual development and respecting differences of opinion, but lower emphasis on multiculturalism, social change, or having students examine their values (Table K.6). These priorities are reflected in instructional practices and lower direct interpersonal engagement with students. UC faculty make greater use of teaching assistants, traditional lectures, and non-interactive methods (Tables K.7 and K.8). They assign fewer readings on race and gender, hold tenure-track positions at higher rates, and are more likely to report that research is prioritized over teaching (Tables K.9 and K.10). Each of the differences mirror those between selective universities and less selective colleges nationwide.

²⁰This mirrors national patterns shown in Table K.11.

It is worth considering that faculty may underreport activities to influence students political views in these survey data, but that phenomenon does not explain cleavages in faculty behavior between selective and non-selective colleges and is inconsistent with data that show the exact gradients we would predict by ideology. The fact that faculty at more selective universities are less interested in shaping their students views is somewhat at odds with their self-reported left-leaning ideology, but is strongly consistent with patterns in faculty behavior when considering career incentives. I evaluate each dimension separately.

On the values side, more left-leaning faculty are substantially more likely to report that goals like influencing the political structure, influencing social values, and promoting racial understanding are “very important” or “essential”, while right-leaning faculty are more likely to emphasize “develop[ing] moral character” and “good citizenship” with evidence of non-monotonicity at ideological extremes on many items (Tables [K.12](#) and [K.14](#)). Ideology is correlated with teaching practices: left-leaning faculty use class discussion more frequently and are far more likely to assign readings on race/ethnicity and on women/gender, while right-leaning faculty are more likely to report extensive lecturing (Tables [K.16](#) and [K.17](#)). These patterns are consistent with meaningful differences in normative priorities but they also partly reflect the large differences in teaching practices by field. As a note, ideology is correlated with discipline (for example, humanities/social sciences vs. STEM/business), which itself should predict curriculum choices. This suggests that the gradients in responses across different groups of faculty are accurately tracking those that we would expect ex ante, even if some faculty underreport their attempts to influence students.

Crucially, however, research focus lines up with a very different set of patterns that cuts against intentional faculty persuasion explaining the impact of enrollment at selective UC campuses. As previously noted, faculty at highly selective institutions (and UCs specifically) are less likely to want to impact students views or beliefs across a range of questions, despite being more liberal than their peers at less selective California State Universities and community colleges. This is because (i) UC faculty are more likely to be in quantitative

fields where such goals are less common and (ii) faculty with heavier research orientation like UC faculty place much greater weight on career incentives tied to research (for example, “becoming an authority in their field” and “recognition by colleagues”) and are far less likely to report that influencing politics/social values or promoting racial understanding is an important objective (Tables [K.13](#) and [K.15](#)). Research-focused faculty and UC faculty teaching practices also look far more scaled and less interpersonal (more extensive lecturing, less discussion and cooperative/experiential learning), alongside greater use of teaching assistants (Tables [K.18](#) and [K.19](#)). All of these practices are consistent with time constraints and institutional production functions that prioritize research at selective universities and contradict a mechanism of intentional political persuasion explaining the treatment effect of selective UC campuses. Taken together, the evidence support the interpretation that, even though faculty at selective institutions are more liberal on average, their revealed priorities lean heavily toward research and away from deliberate efforts to shape students political views, making it difficult to reconcile the main causal effects with an instructor or curriculum mechanism.

Students’ self-reports are also inconsistent with instructors or curriculum as a dominant mechanism. In my proprietary survey, in-sample UC students rank friends and family as significantly more influential than professors or teachers (Table [A.4](#)). They report discussing current events more frequently with peers than with family or in college (Tables [A.5](#) through [A.7](#)) and are no more likely than CSU students to cite faculty as an important political influence (Table [A.4](#)). UC students do not perceive their faculty as significantly more liberal than do students at less selective colleges, despite large measured differences in faculty ideology self-reported by instructors (Table [A.11](#)). Furthermore, students’ own partisanship and policy views are, if anything, negatively associated with those of their faculty and teachers (Table [6](#)). Faculty and teacher views are not significantly associated with a student’s partisanship or ideology among even the subset of students who cite their instructors as the most meaningful influence on their politics (Table [7](#)).

While the evidence does not support intentional efforts by faculty to shape student views, unintentional instructional effects remain plausible. UC students may be more likely to enroll in academically-oriented rather than career-focused courses, or may be exposed to different emphases in skills and content. These channels are difficult to isolate empirically, but survey evidence suggests that UC students hold more left-aligned factual beliefs on politically salient topics. Even after controlling for GPA, they are significantly more likely than their CSU counterparts to agree that there is a scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change, that violent crime has declined over time, and that COVID-19 had a far higher mortality rate than influenza or pneumonia during the pandemic.

Findings from compulsory schooling laws further challenge the instructional mechanism. The largest treatment effects I observe are among a complier population of marginal high school dropouts. Effects are also larger in Florida, a politically conservative context where Republican legislators can regulate curricula. Moreover, significant partisan shifts appear even among Generation X voters, whose education predated the current alignment of party systems. These results suggest that the political externalities of education arise from mechanisms more fundamental than pedagogy or instructional content from a specific era or educational institution.

4.3 Long-Run Mechanisms

Education may shape partisanship indirectly through longer-run mechanisms such as degree attainment, earnings, neighborhood selection, and household composition. These channels are theoretically plausible: educational credentials and career trajectories influence peer groups, and partisan cleavages persist along income, education, and residential lines. I consider the role of each in turn.

The first-stage effects of UC admission I document closely mirror those in [Bleemer \(2024\)](#), who finds that the policy significantly increased bachelor's degree completion, early-career earnings, and graduate school attendance. These outcomes could matter politically by shift-

ing later-life peer environments or through the economic consequences of educational attainment itself. Yet, the theoretical direction of income effects on partisanship remains ambiguous. While classical models of political economy predict rising income should reduce support for redistribution and shift voters to the right, more recent work suggests that in contexts like college campuses, where sociocultural values may be more salient than economic issues, the income effects of education may be dominated.

To assess whether these long-run changes translate into partisan sorting, I examine neighborhood characteristics for students observed in California’s voter file. Figure H.5 and Table H.5 report results on median neighborhood income, education, and party affiliation. Across all measures, there is little evidence of residential sorting at the policy threshold. I likewise find no consistent discontinuity in the partisan affiliation of household members. These null effects suggest that residential context is unlikely to drive the persistent changes in partisanship observed among policy-eligible students.

Evidence from compulsory schooling laws further weakens the case for long-run mechanisms. The largest effects are found among students born after 2002. These cohorts are too young to have accumulated meaningful labor market experience or formed distinct adult residential or professional peer groups.²¹ As such, the findings imply that the partisan externalities of education emerge well before long-run sorting can occur, reinforcing the case for socialization during schooling as a major mechanism.

5 Conclusion

This paper provides causal evidence that education affects partisanship across multiple margins of treatment. Using natural experiments from a highly selective college admissions cutoff in California and compulsory schooling cutoffs in Florida and California, I show that education shifts individuals away from the Republican Party. Across settings, the estimated

²¹Although it is worth noting that students at selective UC campuses have coworkers who they perceive as substantially more likely to be liberal than their peers at less selective CSUs (Table A.10).

effects are economically meaningful, on the order of 2 to 3 percentage points per year of instruction, and are absorbed by increases in Democratic registration and/or non-partisan registration depending on the context. The effects emerge quickly, persist into adulthood, and appear across cohorts, geographies, and demographic groups.

The identification strategies in this paper operate at distinct margins of treatment, with different counterfactuals. In the compulsory-schooling design, the cutoff compels marginal students to remain in school at the late high school dropout margin rather than exiting one grade earlier, shifting time away from earlier exposure to adult environments like blue collar workplaces and families toward same-age peer settings. In the UC design, the admissions cutoff reallocates marginal applicants into more selective college environments from a mixed counterfactual that includes less selective 4-year institutions and some non-enrollment in college. These settings differ in institutions, complier populations, and baseline political context, but have a common result: more schooling and more selective institutions reduce non-registration and Republican affiliation while increasing non-partisan and/or Democratic registration.

The scale and granularity of the data, linking administrative education records to verified voter registration histories, enable a rare combination of design-based identification, benchmarking of magnitudes, and heterogeneity analysis. Naive education gradients in survey data have changed sign since the mid-20th century, while the causal effects estimated here are in the same direction dating back to 1969, consistent with substantial and time-varying selection into schooling that is correlated with partisanship (Gethin et al., 2021a,b). Estimates are over half as large as the modern day association between years of schooling and partisanship (Kuziemko et al., 2023). Effects are larger among men than women, and heterogeneity by family income helps demonstrate a plausible role for how sociocultural policy views rather than economic policy views are likely to explain changes in partisanship (Apfeld et al., 2022).

In terms of causal mechanisms, the evidence is most consistent with peer socialization

during schooling rather than deliberate instructor persuasion. In the UC setting, treated students are exposed to more politically liberal peer environments and a more peer-dense residential college experience. In the compulsory schooling setting, additional time in school extends exposure to same-age peer networks at a politically formative stage and delays entry into adult social contexts. Student survey evidence shows that party registration and issue ideology correlate strongly with the perceived ideology of friends to even a greater degree than family, but are either not correlated or are negatively correlated with the ideology of their teachers and professors. Faculty survey evidence indicates that, despite ideological differences across institutions, faculty at more selective universities place greater weight on research-oriented incentives and report less interest and activity to shape students' political views. Taken together, these patterns are difficult to reconcile with an instructor or curriculum-driven explanation for the main estimates.

These results offer two core takeaways. First, education generates durable partisan effects that are visible relatively soon after exposure and persist into a person's early 50s. Second, across both the extensive and intensive margins of schooling, the political externalities of education operate through changes in social context, meaning who students live with, interact with, and learn from indirectly. In doing so, educational institutions shape political identity in an era of widening cleavages and polarization.

While this paper focuses on large public education systems, like public universities and state K-12 institutions, future work could test whether similar effects arise in settings where the social environment is structured differently, such as religious schools, identity-focused institutions, or military academies. Further work could also isolate how field of study, pedagogy, and curriculum interact with peer environments. On balance, my findings contribute to our understanding of how the extensive and intensive margins of education can have partisan externalities across settings, treatment margins, demographics, and generations.

References

- Riley Acton, Emily Cook, and Paola Ugalde Araya. Political Views and College Choices in a Polarized America, September 2025. URL <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=5498778>.
- Sule Alan, Ceren Baysan, Mert Gumren, and Elif Kubilay. Building Social Cohesion in Ethnically Mixed Schools: An Intervention on Perspective Taking*. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 136(4):2147–2194, November 2021. ISSN 0033-5533. doi: 10.1093/qje/qjab009. URL <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab009>.
- Noam Angrist, Kevin Winseck, Harry Anthony Patrinos, and Joshua Graff Zivin. Human Capital and Climate Change. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, pages 1–28, March 2024. ISSN 0034-6535. doi: 10.1162/rest_a.01444. URL https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01444.
- Brendan Apfeld, Emanuel Coman, John Gerring, and Stephen Jessee. Higher Education and Cultural Liberalism: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Romania. *The Journal of Politics*, pages 000–000, May 2022. ISSN 0022-3816. doi: 10.1086/720644. URL <https://vpn.uci.edu/+CSC0+0075676763663A2F2F6A6A6A2E77626865616E79662E68707576706E74622E727168++/doi/full/10.1086/720644>. Publisher: The University of Chicago Press.
- Richard C. Atkinson and Patricia A. Pelfrey. Rethinking Admissions: US Public Universities in the Post-Affirmative Action Age. October 2004. URL <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2w60b2x4>.
- David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, and Kaveh Majlesi. Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure. *American Economic Review*, 110(10):3139–3183, October 2020. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/aer.20170011. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20170011>.
- D’Wayne Bell, John Holbein, Samuel Imlay, and Jonathan Smith. Which Colleges Increase Voting Rates? *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2024. ISSN 1556-5068. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.4736398. URL <https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=4736398>.
- Michael C. Bender. Trump Administration Threatens to Withhold Funds From Public Schools. *The New York Times*, April 2025. ISSN 0362-4331. URL <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/03/us/politics/public-school-funding-trump-dei.html>.
- Michael C. Bender and Stephanie Saul. Trump Administration Sends Harvard a List of Demands to Protect Federal Funds. *The New York Times*, April 2025. ISSN 0362-4331. URL <https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/03/us/politics/trump-harvard-funding-demands.html>.
- Stephen B. Billings, Eric Chyn, and Kareem Haggag. The Long-Run Effects of School Racial Diversity on Political Identity. *American Economic Review: Insights*, 3(3):267–284, September 2021. doi: 10.1257/aeri.20200336. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20200336>.

- Zachary Bleemer. Affirmative action and its race-neutral alternatives. Journal of Public Economics, 220:104839, April 2023. ISSN 0047-2727. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104839. URL <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S004727272300021X>.
- Zachary Bleemer. Top Percent Policies and the Return to Postsecondary Selectivity. 2024.
- Giampaolo Bonomi, Nicola Gennaioli, and Guido Tabellini. Identity, Beliefs, and Political Conflict*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 136(4):2371–2411, November 2021. ISSN 0033-5533. doi: 10.1093/qje/qjab034. URL <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab034>.
- Luca Braghieri. Political Correctness, Social Image, and Information Transmission, 2021. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/rct.5063-1.1>.
- Sebastian Calonico, Matias D. Cattaneo, and Rocio Titiunik. Robust Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression-Discontinuity Designs. Econometrica, 82(6):2295–2326, 2014. ISSN 1468-0262. doi: 10.3982/ECTA11757. URL <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.3982/ECTA11757>. _eprint: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.3982/ECTA11757>.
- Sebastian Calonico, Matias D Cattaneo, and Max H Farrell. Optimal bandwidth choice for robust bias-corrected inference in regression discontinuity designs. The Econometrics Journal, 23(2):192–210, May 2020. ISSN 1368-4221, 1368-423X. doi: 10.1093/ectj/utz022. URL <https://academic.oup.com/ectj/article/23/2/192/5625071>.
- Colin Campbell and Jonathan Horowitz. Does College Influence Sociopolitical Attitudes? Sociology of Education, 89(1):40–58, January 2016. ISSN 0038-0407. doi: 10.1177/0038040715617224. URL <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038040715617224>. Publisher: SAGE Publications Inc.
- Davide Cantoni, Yuyu Chen, David Y. Yang, Noam Yuchtman, and Y. Jane Zhang. Curriculum and Ideology. Journal of Political Economy, 125(2):338–392, April 2017. ISSN 0022-3808. doi: 10.1086/690951. URL <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/690951>. Publisher: The University of Chicago Press.
- Enrico Cantoni and Vincent Pons. Does Context Outweigh Individual Characteristics in Driving Voting Behavior? Evidence from Relocations within the United States. American Economic Review, 112(4):1226–1272, April 2022. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/aer.20201660. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20201660>.
- Alexander W. Cappelen, Benjamin Enke, and Bertil Tungodden. Universalism: Global Evidence. American Economic Review, 115(1):43–76, January 2025. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/aer.20230038. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20230038>.
- Scott E. Carrell, Mark Hoekstra, and James E. West. The Impact of College Diversity on Behavior toward Minorities. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11(4): 159–182, November 2019. ISSN 1945-7731. doi: 10.1257/pol.20170069. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20170069>.

- Matias D. Cattaneo, Michael Jansson, and Xinwei Ma. Manipulation Testing Based on Density Discontinuity. The Stata Journal: Promoting communications on statistics and Stata, 18(1):234–261, March 2018. ISSN 1536-867X, 1536-8734. doi: 10.1177/1536867X1801800115. URL <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1536867X1801800115>.
- Matias D. Cattaneo, Michael Jansson, and Xinwei Ma. Simple Local Polynomial Density Estimators. Journal of the American Statistical Association, pages 1–7, July 2019. ISSN 0162-1459, 1537-274X. doi: 10.1080/01621459.2019.1635480. URL <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01621459.2019.1635480>.
- Charlotte Cavaille and John Marshall. Education and Anti-Immigration Attitudes: Evidence from Compulsory Schooling Reforms across Western Europe. American Political Science Review, 113(1):254–263, February 2019. ISSN 0003-0554, 1537-5943. doi: 10.1017/S0003055418000588. Publisher: Cambridge University Press.
- Jiwon Choi, Ilyana Kuziemko, Ebonya Washington, and Gavin Wright. Local Economic and Political Effects of Trade Deals: Evidence from NAFTA. American Economic Review, 114(6):1540–1575, June 2024. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/aer.20220425. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20220425>.
- Lucia Corno, Eliana La Ferrara, and Justine Burns. Interaction, Stereotypes, and Performance: Evidence from South Africa. American Economic Review, 112(12):3848–3875, December 2022. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/aer.20181805. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20181805>.
- Ernesto Dal Bo, Frederico Finan, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne. Economic and Social Outsiders but Political Insiders: Swedens Populist Radical Right. The Review of Economic Studies, 90(2):675–706, March 2023. ISSN 0034-6527. doi: 10.1093/restud/rdac037. URL <https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac037>.
- Carlos Dobkin and Fernando Ferreira. Do school entry laws affect educational attainment and labor market outcomes? Economics of Education Review, 29(1):40–54, February 2010. ISSN 0272-7757. doi: 10.1016/j.econedurev.2009.04.003. URL <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0272775709000685>.
- The Economist. Hard-right parties are now Europes most popular. The Economist, 2025. ISSN 0013-0613. URL <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2025/02/28/hard-right-parties-are-now-europes-most-popular>.
- Benjamin Enke. Moral Values and Voting. Journal of Political Economy, 128(10):3679–3729, October 2020. ISSN 0022-3808. doi: 10.1086/708857. URL <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/708857>. Publisher: The University of Chicago Press.
- Benjamin Enke, Mattias Polborn, and Alex Wu. Morals as Luxury Goods and Political Polarization. Working Paper 30001, National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2022. URL <https://www.nber.org/papers/w30001>. Series: Working Paper Series.

- Benjamin Enke, Ricardo Rodriguez-Padilla, and Florian Zimmermann. Moral Universalism and the Structure of Ideology. The Review of Economic Studies, 90(4):1934–1962, July 2023. ISSN 0034-6527, 1467-937X. doi: 10.1093/restud/rdac066. URL <https://academic.oup.com/restud/article/90/4/1934/6726197>.
- Benjamin Enke, Raymond Fisman, Luis Mota Freitas, and Steven Sun. Universalism and Political Representation: Evidence from the Field. American Economic Review: Insights, 6(2):214–229, June 2024. ISSN 2640-205X. doi: 10.1257/aeri.20230222. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20230222>.
- Frederico Finan, Enrique Seira, and Alberto Simpser. Voting with ones neighbors: Evidence from migration within Mexico. Journal of Public Economics, 202:104495, October 2021. ISSN 0047-2727. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104495. URL <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272721001316>.
- Daniel Firoozii and Igor Geyn. Do Tuition Subsidies Raise Political Participation? American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 17(4):354–378, November 2025. ISSN 1945-7731. doi: 10.1257/pol.20240422. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20240422>.
- Nicola Gennaioli and Guido Tabellini. Identity Politics. In Presidential Address. Econometric Society, 2025.
- Amory Gethin, Clara Martinez-Toledano, and Thomas Piketty. Brahmin Left Versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, (qjab036), October 2021a. ISSN 0033-5533. doi: 10.1093/qje/qjab036. URL <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab036>.
- Amory Gethin, Clara Martinez-Toledano, and Thomas Piketty, editors. Political cleavages and social inequalities: a study of fifty democracies, 1948-2020. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England, 2021b. ISBN 978-0-674-24842-7.
- Yoav Goldstein and Matan Kolerman. Changing Minds: How Academic Fields Shape Political Attitudes, March 2025. URL <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=5196889>.
- Mireille Jacobson, Maria Kogelnik, and Heather Royer. Holiday, Just One Day Out of Life: Birth Timing and Post-natal Outcomes, June 2020. URL <https://www.nber.org/papers/w27326>.
- Ethan Kaplan, Jorg L. Spenkuch, and Cody Tuttle. A Different World: Enduring Effects of School Desegregation on Ideology and Attitudes, January 2025. URL <https://www.nber.org/papers/w33365>.
- Clark Kerr, Marian L. Gade, and Maureen Kawaoka. The gold and the blue: a personal memoir of the University of California, 1949-1967, volume 2. University of California Press, Berkeley, 2001. ISBN 978-0-520-22367-7 978-0-520-23641-7.

- Herbert P. Kitschelt and Philipp Rehm. Secular Partisan Realignment in the United States: The Socioeconomic Reconfiguration of White Partisan Support since the New Deal Era. *Politics & Society*, August 2019. doi: 10.1177/0032329219861215. URL <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0032329219861215>. Publisher: SAGE Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA.
- Michal Kolesar and Christoph Rothe. Inference in Regression Discontinuity Designs with a Discrete Running Variable. *American Economic Review*, 108(8):2277–2304, August 2018. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/aer.20160945. URL <https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.20160945>.
- Ilyana Kuziemko and Ebonya Washington. Why Did the Democrats Lose the South? Bringing New Data to an Old Debate. *American Economic Review*, 108(10):2830–2867, October 2018. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/aer.20161413. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20161413>.
- Ilyana Kuziemko, Nicolas Longuet-Marx, and Suresh Naidu. Compensate the Losers? Economic Policy and Partisan Realignment in the US, October 2023. URL <https://www.nber.org/papers/w31794>.
- Sara LaLumia, James M. Sallee, and Nicholas Turner. New Evidence on Taxes and the Timing of Birth. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 7(2):258–293, May 2015. ISSN 1945-7731. doi: 10.1257/pol.20130243. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.20130243>.
- Juliana Londono-Velez. The impact of diversity on perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution. *Journal of Public Economics*, 214:104732, October 2022. ISSN 0047-2727. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2022.104732. URL <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272722001347>.
- Morgan Marietta and David C. Barker. *One Nation, Two Realities: Dueling Facts in American Democracy*. Oxford University Press New York, 1 edition, April 2019. ISBN 978-0-19-067717-6 978-0-19-067720-6. doi: 10.1093/oso/9780190677176.001.0001. URL <https://academic.oup.com/book/38739>.
- John Marshall. Education and Voting Conservative: Evidence from a Major Schooling Reform in Great Britain. *The Journal of Politics*, 78(2):382–395, April 2016. ISSN 0022-3816. doi: 10.1086/683848. URL <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/683848>. Publisher: The University of Chicago Press.
- John Marshall. The Anti-Democrat Diploma: How High School Education Decreases Support for the Democratic Party. *American Journal of Political Science*, 63(1):67–83, 2019. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/ajps.12409. URL <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12409>. [_eprint: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ajps.12409](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ajps.12409).
- Justin McCrary. Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A density test. *Journal of Econometrics*, 142(2):698–714, February 2008. ISSN

0304-4076. doi: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.005. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304407607001133>.

Justin McCrary and Heather Royer. The Effect of Female Education on Fertility and Infant Health: Evidence from School Entry Policies Using Exact Date of Birth. American Economic Review, 101(1):158–195, February 2011. ISSN 0002-8282. doi: 10.1257/aer.101.1.158. URL <https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/10.1257/aer.101.1.158>.

Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard. A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5):914–927, 1981. ISSN 0022-3808. URL <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1830813>. Publisher: University of Chicago Press.

Tali Mendelberg, Katherine T. McCabe, and Adam Thal. College Socialization and the Economic Views of Affluent Americans. American Journal of Political Science, 61(3):606–623, 2017. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/ajps.12265. URL <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12265>. .eprint: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/ajps.12265>.

Taylor Orth. Most college graduates say college makes people more liberal. Technical report, YouGov, 2022. URL <https://today.yougov.com/politics/articles/42503-most-say-college-makes-people-more-liberal>.

Kim Parker. Views of Higher Education Divided by Party, August 2019. URL <https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2019/08/19/the-growing-partisan-divide-in-views-of-higher-education-2/>.

Thomas Romer. Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax. Journal of Public Economics, 4(2):163–185, February 1975. ISSN 0047-2727. doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(75)90016-X. URL <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/004727277590016X>.

Ralph Scott. Does university make you more liberal? Estimating the within-individual effects of higher education on political values. Electoral Studies, 77:102471, June 2022. ISSN 0261-3794. doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102471. URL <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379422000312>.

Elizabeth Simon. Demystifying the link between higher education and liberal values: A within-sibship analysis of British individuals attitudes from 19942020. The British Journal of Sociology, n/a(n/a), 2022. ISSN 1468-4446. doi: 10.1111/1468-4446.12972. URL <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-4446.12972>. .eprint: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1468-4446.12972>.

Reilly Steel. The Political Transformation of Corporate America, 2001-2022, October 2024. URL <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4974868>.

Logan Strother, Spencer Piston, Ezra Golberstein, Sarah E. Gollust, and Daniel Eisenberg. College roommates have a modest but significant influence on each others political ideology. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 118(2), January 2021. ISSN 0027-8424,

1091-6490. doi: 10.1073/pnas.2015514117. URL <https://www.pnas.org/content/118/2/e2015514117>. Publisher: National Academy of Sciences Section: Social Sciences.

Andrew Van Dam. States with the worst brain drain - and more! The Washington Post, September 2022. URL <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/09/09/films-assigned-college/>.

Floyd Jiuyun Zhang. Political endorsement by Nature and trust in scientific expertise during COVID-19. Nature Human Behaviour, 7(5):696–706, May 2023. ISSN 2397-3374. doi: 10.1038/s41562-023-01537-5. URL <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-023-01537-5>. Publisher: Nature Publishing Group.

Tables

Table 1: Effects of Compulsory Schooling on Partisanship

Location	(1) All	(2) All	(3) FL	(4) FL	(5) CA	(6) CA
<i>A. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican	-0.0042** (0.0008)	-0.0037** (0.0007)	-0.0041** (0.0012)	-0.0050** (0.0011)	-0.0032** (0.0010)	-0.0028** (0.0010)
Democrat/Independent	0.0042** (0.0008)	0.0037** (0.0007)	0.0041** (0.0012)	0.0050** (0.0011)	0.0032** (0.0010)	0.0028** (0.0010)
Democrat	0.0034** (0.0009)	0.0024** (0.0008)	0.0030* (0.0012)	0.0036** (0.0012)	0.0016 (0.0012)	0.0015 (0.0012)
No Party	0.0003 (0.0008)	0.0012 (0.0008)	0.0014 (0.0012)	0.0017 (0.0012)	0.0012 (0.0010)	0.0009 (0.0010)
Third Party	0.0005 (0.0004)	0.0000 (0.0004)	-0.0003 (0.0005)	-0.0003 (0.0005)	0.0004 (0.0007)	0.0004 (0.0007)
Bandwidth	70	70	70	70	70	70
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	5,110,316	5,110,316	2,380,489	2,380,489	2,729,827	2,729,827

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate. Controls include sex, race, state of voter registration, and year of birth fixed effects.

Table 2: Effects of Compulsory Schooling on Partisanship by Generation

Generation	(1) Gen X	(2) Gen X	(3) Gen Y	(4) Gen Y	(5) Gen Z	(6) Gen Z
<i>A. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican	-0.0045* (0.0019)	-0.0047* (0.0018)	-0.0029** (0.0010)	-0.0025* (0.0010)	-0.0069** (0.0014)	-0.0056** (0.0013)
Democrat/Independent	0.0045* (0.0019)	0.0047* (0.0018)	0.0029** (0.0010)	0.0025* (0.0010)	0.0069** (0.0014)	0.0056** (0.0013)
Democrat	0.0024 (0.0020)	0.0023 (0.0020)	0.0031** (0.0011)	0.0023* (0.0011)	0.0047** (0.0016)	0.0029+ (0.0016)
No Party	0.0010 (0.0017)	0.0014 (0.0017)	-0.0003 (0.0011)	0.0006 (0.0011)	0.0014 (0.0016)	0.0022 (0.0016)
Third Party	0.0011 (0.0010)	0.0010 (0.0010)	0.0001 (0.0005)	-0.0005 (0.0005)	0.0009 (0.0008)	0.0004 (0.0008)
Bandwidth	70	70	70	70	70	70
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	951,135	951,135	2,891,260	2,891,260	1,427,996	1,427,996

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate. Generation X includes all people born between 1969 and 1980, Generation Y includes all people born between 1981 and 1995, and Generation Z includes all people born after 1995. Controls include sex, race, state of voter registration, and year of birth fixed effects.

Table 3: Effects of Compulsory Schooling on Partisanship by Sex

Sex	(1) Men	(2) Men	(3) Women	(4) Women
<i>A. Political Party Membership</i>				
Republican	-0.0050** (0.0011)	-0.0046** (0.0011)	-0.0035** (0.0010)	-0.0028** (0.0010)
Democrat/Independent	0.0050** (0.0011)	0.0046** (0.0011)	0.0035** (0.0010)	0.0028** (0.0010)
Democrat	0.0037** (0.0012)	0.0029* (0.0012)	0.0032** (0.0012)	0.0020+ (0.0012)
No Party	0.0009 (0.0012)	0.0018 (0.0012)	-0.0003 (0.0011)	0.0007 (0.0011)
Third Party	0.0004 (0.0006)	-0.0001 (0.0006)	0.0006 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0006)
Bandwidth	70	70	70	70
Polynomial	1	1	1	1
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	2,454,819	2,454,819	2,655,497	2,655,497

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate. Controls include sex, race, state of voter registration, and year of birth fixed effects.

Table 4: Effects of UC Admission Policy per Year of Expected Elite College Completion

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>						
Registered to Vote	0.0585* (0.0291)	0.0170 (0.0314)	0.0542+ (0.0299)	0.0519+ (0.0305)	0.0499 (0.0325)	0.0479 (0.0329)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0249* (0.0125)	-0.0257+ (0.0131)	-0.0261* (0.0123)	-0.0276* (0.0126)	-0.0282* (0.0139)	-0.0294* (0.0141)
Democrat/Independent	0.0689* (0.0303)	0.0579+ (0.0306)	0.0804** (0.0301)	0.0796** (0.0308)	0.0780* (0.0333)	0.0773* (0.0338)
Democratic Party	0.0376 (0.0270)	0.0205 (0.0284)	0.0425 (0.0271)	0.0425 (0.0276)	0.0358 (0.0296)	0.0356 (0.0301)
No Party Preference	0.0528* (0.0218)	0.0372+ (0.0220)	0.0483* (0.0214)	0.0477* (0.0219)	0.0463+ (0.0245)	0.0459+ (0.0249)
Third Party	-0.0104 (0.0069)	-0.0117 (0.0072)	-0.0104 (0.0069)	-0.0106 (0.0070)	-0.0041 (0.0076)	-0.0042 (0.0077)
<i>C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>						
Republican Convert	-0.0053 (0.0035)	-0.0035 (0.0039)	-0.0062+ (0.0034)	-0.0063+ (0.0035)	-0.0085* (0.0040)	-0.0085* (0.0041)
Democratic Convert	-0.0050 (0.0058)	-0.0052 (0.0063)	-0.0054 (0.0059)	-0.0059 (0.0061)	-0.0041 (0.0063)	-0.0045 (0.0065)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). Expected years of elite college enrollment refer to IPEDS estimated average years of college attended interacted with an indicator for whether or not the student enrolled at a college or university labeled “highly selective” or “elite” by Barron’s College Guide. “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the number of UC campuses to which an individual was admitted.

Table 5: ITT Effect of UC Admission Policy for Students from Low Quality HS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	No 4-yr	Select 4-yr	Elite 4-yr	Reg.	Rep.	Ind.	Dem.
<i>A. Students admitted to at least one fallback UC (N=6,850)</i>							
Treated	-0.0129 (0.0149)	-0.0956** (0.0227)	0.1086** (0.0221)	0.0160 (0.0239)	-0.0234** (0.0080)	0.0035 (0.0165)	0.0359 (0.0219)
<i>B. Students admitted to no fallback UCs (N=8,205)</i>							
Treated	-0.0526** (0.0146)	-0.0473* (0.0197)	0.0999** (0.0206)	0.0459* (0.0215)	0.0030 (0.0073)	-0.0128 (0.0147)	0.0557** (0.0200)
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Bandwidth	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. “No 4-yr” is an indicator variable for non-enrollment at any four year college or university in the United States. “Select 4-yr” and “Elite 4-yr” are indicators for enrollment at any college or university in the United States rated as selective or less and highly selective or more by Barron’s college guide. “Reg.” is an indicator for being registered to vote anywhere in the United States in 2022. “Dem.” and “Rep.” are indicator variables for registration with the Democratic and Republican party. “Ind.” reflects an indicator for being registered to vote, but not with either major party.

Table 6: Association Between Ideology of Influential People and Own Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Democrat	Republican	Social Issues	Economic Issues
Family: Moderate	-0.0408 (0.0362)	0.0190 (0.0119)	0.0561* (0.0251)	0.0903** (0.0337)
Family: Conservative	-0.1234** (0.0377)	0.0478** (0.0161)	0.1465** (0.0283)	0.2202** (0.0396)
Friends: Moderate	-0.1011** (0.0303)	0.0349* (0.0144)	0.2024** (0.0240)	0.2590** (0.0332)
Friends: Conservative	-0.2019** (0.0465)	0.1120* (0.0436)	0.3973** (0.0588)	0.4841** (0.0728)
Coworkers: Moderate	-0.0113 (0.0309)	0.0128 (0.0133)	-0.0065 (0.0229)	-0.0225 (0.0321)
Coworkers: Conservative	-0.0402 (0.0422)	0.0251 (0.0210)	0.0394 (0.0348)	0.0836+ (0.0474)
Teachers/Prof: Moderate	-0.0029 (0.0292)	-0.0393** (0.0124)	-0.0630** (0.0215)	-0.1062** (0.0301)
Teachers/Prof: Conservative	0.0062 (0.0672)	-0.0168 (0.0329)	-0.0105 (0.0514)	-0.1096+ (0.0647)
Sample Size	1,105	1,105	1,105	1,105
Controls	No	No	No	No

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. “Democrat” and “Republican” are indicator variables for registration with the respective party. “Social Issues” and “Economic Issues” are ideology indices scaled from -1 (most left-wing/progressive response to every item) to $+1$ (most right-wing/conservative response to every item). All coefficients are relative to the omitted category in which the respondent describes the relevant influence group as liberal.

Table 7: Association Between Ideology of Influential People and Own Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Democrat	Republican	Social Issues	Economic Issues
<i>A. Students who said family was most influential (N=552)</i>				
Family: Moderate	-0.1201*	0.0349*	0.1324**	0.1996**
	(0.0498)	(0.0167)	(0.0362)	(0.0484)
Family: Conservative	-0.3195**	0.1302**	0.3981**	0.5457**
	(0.0457)	(0.0282)	(0.0398)	(0.0563)
<i>B. Students who said friends were most influential (N=365)</i>				
Friends: Moderate	-0.1973**	0.0560*	0.3069**	0.3575**
	(0.0539)	(0.0275)	(0.0450)	(0.0622)
Friends: Conservative	-0.4221**	0.1424	0.7103**	0.7807**
	(0.0306)	(0.1007)	(0.1205)	(0.1690)
<i>C. Students who said coworkers were most influential (N=17)</i>				
Coworkers: Moderate	-0.2083	-0.0000	-0.1875	-0.2894
	(0.2524)	(0.0000)	(0.1992)	(0.2762)
Coworkers: Conservative	-0.0417	0.3333	0.2477	0.4514
	(0.3543)	(0.2999)	(0.2398)	(0.3474)
<i>D. Students who said teachers/profesors were most influential (N=171)</i>				
Teachers/Prof: Moderate	-0.0061	-0.0088	0.0281	0.0467
	(0.0782)	(0.0239)	(0.0581)	(0.0758)
Teachers/Prof: Conservative	0.0667	0.1730	0.0190	0.1456
	(0.2256)	(0.1811)	(0.1090)	(0.2110)
Controls	No	No	No	No

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. “Democrat” and “Republican” are indicator variables for registration with the respective party. “Social Issues” and “Economic Issues” are ideology indices scaled from -1 (most left-wing/progressive response to every item) to $+1$ (most right-wing/conservative response to every item). All coefficients are relative to the omitted category in which the respondent describes the relevant influence group as liberal. Each panel restricts the sample to just th students who identified a particular group as the most influential group on their political views.

Figures




Figure 1: McCrary Test for Compulsory Schooling Laws

Note: Birthdates are normalized relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff date for school entry.




Figure 2: Demographic Balance Test for Compulsory Schooling Laws

Note: Birthdates are normalized relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff date for school entry.




Figure 3: McCrary Test fo UC Admission Policy

Note: This figure displays density of observations across the reweighted GPA normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within a high school cohort.




Figure 4: Graphs of Predicted Voter Registration Outcomes for UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual’s high school cohort. Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.




Figure 5: RD Graphs of Compulsory Schooling Laws

Note: Birthdates are normalized relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff date for school entry.




Figure 6: RD Graphs of Voter Registration Outcomes

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual’s high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table C.1.

Online Appendices

A In-Sample Survey Appendix

A.1 Survey Descriptive Statistics




Figure A.1: Poll Respondent Ideologies and Two-Party Preference

Note: The two ideological indexes in this figure are calculated using the questions in Block 3 of the Survey in Section A.2. Index values are calculated as the average policy view on a particular set of questions with the most liberal response assigned -1, the most conservative response assigned +1, and all other responses interpolated at equidistant points. Each dot reflects a point in the two-dimensional ideology space. The darker the color of a dot, the more individuals are located at that particular point. The color gradient from blue to red reflects the proportion of individuals at a given point who say they favor the Democratic Party over the Republican Party on policy issues, with blue dots corresponding to the Democratic Party and red dots corresponding to the Republican Party. Plugging in the median response for each question from Pew Research samples of American voters yields a score of (0,0).




Figure A.2: Mean Respondent Ideology by Voter Registration Status

Note: The two ideological indexes in this figure are calculated using the questions in Block 3 of the Survey in Section A.2. Index values are calculated as the average policy view on a particular set of questions with the most liberal response assigned -1, the most conservative response assigned +1, and all other responses interpolated at equidistant points. Each dot reflects the average ideological scores of a particular voter registration group from in-sample respondents in the two-dimensional ideology space. The dots are sized roughly based on the number of respondents within the particular voter registration group. Plugging in the median response for each question from Pew Research samples of American voters yields a score of (0,0).

Table A.1: Comparison of Survey Takers and Full Sample

Demographics	Respondents	Full Sample
Female	52.2%	52.8%
Underrepresented Minority	25.2%	24.4%
Likely Cal Grant Eligible	38.1%	34.0%
First Generation Student	45.2%	45.1%
FAFSA Filer	68.9%	63.7%
Student Works Pre-College	5.1%	4.7%
Low Enrollment County	5.3%	5.6%
Low Quality High School	14.2%	14.1%
Raised by Single Parent	17.1%	15.6%
Dad's Years of Schooling	14.2 years	14.3 years
Mom's Years of Schooling	14.0 years	14.0 years
ISIR Family Income	\$77,594	\$81,476
Reported Family Income	\$88,413	\$93,056
High School GPA	3.61	3.59
Household Size	3.95	4.04
Party Registration	Respondents	Full Sample
No Registration	45.3%	48.9%
Democratic	32.1%	29.5%
No Party	15.6%	14.8%
Republican	4.8%	4.8%
Third Party	2.0%	1.7%
College Sector	Respondents	Full Sample
University of California	56.7%	52.8%
California Sate University	15.2%	15.1%
California Private	7.1%	7.2%
Out-of-State	8.0%	9.2%
2-yr or No College	12.7%	15.3%

Note: The column titled "Respondents" reflects the mean value or percentage among people who participated in my proprietary survey, which was sent to all in-sample UC applicants. The column titled "Full Sample" shows the corresponding value for all UC applicants within my sample, regardless of whether or not they participated in the survey.

Table A.2: Two-Party Policy Preference by Party Registration

Registration Status	Two-Party Preference		
	Republican	Democratic	Total %
Democratic	6.2	93.8	100.0
Non-Partisan	26.6	73.4	100.0
Not Registered	25.7	74.3	100.0
Other	21.7	78.3	100.0
Republican	77.4	22.6	100.0
N	243	862	1,105

Note: The Democratic and Republican columns reflect the proportion of survey respondents with a given voter registration status who say they favor a given major political party on policy issues. “Non-partisan” refers to individuals who are registered to vote, but are unaffiliated with a political party. “Other” refers to individuals who are registered members of third parties.

Table A.3: Ideology Scores by Party Registration

Registration Status	Mean Ideology	
	Economic	Social
Democratic	-0.595	-0.638
Non-Partisan	-0.329	-0.434
Not Registered	-0.399	-0.458
Other	-0.333	-0.536
Republican	0.192	-0.022

Note: The economic and social columns reflect the mean ideological score of survey respondents with a given voter registration status. The two ideological indexes are calculated using the questions in Block 3 of the Survey in Section A.2. Index values are calculated as the average policy view on a particular set of questions with the most liberal response assigned -1, the most conservative response assigned +1, and all other responses interpolated at equidistant points. “Non-partisan” refers to individuals who are registered to vote, but are unaffiliated with a political party. “Other” refers to individuals who are registered members of third parties.

Table A.4: Self-Reported Political Influence Ratings

College Enrollment	Mean Influence Score			
	Family	Friends	Coworkers	Educators
UC	1.91	1.86	3.46	2.77
CSU	1.66	1.96	3.57	2.80
Other CA	1.80	2.03	3.41	2.77
Other OOS	1.72	1.98	3.56	2.74
No 4 Yr	1.86	2.01	3.49	2.64
Total	1.84	1.92	3.48	2.75

Note: Each column reflects the mean self-reported influence rank respondents assign to a particular group. The most influential group is assigned the value 1, the second most influential is assigned the value 2, the third is assigned 3, and the least influential is assigned the value 4. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.5: Self-Reported Current Events Discussions with Family

College Enrollment	Discusses Current Events with Family				
	Rarely	Yearly	Monthly	Weekly	Total
UC	11.2	9.1	32.4	47.4	100.0
CSU	8.9	7.7	34.3	49.1	100.0
Other CA	11.4	5.1	32.9	50.6	100.0
Other OOS	9.0	5.6	32.6	52.8	100.0
No 4 Yr	9.2	2.8	29.8	58.2	100.0
Total	10.4	7.5	32.4	49.7	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who say they discussed current events with the stated frequency. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.6: Self-Reported Current Events Discussions in College

College Enrollment	Discussed Current Events in College				
	Rarely	Yearly	Monthly	Weekly	Total
UC	16.4	4.8	26.5	52.3	100.0
CSU	15.4	7.7	26.6	50.3	100.0
Other CA	13.9	2.5	25.3	58.2	100.0
Other OOS	13.5	4.5	14.6	67.4	100.0
No 4 Yr	15.6	5.0	19.9	59.6	100.0
Total	15.7	5.1	24.6	54.6	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who say they discussed current events with the stated frequency. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.7: Self-Reported Current Events Discussions with Friends

College Enrollment	Discusses Current Events with Friends				
	Rarely	Yearly	Monthly	Weekly	Total
UC	4.3	4.6	29.2	61.9	100.0
CSU	7.1	2.4	34.9	55.6	100.0
Other CA	1.3	10.1	29.1	59.5	100.0
Other OOS	6.7	0.0	29.2	64.0	100.0
No 4 Yr	7.1	3.5	30.5	58.9	100.0
Total	5.1	4.2	30.2	60.5	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who say they discussed current events with the stated frequency. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.8: Self-Reported College Student Housing

College Enrollment	Ever Lived with Students		
	Yes	No	Total
UC	82.8	17.2	100.0
CSU	57.4	42.6	100.0
Other CA	84.8	15.2	100.0
Other OOS	88.8	11.2	100.0
No 4 Yr	58.2	41.8	100.0
Total	76.4	23.6	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who say they have or have not ever lived in on-campus student housing or in a housing complex mostly composed of college students. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.9: Self-Reported Perceptions of Friend Ideology

College Enrollment	Perceived Friend Ideology			Total
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	
UC	63.2	31.1	5.7	100.0
CSU	54.4	36.7	8.9	100.0
Other CA	64.6	30.4	5.1	100.0
Other OOS	64.0	31.5	4.5	100.0
No 4 Yr	56.0	36.9	7.1	100.0
Total	61.1	32.7	6.2	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who would use the respective ideological label to characterize their friends. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.10: Self-Reported Perceptions of Coworker Ideology

College Enrollment	Perceived Coworker Ideology			Total
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	
UC	38.3	47.7	14.0	100.0
CSU	33.1	47.9	18.9	100.0
Other CA	40.5	39.2	20.3	100.0
Other OOS	41.6	46.1	12.4	100.0
No 4 Yr	42.6	48.2	9.2	100.0
Total	38.5	47.1	14.5	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who would use the respective ideological label to characterize their coworkers. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.11: Self-Reported Perceptions of Educator Ideology

College Enrollment	Perceived Educator Ideology			Total
	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	
UC	57.6	38.9	3.5	100.0
CSU	55.0	37.3	7.7	100.0
Other CA	50.6	44.3	5.1	100.0
Other OOS	51.7	42.7	5.6	100.0
No 4 Yr	56.0	38.3	5.7	100.0
Total	56.0	39.3	4.7	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who would use the respective ideological label to characterize their professors or teachers. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

A.2 Survey Questions

Survey Block 1

Question 1. Indicate how often you have: (Select one option in each row)

	Rarely	Yearly	Monthly	Weekly
Discussed current events with friends				
Discussed current events with family				
Discussed current events during college				
Demonstrated or volunteered for a cause				
Attended religious services				

Question 2. Rank the following groups of people based on how big of an impact you feel they had on your political views. (Drag and drop to move them. 1 means largest impact, 4 means smallest impact.)

Your Professors or Teachers

Your Friends

Your Family

Your Coworkers

Question 3. At roughly what age would you say that you developed most of your social and economic views?

Before age 18

Ages 18 to 21

Ages 21 to 24

Ages 24 to 30

After age 30

Question 4. Have you ever lived in an on-campus college dormitory or in a housing complex mostly composed of college students?

Yes

No

Question 5. If you had to choose, which party is more closely aligned with your policy views?

the Republican Party

the Democratic Party

Survey Block 2

Question 6. Compared to other Americans, would you say that members of {Unselected choice from Question 5} are more, about the same, or less... (Select one option in each row)

	More	About the Same	Less
Moral			
Open-minded			
Intelligent			

Question 7. To the best of your knowledge, which the following claims are true and which are false? (Select one option in each row)

	True	False
COVID killed over 5 times as many Americans as the flu and pneumonia last year.		
Over 95% of climate scientists agree that humans are causing global warming and climate change.		
The violent crime and murder rates were lower last year than 30 years ago.		
More than 75% of immigrants currently in the US are living in the country legally.		
Over 90% of expert economists believe gas price changes are predominantly due to market forces, not government policy.		

Question 8. Which of the following best describes the beliefs of... (Select one option in each row)

	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
Your Family			
Your Friends			
Your Coworkers			
Your Professors or Teachers			
Yourself			

Survey Block 3

Question 9. Which of the following statements comes closest to your overall view of gun laws in the United States?

Gun laws should be MORE strict than they are today

Gun laws are about right

Gun laws should be LESS strict than they are today

Question 10. Do you think abortion should be...?

Legal in all cases, no exceptions

Legal in most cases, some exceptions

Illegal in most cases, some exceptions

Illegal in all cases, no exceptions

Question 11. When it comes to transgender people which statement comes closest to your views, even if neither is exactly right?

Someone's gender can be different from the sex they were assigned at birth

Someone's gender is determined by the sex they were assigned at birth

Question 12. Which comes closest to your views about what needs to be done to ensure equal rights for all Americans regardless of their racial or ethnic backgrounds, even if none are exactly right?

Most U.S. laws and major institutions need to be completely rebuilt because they are fundamentally biased against some racial and ethnic groups

While there are many inequities in U.S. laws and institutions, necessary changes can be made by working within the current systems

Little needs to be done

Nothing at all needs to be done

Question 13. Should LEGAL immigration into the United States be...?

Increased

Kept at present level

Decreased

Question 14. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for people convicted of murder?

Strongly Favor

Somewhat Favor

Somewhat Oppose

Strongly Oppose

Question 15. Thinking about the assistance government provides to people in need, do you think the government...?

Should provide MORE assistance

Is providing about the right amount of assistance

Should provide LESS assistance

Question 16. Thinking about the country's energy supply, do you think the US should...?

Phase out the use of fossil fuels completely, relying instead on renewable sources only

Use a mix of energy sources including fossil fuels along with renewable energy sources

Question 17. Would you favor or oppose making tuition at public colleges and universities free for all American students?

Strongly Favor

Somewhat Favor

Somewhat Oppose

Strongly Oppose

Question 18. Do you think it is the responsibility of the federal government to make sure all Americans have health care coverage?

Yes, it should be provided through a single national health insurance system run by the government

Yes, it should be provided through a mix of private insurance companies and government programs

No, but government should continue programs like Medicare and Medicaid for seniors and the very poor

No, government should not be involved in providing health insurance at all

Question 19. Would you favor or oppose raising the federal minimum wage to \$15.00 an hour?

Strongly Favor

Somewhat Favor

Somewhat Oppose

Strongly Oppose

Question 20. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger government providing more services?

Bigger government, more services

Smaller government, fewer services

B Descriptives and First-Stage Appendix

B.1 Matching Procedure and Description

For reference, I match on full name and date of birth, whereas many papers in this literature match on full name but not date of birth. Empirically, the match rate is relatively high in the near-threshold UC applicant sample: roughly 53 percent of college applicants are matched to a voter registration record using full name and date of birth. There are several substantive reasons why a UC applicant would not match to a registration record even in the absence of linkage error: (1) noncitizens are ineligible to register, (2) some students move out of state or out of the country, (3) some die or are otherwise disenfranchised, and (4) a nontrivial share of eligible students simply chooses not to register (which is itself an outcome of interest in the paper). The remaining non-matches likely reflect linkage frictions like surname changes (including after marriage), other legal name changes, use of nicknames, and/or use of alternative spellings across the UC application and voter file.

In the data, Name-Date-of-Birth duplicates are exceedingly rare. Fewer than 0.5 percent of people share both a full name and birthdate with another person. In these cases, I assign one of the registration records at random to the college applicant. As a plausibility check on match rates, internal UC survey evidence indicates that roughly 70 percent of eligible students are registered to vote, while administrative records at the campus from which I use data suggest that about 18 percent of students are noncitizens. Scaling the observed match rate by eligibility yields $0.53/(1 - 0.18) \approx 0.65$, which is reasonably close to the survey-based registration benchmark, with the gap plausibly attributable to the name changes and spelling issues described above. Because the estimated treatment effects I find are larger for men than for women, and because the RD design balances pre-treatment characteristics near the threshold, I do not view imperfect matching as a major threat to the interpretation of the results, though it may reduce precision.

B.2 1st Stage

I focus on reduced-form effects, because scoring above the 96th percentile threshold impacts multiple dimensions of admission and enrollment, violating the exclusion restriction.²² I also present IV estimates using total UC admissions as the treatment to help interpret magnitudes. I view total UC admissions as a better measure of treatment than a binary variable for admission to any UC or enrollment outcomes, because of substitution between

²²It is worth noting that reduced-form effects are also preferable because the composition of a prospective student's college applications, which includes campuses outside of the UC system, is unobserved.

UC campuses and less severe exclusion restriction violations. Substitution between UC campuses matters because there are meaningful within-system differences in campus characteristics that may act as causal mechanisms. The exclusion restriction is violated for many enrollment measures because enrollment changes along multiple dimensions.²³

I begin by illustrating the impact of the UC’s top percentile policy on UC applications and admissions. The UC conferred a significant advantage to college applicants who ranked marginally above the 96th percentile of reweighted GPA. I illustrate this visually in Figure B.1 by plotting against students’ centered GPA values (1) the number of UC campuses to which they applied in gray and (2) the number of UC campuses to which students were admitted in black. Just below the threshold for eligibility, the typical student applied to roughly 4.5 and was admitted to just under 3 UC campuses. While there is a discrete jump in the number of admissions per student, there is no comparable change in the total number of UC applications.

I show the estimates for these outcomes explicitly in Table B.1, varying the inclusion of covariate controls, the order of a polynomial control for the running variable, and the bandwidth used between 0.3 GPA points and the MSE-optimal bandwidth (Calónico et al., 2020). I find consistently across specifications that there are no meaningful or statistically significant changes in UC application rates at a 90 percent confidence interval. However, there is a sizable discontinuity in UC admission rates on the order of roughly 0.4 campuses at the threshold. Although I prefer the reduced-form estimates throughout this paper, I use this admission effect as a first-stage to understand the scale of the top percentile policy’s impact.

Turning to enrollment, I demonstrate that the UC’s top percentile admission policy changes the enrollment patterns of policy-eligible students along multiple dimensions. Conferring an admission advantage at the UC increased enrollment at both the extensive margin of four-year college attendance and the intensive margin of selectivity, in part by attracting students to highly selective UC campuses from CSUs and, to a smaller degree, from less selective UCs, two-year colleges, or non-enrollment in college.

In Figure B.2, I illustrate the effect of the UC’s top percentile policy on UC application success rates, and enrollment in UCs, CSUs, private Californian colleges, out-of-state colleges, and two-year colleges or no college enrollment.²⁴ The final two panels in the figure

²³This leads the net changes I observe for any single measure of enrollment to understate the gross proportion of applicants who change their enrollment decision. The result would be both overstated IV estimates for enrollment and the potential for misattribution of the effect to one particular enrollment characteristic, when another is more consequential. Aggregate UC admissions faces an similar but less severe problem if eligibility for top percentile admission increases college application rates outside of the UC or changes the composition of UCs to which eligible students apply.

²⁴UC application success rates refer to the ratio between the number of UC campuses an applicant was

decompose four year colleges by a collapsed version of Opportunity Insights’ selectivity ratings.²⁵ I find that student enrollment rises at highly selective colleges and UCs, primarily at the expense of CSUs, less selective colleges, and non-enrollment in college. Specifically, I find a 6 percentage point increase in highly selective colleges, driven by UCs in this category, with one quarter of counterfactual enrollment coming from two-year colleges or non-enrollment, half coming from CSUs, and the final quarter coming from UCs below the “Highly Selective” category. Figure B.3 illustrates that students flow to UC campuses with higher instructional expenditures, applicant rejection rates, timely graduation rates, and median graduate earnings than counterfactual institutions. I demonstrate robustness by testing each of these intermediate outcomes across six different specifications in Tables B.2 and B.3, finding similar results across each.

admitted to and the number of UC campuses to which they applied.

²⁵Four-year colleges rated highly selective or better are categorized as “Highly Selective”, four year colleges rated selective or below are labeled “Selective”, and all other enrollment categories are grouped into “2 Year/No College”.

Table B.1: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on First Stage Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
UC Applications	-0.0088 (0.0210)	-0.0138 (0.0205)	-0.0267 (0.0198)	-0.0308 (0.0192)	0.0202 (0.0284)	0.0087 (0.0277)
UC Admissions	0.4153** (0.0277)	0.4043** (0.0268)	0.3784** (0.0216)	0.3749** (0.0207)	0.4542** (0.0309)	0.4425** (0.0298)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “UC Applications” refers to the aggregate number of UC campuses to which an applicant applied. “UC Admissions” refers to the aggregate number of UC campuses to which an applicant was admitted.

Table B.2: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Admission and Enrollment

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Admission Outcomes</i>						
UC Success Rate	0.0947** (0.0050)	0.0940** (0.0049)	0.0900** (0.0038)	0.0899** (0.0037)	0.0999** (0.0054)	0.0991** (0.0053)
<i>B. Enrollment Decomposed by Sector</i>						
UC	0.0339** (0.0075)	0.0332** (0.0073)	0.0318** (0.0068)	0.0309** (0.0065)	0.0382** (0.0098)	0.0391** (0.0094)
CSU	-0.0399** (0.0052)	-0.0391** (0.0051)	-0.0289** (0.0041)	-0.0282** (0.0041)	-0.0433** (0.0059)	-0.0422** (0.0058)
Other CA	0.0042 (0.0040)	0.0038 (0.0040)	0.0026 (0.0040)	0.0023 (0.0039)	0.0040 (0.0057)	0.0032 (0.0057)
Other OOS	0.0162** (0.0049)	0.0148** (0.0048)	0.0086* (0.0039)	0.0082* (0.0038)	0.0185** (0.0055)	0.0169** (0.0054)
2 Year/No College	-0.0147** (0.0041)	-0.0140** (0.0040)	-0.0141** (0.0036)	-0.0132** (0.0036)	-0.0174** (0.0053)	-0.0171** (0.0052)
<i>C. Four Year Enrollment Decomposed by Selectivity</i>						
Highly Selective	0.0743** (0.0085)	0.0739** (0.0082)	0.0604** (0.0064)	0.0588** (0.0062)	0.0834** (0.0093)	0.0816** (0.0089)
Selective	-0.0587** (0.0073)	-0.0572** (0.0071)	-0.0463** (0.0059)	-0.0456** (0.0058)	-0.0660** (0.0085)	-0.0645** (0.0083)
2 Year/No College	-0.0147** (0.0041)	-0.0140** (0.0040)	-0.0141** (0.0036)	-0.0132** (0.0036)	-0.0174** (0.0053)	-0.0171** (0.0052)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). The “UC Success Rate” refers to the ratio between the number of UC campuses an individual applied to and the number of UC campuses to which they were actually admitted. “Other OOS” refers to out-of-state four year colleges. “Highly Selective” refers to four year colleges classified by Opportunity Insights ratings as Highly Selective, Elite, or Ivy Plus. “Selective” refers to four year colleges classified by Opportunity Insights ratings as Selective or a lower category of selectivity.

Table B.3: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Quality and Selectivity

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Instr. Spending	2646.47** (235.59)	2594.58** (228.96)	2496.89** (184.78)	2456.31** (178.38)	2962.02** (263.99)	2898.69** (257.02)
Rejection Rate	0.0395** (0.0041)	0.0388** (0.0040)	0.0378** (0.0032)	0.0371** (0.0031)	0.0445** (0.0046)	0.0435** (0.0044)
Graduation Rate	0.0311** (0.0040)	0.0305** (0.0039)	0.0290** (0.0032)	0.0281** (0.0030)	0.0367** (0.0046)	0.0359** (0.0044)
Median Income	1997.58** (176.18)	1958.35** (169.12)	1765.27** (136.62)	1743.78** (130.32)	2242.71** (197.44)	2187.53** (189.78)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Instr. Spending” refers to average per student instructional expenditures. “Rejection Rate” refers to the fraction of applicants to a particular campus who were rejected. “Graduation Rate” refers to the proportion of first time full-time freshmen who enter a given campus who complete their intended degree within 150 percent of normative time to degree. “Median Income” in this context refers to the median post-enrollment earnings for students who attended a given campus. Data are from Opportunity Insights.




Figure B.1: RD Graph of UC Applications and Admissions

Note: Gray dots reflect the number of UC applications per student. Black dots reflect the number of UC admissions per student. Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort.




Figure B.2: RD Graphs of College Enrollment

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual’s high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table B.2.




Figure B.3: RD Graphs of College Quality

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table B.3.

C ITT, IV, and HTE Estimates Appendix

Table C.1: Intent-to-Treat Effects of UC Admission Policy on Registration and Partisanship

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>						
Registered to Vote	0.0118 (0.0078)	0.0110 (0.0078)	0.0127 ⁺ (0.0069)	0.0119 ⁺ (0.0069)	0.0158 (0.0102)	0.0148 (0.0101)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0060 ⁺ (0.0032)	-0.0061 ⁺ (0.0032)	-0.0061* (0.0029)	-0.0063* (0.0028)	-0.0089* (0.0043)	-0.0091* (0.0043)
Democrat/Independent	0.0202* (0.0080)	0.0197* (0.0079)	0.0188** (0.0069)	0.0182** (0.0069)	0.0247* (0.0103)	0.0239* (0.0102)
Democratic Party	0.0107 (0.0069)	0.0103 (0.0069)	0.0100 (0.0064)	0.0097 (0.0063)	0.0113 (0.0093)	0.0110 (0.0093)
No Party Preference	0.0097 ⁺ (0.0056)	0.0094 ⁺ (0.0056)	0.0113* (0.0049)	0.0109* (0.0049)	0.0146 ⁺ (0.0076)	0.0142 ⁺ (0.0076)
Third Party	-0.0025 (0.0016)	-0.0025 (0.0016)	-0.0024 (0.0016)	-0.0024 (0.0016)	-0.0013 (0.0024)	-0.0013 (0.0024)
<i>C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>						
Republican Convert	-0.0026** (0.0010)	-0.0025** (0.0010)	-0.0015 ⁺ (0.0008)	-0.0014 ⁺ (0.0008)	-0.0027* (0.0012)	-0.0026* (0.0012)
Democratic Convert	-0.0013 (0.0014)	-0.0014 (0.0014)	-0.0013 (0.0014)	-0.0013 (0.0014)	-0.0013 (0.0020)	-0.0014 (0.0020)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party.

Table C.2: IV Estimates of Effects on Voter Registration Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>						
Registered to Vote	0.0113 (0.0166)	0.0092 (0.0170)	0.0336 ⁺ (0.0184)	0.0317 ⁺ (0.0185)	0.0347 (0.0225)	0.0335 (0.0229)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0129 ⁺ (0.0069)	-0.0139* (0.0070)	-0.0162* (0.0075)	-0.0169* (0.0076)	-0.0196* (0.0095)	-0.0206* (0.0097)
Democrat/Independent	0.0349* (0.0173)	0.0334 ⁺ (0.0175)	0.0498** (0.0184)	0.0486** (0.0185)	0.0543* (0.0228)	0.0541* (0.0233)
Democratic Party	0.0118 (0.0154)	0.0113 (0.0156)	0.0264 (0.0167)	0.0259 (0.0168)	0.0249 (0.0206)	0.0249 (0.0210)
No Party Preference	0.0218 ⁺ (0.0120)	0.0210 ⁺ (0.0123)	0.0299* (0.0130)	0.0291* (0.0132)	0.0322 ⁺ (0.0168)	0.0321 ⁺ (0.0172)
Third Party	-0.0067 (0.0040)	-0.0067 (0.0041)	-0.0065 (0.0042)	-0.0065 (0.0043)	-0.0029 (0.0053)	-0.0029 (0.0054)
<i>C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>						
Republican Convert	-0.0018 (0.0018)	-0.0016 (0.0018)	-0.0038 ⁺ (0.0021)	-0.0038 ⁺ (0.0021)	-0.0059* (0.0028)	-0.0060* (0.0028)
Democratic Convert	-0.0025 (0.0033)	-0.0028 (0.0033)	-0.0033 (0.0037)	-0.0036 (0.0037)	-0.0029 (0.0044)	-0.0032 (0.0045)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the number of UC campuses to which an individual was admitted.

Table C.3: IV Estimates of Effects on Voter Turnout Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Turnout Rates</i>						
Ever Voted	0.0057 (0.0162)	0.0037 (0.0165)	0.0203 (0.0182)	0.0184 (0.0183)	0.0307 (0.0222)	0.0294 (0.0227)
Total Votes Cast	0.1005 (0.0764)	0.0961 (0.0782)	0.1412 (0.0895)	0.1360 (0.0903)	0.1509 (0.1104)	0.1443 (0.1127)
<i>B. Presidential and Midterm Election Votes</i>						
Presidential Votes	0.0648 (0.0541)	0.0610 (0.0554)	0.0989 (0.0626)	0.0951 (0.0632)	0.1029 (0.0767)	0.0992 (0.0783)
Midterm Votes	0.0361 (0.0283)	0.0330 (0.0289)	0.0423 (0.0320)	0.0409 (0.0322)	0.0480 (0.0401)	0.0451 (0.0410)
<i>C. General and Primary Election Votes</i>						
General Votes	0.0329 (0.0519)	0.0286 (0.0530)	0.0568 (0.0584)	0.0530 (0.0589)	0.0473 (0.0715)	0.0425 (0.0729)
Primary Votes	0.0809* (0.0338)	0.0792* (0.0345)	0.0843* (0.0378)	0.0830* (0.0381)	0.1036* (0.0468)	0.1017* (0.0479)
<i>D. Partisan Primary Turnout Rates</i>						
Republican Primaries	-0.0054 (0.0084)	-0.0064 (0.0085)	-0.0057 (0.0088)	-0.0064 (0.0089)	-0.0048 (0.0107)	-0.0057 (0.0110)
Democratic Primaries	0.0434* (0.0213)	0.0437* (0.0217)	0.0488* (0.0231)	0.0490* (0.0232)	0.0580* (0.0284)	0.0584* (0.0290)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Voted” refers to the extensive margin of ever having cast a ballot in a regularly scheduled federal election and “votes” refers to the aggregate number of ballots cast by an individual in a regularly scheduled federal election. Republican and Democratic primaries refer to the total ballots cast in partisan presidential primary elections. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the number of UC campuses to which an individual was admitted.

Table C.4: Effects of Compulsory Schooling on Partisanship by Race and Ethnicity

Race	(1) White	(2) White	(3) Minority	(4) Minority
<i>A. Political Party Membership</i>				
Republican	-0.0068** (0.0013)	-0.0062** (0.0013)	-0.0026** (0.0009)	-0.0022* (0.0009)
Democrat/Independent	0.0068** (0.0013)	0.0062** (0.0013)	0.0026** (0.0009)	0.0022* (0.0009)
Democrat	0.0055** (0.0013)	0.0047** (0.0012)	0.0021+ (0.0011)	0.0010 (0.0011)
No Party	0.0014 (0.0012)	0.0019 (0.0012)	-0.0005 (0.0011)	0.0008 (0.0010)
Third Party	-0.0002 (0.0007)	-0.0005 (0.0007)	0.0010+ (0.0005)	0.0004 (0.0005)
Bandwidth	70	70	70	70
Polynomial	1	1	1	1
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	2,112,126	2,112,126	2,998,190	2,998,190

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate. In this table “White” is defined as all registrants self-identifying as non-hispanic white, whereas all other registrants are categorized as “Minority”. Controls include sex, race, state of voter registration, and year of birth fixed effects.

Table C.5: Effects of UC Policy on Partisanship per Year of Elite College by Gender

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Self-Identify as Male or Other Gender</i>						
Registered to Vote	0.0087 (0.0473)	0.0035 (0.0501)	0.0646 (0.0463)	0.0627 (0.0475)	0.0118 (0.0521)	0.0070 (0.0520)
Republican Party	-0.0439 ⁺ (0.0242)	-0.0487 ⁺ (0.0257)	-0.0488* (0.0232)	-0.0517* (0.0239)	-0.0527* (0.0267)	-0.0547* (0.0266)
Democrat/Independent	0.0836 ⁺ (0.0465)	0.0830 ⁺ (0.0481)	0.1135* (0.0474)	0.1144* (0.0488)	0.0645 (0.0525)	0.0617 (0.0525)
Democratic Party	0.0462 (0.0448)	0.0470 (0.0466)	0.0674 (0.0441)	0.0685 (0.0453)	0.0058 (0.0475)	0.0040 (0.0475)
Independent	0.0348 (0.0403)	0.0335 (0.0428)	0.0460 (0.0385)	0.0459 (0.0397)	0.0587 (0.0446)	0.0577 (0.0447)
<i>B. Self-Identify as Female</i>						
Registered to Vote	0.0285 (0.0385)	0.0250 (0.0403)	0.0463 (0.0385)	0.0435 (0.0392)	0.0755 ⁺ (0.0414)	0.0753 ⁺ (0.0430)
Republican Party	-0.0091 (0.0139)	-0.0109 (0.0145)	-0.0105 (0.0138)	-0.0114 (0.0140)	-0.0121 (0.0151)	-0.0133 (0.0157)
Democrat/Independent	0.0421 (0.0385)	0.0398 (0.0395)	0.0568 (0.0385)	0.0549 (0.0392)	0.0876* (0.0424)	0.0886* (0.0440)
Democratic Party	0.0031 (0.0364)	0.0014 (0.0378)	0.0257 (0.0358)	0.0240 (0.0364)	0.0548 (0.0388)	0.0562 (0.0402)
Independent	0.0310 (0.0268)	0.0310 (0.0281)	0.0311 (0.0272)	0.0309 (0.0277)	0.0328 (0.0299)	0.0323 (0.0311)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the expected year of elite college education a student completes.

Table C.6: Effects of UC Policy on Partisanship per Year of Elite College by Family Income

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Students from Lower Income Families</i>						
Registered to Vote	0.0834 ⁺ (0.0476)	0.0881 ⁺ (0.0522)	0.1098* (0.0466)	0.1149* (0.0505)	0.1463* (0.0655)	0.1603* (0.0708)
Republican Party	-0.0242 (0.0156)	-0.0246 (0.0169)	-0.0170 (0.0147)	-0.0173 (0.0158)	0.0124 (0.0197)	0.0148 (0.0213)
Democrat/Independent	0.1171* (0.0485)	0.1180* (0.0513)	0.1268** (0.0468)	0.1322** (0.0507)	0.1339* (0.0643)	0.1455* (0.0692)
Democratic Party	0.0913* (0.0440)	0.0903 ⁺ (0.0469)	0.1125** (0.0428)	0.1151* (0.0457)	0.0863 (0.0580)	0.0925 (0.0617)
Independent	0.0123 (0.0325)	0.0159 (0.0355)	0.0143 (0.0319)	0.0171 (0.0344)	0.0476 (0.0440)	0.0530 (0.0474)
<i>B. Students from Higher Income Families</i>						
Registered to Vote	-0.0167 (0.0389)	-0.0218 (0.0395)	0.0221 (0.0384)	0.0171 (0.0380)	0.0136 (0.0378)	0.0065 (0.0384)
Republican Party	-0.0244 (0.0171)	-0.0271 (0.0174)	-0.0321 ⁺ (0.0169)	-0.0342* (0.0168)	-0.0435* (0.0177)	-0.0462* (0.0181)
Democrat/Independent	0.0290 (0.0377)	0.0261 (0.0379)	0.0542 (0.0385)	0.0512 (0.0380)	0.0571 (0.0385)	0.0527 (0.0391)
Democratic Party	-0.0169 (0.0357)	-0.0161 (0.0360)	0.0038 (0.0353)	0.0051 (0.0348)	0.0171 (0.0347)	0.0154 (0.0354)
Independent	0.0413 (0.0296)	0.0385 (0.0299)	0.0503 ⁺ (0.0290)	0.0462 (0.0286)	0.0400 (0.0300)	0.0372 (0.0305)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the expected year of elite college education a student completes.

Table C.7: Effects of UC Policy on Partisanship per Year of Elite College by Home County

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Students from Rural, Low College Counties</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0724 (0.0955)	-0.0969 (0.1285)	-0.0784 (0.1362)	-0.1123 (0.1851)	0.1173 (0.2004)	0.1241 (0.2163)
Democrat/Independent	0.1949 (0.2499)	0.2420 (0.3196)	0.2313 (0.2888)	0.2923 (0.3929)	-0.3392 (0.5588)	-0.3660 (0.6198)
Democratic Party	-0.0263 (0.1761)	-0.0210 (0.2128)	0.0102 (0.2186)	0.0346 (0.2687)	-0.1142 (0.3367)	-0.1654 (0.3919)
Independent	0.2033 (0.1631)	0.2513 (0.2227)	0.2211 (0.2511)	0.2577 (0.3370)	-0.2249 (0.3883)	-0.2005 (0.3894)
<i>B. Students from Urban, High College Counties</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0204 ⁺ (0.0122)	-0.0223 ⁺ (0.0127)	-0.0240* (0.0119)	-0.0249* (0.0120)	-0.0243 ⁺ (0.0129)	-0.0254 ⁺ (0.0130)
Democrat/Independent	0.0539 ⁺ (0.0295)	0.0516 ⁺ (0.0300)	0.0745* (0.0298)	0.0732* (0.0301)	0.0677* (0.0312)	0.0657* (0.0314)
Democratic Party	0.0228 (0.0274)	0.0220 (0.0282)	0.0431 (0.0269)	0.0423 (0.0271)	0.0319 (0.0281)	0.0303 (0.0282)
Independent	0.0221 (0.0227)	0.0217 (0.0235)	0.0314 (0.0218)	0.0309 (0.0221)	0.0358 (0.0238)	0.0354 (0.0240)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calónico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the expected year of elite college education a student completes.

D RD Validation Appendix

Table D.1: Balance Checks for Predicted Voter Registration Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>			
Predicted Voter Registration	0.0008 (0.0008)	0.0008 (0.0008)	0.0006 (0.0012)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>			
Predicted Republican	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0003)
Predicted Non-Republican	0.0008 (0.0007)	0.0006 (0.0007)	0.0004 (0.0010)
Predicted Democrat	0.0003 (0.0006)	0.0003 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0009)
Predicted No Party	0.0004 (0.0004)	0.0003 (0.0005)	0.0003 (0.0007)
Predicted Third Party	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)
<i>C. Midlife Conversion Between Major Parties</i>			
Predicted Republican Conversion	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0001 ⁺ (0.0000)
Predicted Democrat Conversion	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0000 (0.0000)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.

Table D.2: Balance Checks for Predicted Voter Turnout Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>A. Total Voter Turnout Rates</i>			
Predicted Voter	0.0010 (0.0008)	0.0007 (0.0008)	0.0006 (0.0012)
Predicted Votes Cast	0.0027 (0.0041)	0.0019 (0.0043)	0.0023 (0.0062)
<i>B. Presidential and Midterm Election Votes</i>			
Predicted Regular Votes	0.0017 (0.0028)	0.0013 (0.0030)	0.0012 (0.0043)
Predicted Midterm Votes	0.0007 (0.0013)	0.0005 (0.0013)	0.0011 (0.0019)
<i>C. General and Primary Election Votes</i>			
Predicted General Votes	0.0016 (0.0027)	0.0011 (0.0028)	0.0012 (0.0040)
Predicted Primary Votes	0.0011 (0.0014)	0.0007 (0.0015)	0.0012 (0.0022)
<i>D. Partisan Primary Turnout Rates</i>			
Predicted Republican Primary Votes	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0002 (0.0002)	0.0003 (0.0003)
Predicted Democratic Primary Votes	0.0002 (0.0008)	0.0002 (0.0008)	0.0002 (0.0012)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.

Table D.3: Balance Checks for Predicted Partisanship (Conditional on Registration)

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
Predicted Republican	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0001 (0.0004)	0.0002 (0.0005)
Predicted Dem/Ind	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.0002 (0.0005)
Predicted Democrat	-0.0001 (0.0010)	-0.0003 (0.0011)	-0.0004 (0.0015)
Predicted No Party	0.0002 (0.0007)	0.0002 (0.0007)	0.0003 (0.0011)
Predicted Third Party	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Results correspond to those in Table D.1, but with outcomes that are predicted using partisanship conditional on registration rather than unconditional partisanship. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.

Table D.4: Covariate Balance Checks

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	0.0024 (0.0070)	-0.0012 (0.0067)	0.0028 (0.0099)
URM	-0.0066 (0.0053)	-0.0045 (0.0056)	-0.0103 (0.0083)
Cal Grant	-0.0041 (0.0066)	-0.0030 (0.0066)	-0.0093 (0.0095)
First Generation	-0.0039 (0.0070)	-0.0022 (0.0067)	-0.0101 (0.0095)
Dad's Schooling	0.0760 ⁺ (0.0403)	0.0541 (0.0418)	0.1105 ⁺ (0.0594)
Mom's Schooling	0.0202 (0.0408)	0.0202 (0.0408)	0.0722 (0.0574)
Dad's Info Missing	0.0024 (0.0037)	0.0038 (0.0039)	-0.0016 (0.0058)
Mom's Info Missing	-0.0022 (0.0030)	-0.0020 (0.0033)	-0.0042 (0.0049)
FAFSA Filed	0.0016 (0.0057)	0.0021 (0.0061)	-0.0053 (0.0089)
Application Year	0.0127 (0.0177)	0.0190 (0.0185)	0.0300 (0.0240)
ISIR Income	1128.7592 (1065.6962)	826.7595 (1090.0484)	2124.8770 (1597.6353)
ISIR Missing	-0.0035 (0.0058)	-0.0043 (0.0062)	0.0037 (0.0090)
Self-Reported Income	986.2342 (1219.9420)	666.3863 (1159.4477)	809.9436 (1651.7142)
No Income Self-Report	-0.0002 (0.0047)	-0.0011 (0.0051)	0.0073 (0.0076)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#).

Table D.5: Covariate Balance Checks

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
Household Size	-0.0110 (0.0121)	-0.0063 (0.0130)	-0.0145 (0.0193)
Low Quality HS	-0.0011 (0.0050)	-0.0011 (0.0048)	0.0025 (0.0063)
Low Enrollment County	-0.0000 (0.0030)	0.0004 (0.0031)	-0.0027 (0.0040)
Student Worker	0.0003 (0.0013)	0.0001 (0.0013)	-0.0012 (0.0018)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#).




Figure D.1: RD Graph of Predicted Voter Turnout Outcomes

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual’s high school cohort. Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.




Figure D.2: Covariate RD Graphs

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort.




Figure D.3: Covariate RD Graphs

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual’s high school cohort.




Figure D.4: Covariate RD Graphs

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual’s high school cohort..




Figure D.5: Predicted Outcome Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given predicted outcome using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth. Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.




Figure D.6: Predicted Outcome Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given predicted outcome using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth. Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 2.




Figure D.7: Covariate Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given covariate using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth.




Figure D.8: Covariate Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given covariate using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth.




Figure D.9: Covariate Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given covariate using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth.

Table D.6: Effects of Compulsory Schooling on Partisanship

Location	(1) Rep.	(2) Rep.	(3) Ind.	(4) Ind.	(5) Dem.	(6) Dem.
Treated	-0.0041** (0.0012)	-0.0044** (0.0012)	0.0011 (0.0013)	0.0011 (0.0013)	0.0030* (0.0012)	0.0033** (0.0012)
Sample	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL	FL
Bandwidth	70	70	70	70	70	70
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	1	1
Labor Day	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No
Sample Size	2,380,489	2,380,489	2,380,489	2,380,489	2,380,489	2,380,489

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate. “Labor Day” refers to a fixed effect for being born on Labor Day.




Figure D.10: Birthdate Density around Labor Day

Note: Birthdates are normalized relative to Labor Day.




Figure D.11: Partisanship among People Born around Labor Day

Note: Birthdates are normalized relative to Labor Day.

Table D.7: Compulsory Schooling Law Demographic Balance Tests

Location	(1) Female	(2) White
Treated	-0.0004 (0.0009)	0.0007 (0.0009)
Sample	All	All
Bandwidth	70	70
Polynomial	1	1
Kernel	Uniform	Uniform
Sample Size	5,110,316	5,110,316

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate.

E Alternative Admission Policies Appendix

To complement findings from the UC’s top percentile policy, I evaluate the impact of enrollment at individual UC campuses using two more admission rules that sharply increase the selectivity of institutions that students attend. The two admission rules vary a distinct margins of treatment – the intensive margin of college selectivity – and are used to confirm the generalizability of my findings to different campuses and different near-threshold sample populations. The relevant colleges are renamed UC San Andreas and the Elite UC to preserve their anonymity per my data agreement.

Starting with the first-stage for each policy, I plot admission outcomes and enrollment choices against students normalized, reweighted GPAs in Figures E.9 for UC San Andreas and Figure E.10 for the Elite UC. In each case, being just above the GPA threshold for a campus increases the probability a student will be admitted to and enroll at the relevant campus. For UC San Andreas’s admission policy, this raises both the extensive margin of 4-year college enrollment and the average selectivity of the college a student attends proxied by the college’s applicant rejection rate and the selectivity category from Opportunity Insights. For the Elite UC’s admission policy, this raises the total number of UC campuses to which a student was admitted and the intensive margin of campus selectivity, but not the extensive margin of 4-year college enrollment. Students conferred an admission advantage to the Elite UC are more likely to enroll at UC campuses that are at least as selective as the Elite UC, at colleges with higher applicant rejection rates, and at colleges labeled highly selective or elite by Opportunity Insights.

Figures E.11 and E.12 show measures of partisanship plotted against normalized GPA for each admission policy. Enrolling at UC San Andreas reduces the share of students who are registered Republicans and increases the share who are independents with no party affiliation. Enrollment at the Elite UC also reduces the share of students who eventually register as Republicans and increases the share who are independents with no party preference. Notably, attending the Elite UC also reduces the share of students who switch between major parties in either direction, with larger reductions in Democratic to Republican switches. Tables E.1 and E.2 estimate results formally using the same set of outcomes as Table C.1, testing for robustness to different specifications that vary the bandwidth used for inference, the inclusion of pre-treatment covariate controls, and the order of a polynomial control for the running variable.

Overall, these two RD designs provide evidence that corroborate my main findings for UC admission from the ELC policy. In each case, UC campuses raise the selectivity of the college at which a student ultimately enrolls, shifting those same students away from

Republican Party registration and toward registration as either independents or Democrats. Effects appear to grow rather than shrink over a longer time window. The fact that these policies generate variation in admission to different campuses illustrates that these effects are not an artifact of a single campus within the UC system. Moreover, the use of near-threshold sample populations from different points of the GPA distribution with alternative less-selective counterfactual enrollment choices underscores the generalizability of my findings to a broader set of college applicants on different treatment margins.




Figure E.1: McCrary Test for UC San Andreas Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for UC San Andreas.




Figure E.2: Covariate RD Graphs for UC San Andreas Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for UC San Andreas.




Figure E.3: Covariate RD Graphs for UC San Andreas Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for UC San Andreas.




Figure E.4: Covariate RD Graphs for UC San Andreas Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for UC San Andreas.




Figure E.5: McCrary Test for Elite UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for the Elite UC.




Figure E.6: Covariate RD Graphs for Elite UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for Elite UC.




Figure E.7: Covariate RD Graphs for Elite UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for Elite UC.




Figure E.8: Covariate RD Graphs for Elite UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for Elite UC.




Figure E.9: RD Graphs of College Enrollment for UC San Andreas Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for UC San Andreas. The outcome UCSA Admission refers to a binary variable for admission to UC San Andreas. UCSA enrollment likewise refers to enrollment at UC San Andreas. College Rejection Rate refers to the proportion of college applicants that were rejected by the college at which a student enrolled, with this outcome set to zero of open access institutions and non-enrollment in college. Highly Selective College refers to a binary indicator for enrollment at any 4-year college rated as Highly Selective, Elite or Ivy-Plus by Opportunity Insights. Selective College refers to a binary indicator for enrollment at any 4-year college rated as Selective or Non-selective by Opportunity Insights. No College/2-Year refers to enrollment at 2-year colleges, community colleges, online colleges, or not having any college enrollment record.




Figure E.10: RD Graphs of College Enrollment for Elite UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for Elite UC. The outcome Total UC Admissions refers to the total number of UC campuses to which a student was admitted. Elite UC enrollment refers to a binary indicator for enrollment at the Elite UC campus or any campus that is more selective than the Elite UC. College Rejection Rate refers to the proportion of college applicants that were rejected by the college at which a student enrolled, with this outcome set to zero of open access institutions and non-enrollment in college. Highly Selective College refers to a binary indicator for enrollment at any 4-year college rated as Highly Selective, Elite or Ivy-Plus by Opportunity Insights. Selective College refers to a binary indicator for enrollment at any 4-year college rated as Selective or Non-selective by Opportunity Insights. No College/2-Year refers to enrollment at 2-year colleges, community colleges, online colleges, or not having any college enrollment record.




Figure E.11: RD Graphs of Voter Registration Outcomes for UC San Andreas Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for UC San Andreas. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table E.1.




Figure E.12: RD Graphs of Voter Registration Outcomes for Elite UC Policy

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the admission cutoff for Elite UC. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table E.2.

Table E.1: Effects of UC San Andreas Admission Policy on Registration and Partisanship

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>						
Registered to Vote	-0.0073 (0.0078)	-0.0093 (0.0077)	-0.0040 (0.0069)	-0.0063 (0.0068)	-0.0068 (0.0106)	-0.0084 (0.0105)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0073* (0.0029)	-0.0073* (0.0028)	-0.0069* (0.0030)	-0.0069* (0.0029)	-0.0074 (0.0045)	-0.0077+ (0.0045)
Democrat/Independent	0.0010 (0.0078)	-0.0010 (0.0077)	0.0030 (0.0068)	0.0007 (0.0068)	0.0007 (0.0105)	-0.0007 (0.0105)
Democratic Party	-0.0032 (0.0075)	-0.0044 (0.0074)	-0.0058 (0.0062)	-0.0072 (0.0062)	-0.0045 (0.0096)	-0.0050 (0.0095)
No Party Preference	0.0106* (0.0044)	0.0096* (0.0044)	0.0072 (0.0048)	0.0064 (0.0048)	0.0022 (0.0075)	0.0013 (0.0074)
Third Party	0.0010 (0.0020)	0.0010 (0.0020)	0.0015 (0.0019)	0.0015 (0.0019)	0.0030 (0.0029)	0.0029 (0.0029)
<i>C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>						
Republican Convert	-0.0002 (0.0009)	-0.0002 (0.0009)	0.0001 (0.0009)	0.0001 (0.0009)	0.0009 (0.0014)	0.0010 (0.0014)
Democratic Convert	0.0009 (0.0014)	0.0009 (0.0014)	0.0001 (0.0013)	-0.0000 (0.0013)	0.0025 (0.0020)	0.0024 (0.0020)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	85,482	85,482	85,482	85,482

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party.

Table E.2: Effects of Elite UC Admission Policy on Registration and Partisanship

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>						
Registered to Vote	-0.0017 (0.0119)	-0.0007 (0.0119)	0.0116 (0.0090)	0.0089 (0.0090)	-0.0007 (0.0137)	0.0026 (0.0136)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0082 ⁺ (0.0043)	-0.0076 ⁺ (0.0043)	-0.0077* (0.0036)	-0.0073* (0.0036)	-0.0112* (0.0055)	-0.0101 ⁺ (0.0055)
Democrat/Independent	0.0073 (0.0119)	0.0072 (0.0119)	0.0193* (0.0091)	0.0162 ⁺ (0.0091)	0.0104 (0.0137)	0.0127 (0.0137)
Democratic Party	-0.0065 (0.0113)	-0.0065 (0.0112)	0.0088 (0.0085)	0.0063 (0.0085)	-0.0060 (0.0129)	-0.0041 (0.0129)
No Party Preference	0.0174* (0.0087)	0.0170* (0.0087)	0.0133* (0.0066)	0.0125 ⁺ (0.0066)	0.0191 ⁺ (0.0100)	0.0194 ⁺ (0.0100)
Third Party	-0.0036 (0.0028)	-0.0034 (0.0028)	-0.0028 (0.0020)	-0.0027 (0.0020)	-0.0027 (0.0032)	-0.0025 (0.0032)
<i>C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>						
Republican Convert	-0.0026* (0.0012)	-0.0026* (0.0012)	-0.0017 ⁺ (0.0009)	-0.0017 ⁺ (0.0009)	-0.0031* (0.0015)	-0.0031* (0.0015)
Democratic Convert	-0.0069** (0.0026)	-0.0063* (0.0026)	-0.0056** (0.0018)	-0.0058** (0.0018)	-0.0066* (0.0029)	-0.0061* (0.0029)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	49,201	49,201	49,201	49,201

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party.

F Robustness Test and External Validity Appendix

Table F.1: Effects of UC Top Percent Policy on Partisanship (Conditional on Registration)

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican Party	-0.0146* (0.0059)	-0.0142* (0.0059)	-0.0133** (0.0052)	-0.0130* (0.0051)	-0.0187* (0.0078)	-0.0181* (0.0077)
Democrat/Independent	0.0146* (0.0059)	0.0142* (0.0059)	0.0133** (0.0052)	0.0130* (0.0051)	0.0187* (0.0078)	0.0181* (0.0077)
Democratic Party	0.0055 (0.0089)	0.0057 (0.0088)	0.0042 (0.0089)	0.0042 (0.0088)	0.0032 (0.0135)	0.0023 (0.0133)
No Party Preference	0.0125 (0.0089)	0.0122 (0.0089)	0.0143+ (0.0083)	0.0138+ (0.0083)	0.0186 (0.0126)	0.0187 (0.0126)
Third Party	-0.0055+ (0.0029)	-0.0053+ (0.0029)	-0.0051+ (0.0029)	-0.0051+ (0.0029)	-0.0031 (0.0044)	-0.0028 (0.0044)
<i>B. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>						
Republican Convert	-0.0048** (0.0018)	-0.0048** (0.0018)	-0.0028+ (0.0015)	-0.0028+ (0.0015)	-0.0051* (0.0023)	-0.0050* (0.0023)
Democratic Convert	-0.0026 (0.0026)	-0.0026 (0.0026)	-0.0028 (0.0025)	-0.0028 (0.0025)	-0.0029 (0.0037)	-0.0030 (0.0037)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	42,108	42,108	42,108	42,108

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Democrat/Independent” refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party.

Table F.2: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Voter Registration Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>A. Total Voter Registration Rate</i>				
Registered to Vote	0.0126 ⁺ (0.0070)	0.0124 ⁺ (0.0070)	0.0135 (0.0103)	0.0138 (0.0102)
<i>B. Political Party Membership</i>				
Republican Party	-0.0063* (0.0029)	-0.0063* (0.0029)	-0.0084 ⁺ (0.0043)	-0.0083 ⁺ (0.0043)
Democrat/Independent	0.0189** (0.0070)	0.0188** (0.0070)	0.0219* (0.0103)	0.0220* (0.0103)
Democratic Party	0.0099 (0.0064)	0.0098 (0.0064)	0.0118 (0.0094)	0.0116 (0.0094)
No Party Preference	0.0108* (0.0050)	0.0108* (0.0050)	0.0108 (0.0077)	0.0112 (0.0076)
Third Party	-0.0018 (0.0016)	-0.0018 (0.0016)	-0.0007 (0.0024)	-0.0008 (0.0024)
<i>C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties</i>				
Republican Convert	-0.0010 (0.0008)	-0.0011 (0.0008)	-0.0023 ⁺ (0.0012)	-0.0024* (0.0012)
Democratic Convert	-0.0015 (0.0014)	-0.0015 (0.0014)	-0.0016 (0.0020)	-0.0015 (0.0020)
Bandwidth	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
HS-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample Size	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). These outcomes correspond to those in [Table C.1](#).

Table F.3: Effects on Party Registration with Bias-Corrected CIs

Outcome	(1)	(2)
<i>Voter Registration</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0140 (0.0085)	0.0131 (0.0084)
Robust 95% CI	[-.003 ; .036]	[-.004 ; .035]
Robust p-value	0.096	0.113
<i>Republican Party</i>		
RD_Estimate	-0.0082* (0.0034)	-0.0083* (0.0034)
Robust 95% CI	[-.017 ; -.001]	[-.017 ; -.002]
Robust p-value	0.021	0.018
<i>Democrat/Independent</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0228** (0.0088)	0.0222* (0.0087)
Robust 95% CI	[.005 ; .046]	[.005 ; .045]
Robust p-value	0.015	0.017
<i>Democratic Party</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0099 (0.0077)	0.0098 (0.0077)
Robust 95% CI	[-.006 ; .03]	[-.006 ; .03]
Robust p-value	0.181	0.181
<i>No Party Preference</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0138* (0.0061)	0.0133* (0.0061)
Robust 95% CI	[.002 ; .03]	[.001 ; .029]
Robust p-value	0.027	0.032
<i>Third Party</i>		
RD_Estimate	-0.0019 (0.0017)	-0.0019 (0.0018)
Robust 95% CI	[-.006 ; .002]	[-.006 ; .002]
Robust p-value	0.369	0.385
<i>Republican Convert</i>		
RD_Estimate	-0.0026* (0.0011)	-0.0026* (0.0011)
Robust 95% CI	[-.005 ; -.001]	[-.005 ; -.001]
Robust p-value	0.015	0.017
<i>Democratic Convert</i>		
RD_Estimate	-0.0013 (0.0015)	-0.0014 (0.0015)
Robust 95% CI	[-.005 ; .002]	[-.005 ; .002]
Robust p-value	0.432	0.404
Bandwidth	MSE-Optimal	MSE-Optimal
Polynomial	1	1
Covariates	No	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Each row titled “RD Estimate” shows the conventional point estimate and standard errors in parentheses for a given outcome variable. These are calculated using a triangular kernel at the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). The rows “Robust 95% CI” and “Robust p-value” show the bias-corrected confidence interval and the bias-corrected p-value for the same outcome variable ([Calonico et al., 2014](#)). These outcomes correspond to those in [Table C.1](#).

Table F.4: Effects on Party Registration with Honest CIs

Outcome	(1)	(2)
<i>Voter Registration</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0140 (0.0075)	0.0139 (0.0074)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0022; .0284]	[-.0025; .0303]
Robust 90% CI	[.0001; .0278]	[.0000; .0277]
<i>Republican Party</i>		
RD Estimate	-0.0076 (0.0032)	-0.0072 (0.0030)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0147; -.0005]	[-.0143; -.0001]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0136; -.0017]	[-.0132; -.0011]
<i>Democrat/Independent</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0213 (0.0076)	0.0211 (0.0074)
Robust 95% CI	[.0049; .0378]	[.0046; .0376]
Robust 90% CI	[.0074; .0352]	[.0072; .0350]
<i>Democratic Party</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0101 (0.0068)	0.0105 (0.0069)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0044; .0248]	[-.0042; .0252]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0021; .0225]	[-.0019; .0229]
<i>No Party Preference</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0128 (0.0055)	0.0126 (0.0054)
Robust 95% CI	[.0009; .0247]	[.0008; .0245]
Robust 90% CI	[.0028; .0228]	[.0026; .0226]
<i>Third Party</i>		
RD Estimate	-0.0013 (0.0020)	-0.0020 (0.0017)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0058; .0032]	[-.0069; .0029]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0051; .0025]	[-.0062; .0023]
<i>Republican Convert</i>		
RD Estimate	-0.0024 (0.0010)	-0.0019 (0.0009)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0046; -.0002]	[-.0042; .0004]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0043; -.0006]	[-.0038; .0000]
<i>Democratic Convert</i>		
RD Estimate	-0.0012 (0.0015)	-0.0013 (0.0015)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0046; .0020]	[-.0046; .0020]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0040; .0015]	[-.0040; .0015]
Bandwidth	MSE-Optimal	0.3
Polynomial	1	1

Note: Each row titled “RD Estimate” shows the point estimate and standard errors in parentheses for a given outcome variable using a triangular kernel and the bounded seconded derivative method (Kolesar and Rothe, 2018). The rows “Robust 95% CI” and “Robust 90% CI” show the honest confidence intervals for the same outcome variable. These outcomes correspond to those in Table C.1.




Figure F.1: Registered

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.2: Republican

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.3: Democrat or Independent

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.4: Democrat

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.5: No Party Preference

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.6: Third Party

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.7: Democratic Conversion

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure F.8: Republican Conversion

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.

Table F.5: Effects of Compulsory Schooling on Partisanship

Location	(1) All	(2) All	(3) FL	(4) FL	(5) CA	(6) CA
<i>A. Political Party Membership</i>						
Republican	-0.0044** (0.0012)	-0.0048** (0.0011)	-0.0027 (0.0018)	-0.0038* (0.0017)	-0.0058** (0.0015)	-0.0058** (0.0015)
Democrat/Independent	0.0044** (0.0012)	0.0048** (0.0011)	0.0027 (0.0018)	0.0038* (0.0017)	0.0058** (0.0015)	0.0058** (0.0015)
Democrat	0.0028* (0.0013)	0.0032* (0.0013)	0.0017 (0.0018)	0.0025 (0.0018)	0.0036* (0.0018)	0.0038* (0.0018)
No Party	0.0011 (0.0012)	0.0012 (0.0012)	0.0014 (0.0019)	0.0017 (0.0018)	0.0011 (0.0016)	0.0008 (0.0016)
Third Party	0.0004 (0.0006)	0.0004 (0.0006)	-0.0004 (0.0007)	-0.0004 (0.0007)	0.0011 (0.0010)	0.0012 (0.0010)
Bandwidth	70	70	70	70	70	70
Polynomial	2	2	2	2	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	5,110,316	5,110,316	2,380,489	2,380,489	2,729,827	2,729,827

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past had another party registration status. Controls include sex, state of voter registration, and year of birth fixed effects.




Figure F.9: Robustness of CSL Results by Bandwidth

Note: Treatment effects for each respective outcome variable are shown at each bandwidth, measured in days, on the horizontal axis.

Table F.6: Placebo Test of Compulsory Schooling among Naturalized Immigrants

	(1)	(2)
Location	CA	CA
Republican	-0.0001 (0.0015)	0.0005 (0.0015)
Democrat/Independent	0.0001 (0.0015)	-0.0005 (0.0015)
Democrat	-0.0009 (0.0018)	-0.0008 (0.0018)
No Party	0.0013 (0.0016)	0.0008 (0.0016)
Third Party	-0.0003 (0.0007)	-0.0005 (0.0007)
Bandwidth	70	70
Polynomial	1	1
Controls	No	Yes
Sample Size	1,281,463	1,281,463

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Bandwidths are measured in days relative to the compulsory schooling law cutoff birthdate. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past had another party registration status. Controls include sex, state of voter registration, and year of birth fixed effects. The immigrant indicator includes individuals whose place of birth includes the following countries or regions: Mexico, Philippines, Vietnam, China, India, Korea, El Salvador, Iran, Taiwan, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Germany, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Peru, Thailand, Pakistan, Russia, Nicaragua, Armenia, and Ukraine, as well as any entries containing the term “Foreign-Born”. These national origins collectively represent all foreign born entries in voter’s place of birth field that appear for more than 0.25 percent of the sample of registered Californian voters who were not born in California but were born within 70 days of the CSL cutoff.

G Falsification Test Appendix




Figure G.1: Republican

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsification tests described in Section 3.2.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.




Figure G.2: Democrat or Independent

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsification tests described in Section 3.2.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.




Figure G.3: Republican Conversion

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsification tests described in Section 3.2.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.

H Mechanisms Appendix

Table H.1: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Student Characteristics

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality</i>						
White	-0.0090** (0.0024)	-0.0093** (0.0024)	-0.0075** (0.0022)	-0.0077** (0.0021)	-0.0092** (0.0031)	-0.0100** (0.0031)
Asian	0.0150** (0.0027)	0.0152** (0.0026)	0.0110** (0.0022)	0.0110** (0.0022)	0.0173** (0.0032)	0.0179** (0.0031)
Black	0.0007 (0.0005)	0.0007 (0.0004)	0.0008 ⁺ (0.0004)	0.0008 ⁺ (0.0004)	0.0002 (0.0006)	0.0002 (0.0006)
Hispanic	-0.0102** (0.0012)	-0.0098** (0.0012)	-0.0062** (0.0009)	-0.0060** (0.0008)	-0.0111** (0.0012)	-0.0106** (0.0012)
International	0.0024** (0.0004)	0.0023** (0.0003)	0.0020** (0.0003)	0.0020** (0.0003)	0.0027** (0.0004)	0.0026** (0.0004)
<i>B. Peer Family Income</i>						
Median Income	2958.64** (379.12)	2830.96** (356.97)	2708.18** (329.26)	2653.35** (307.64)	3516.16** (468.53)	3324.75** (444.65)
Bottom 80 Percent	-0.0133** (0.0017)	-0.0127** (0.0016)	-0.0121** (0.0014)	-0.0118** (0.0014)	-0.0161** (0.0021)	-0.0152** (0.0020)
Top 5 Percent	0.0134** (0.0014)	0.0128** (0.0013)	0.0120** (0.0012)	0.0118** (0.0011)	0.0151** (0.0017)	0.0143** (0.0016)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Median Income” in this context refers to the median family income of peers at a given campus. “Bottom 80 Percent” and “Top 5 Percent” refer to the fraction of students at a given campus who hail from families within a given range of the household income distribution within the United States. Data are from Opportunity Insights.

Table H.2: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Imputed Peer Ideology

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Self-Reported Freshman Ideology</i>						
Far-Right Peers	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0003** (0.0001)	-0.0004** (0.0001)	-0.0004** (0.0001)
Conservative Peers	-0.0007 (0.0005)	-0.0007 (0.0005)	-0.0008+ (0.0005)	-0.0008+ (0.0005)	-0.0007 (0.0007)	-0.0008 (0.0007)
Moderate Peers	-0.0035** (0.0005)	-0.0034** (0.0005)	-0.0030** (0.0004)	-0.0029** (0.0004)	-0.0041** (0.0006)	-0.0040** (0.0005)
Liberal Peers	0.0045** (0.0007)	0.0045** (0.0007)	0.0040** (0.0006)	0.0039** (0.0006)	0.0050** (0.0009)	0.0050** (0.0009)
Far-Left Peers	0.0001+ (0.0000)	0.0001+ (0.0000)	0.0001 (0.0000)	0.0001 (0.0000)	0.0001* (0.0001)	0.0001* (0.0001)
<i>B. GOP Share of Institution's Graduates</i>						
GOP Graduate Share	-0.0053** (0.0007)	-0.0053** (0.0007)	-0.0051** (0.0006)	-0.0051** (0.0006)	-0.0058** (0.0009)	-0.0057** (0.0009)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “GOP Share” refers to the share of registered voters from my sample who attended a given institution that are a member of the Republican Party in 2021. Data on other outcomes are imputed from UCLA’s HERI surveys using the method described in Section 4.

Table H.3: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Imputed Peer Religion

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Self-Reported Freshman Religion</i>						
Protestant Peers	-0.0030** (0.0008)	-0.0030** (0.0008)	-0.0028** (0.0007)	-0.0028** (0.0007)	-0.0031** (0.0010)	-0.0032** (0.0010)
Catholic Peers	-0.0037** (0.0007)	-0.0036** (0.0007)	-0.0035** (0.0006)	-0.0033** (0.0006)	-0.0043** (0.0009)	-0.0043** (0.0009)
Jewish Peers	0.0022** (0.0003)	0.0021** (0.0002)	0.0017** (0.0002)	0.0016** (0.0002)	0.0023** (0.0003)	0.0023** (0.0003)
Other Peers	0.0013** (0.0004)	0.0013** (0.0004)	0.0013** (0.0004)	0.0013** (0.0003)	0.0014** (0.0005)	0.0015** (0.0005)
No Religion Peers	0.0034** (0.0008)	0.0034** (0.0007)	0.0033** (0.0007)	0.0032** (0.0007)	0.0037** (0.0010)	0.0038** (0.0010)
<i>B. Aggregate Self-Reported Christians</i>						
Christian Peers	-0.0067** (0.0013)	-0.0065** (0.0012)	-0.0063** (0.0011)	-0.0061** (0.0011)	-0.0074** (0.0016)	-0.0075** (0.0016)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Christian Peers” is a simple aggregation of the share of peers who self identify as Catholic or Protestant. Data are imputed from UCLA’s HERI surveys using the method described in Section 4.

Table H.4: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Imputed Faculty Ideology

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Self-Reported Faculty Ideology</i>						
Far-Right Faculty	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)	-0.0000 (0.0000)
Conservative Faculty	-0.0041** (0.0006)	-0.0041** (0.0006)	-0.0037** (0.0006)	-0.0037** (0.0006)	-0.0047** (0.0008)	-0.0047** (0.0008)
Moderate Faculty	-0.0023** (0.0004)	-0.0023** (0.0004)	-0.0019** (0.0003)	-0.0019** (0.0003)	-0.0026** (0.0005)	-0.0026** (0.0005)
Liberal Faculty	0.0050** (0.0008)	0.0050** (0.0007)	0.0043** (0.0007)	0.0043** (0.0006)	0.0057** (0.0009)	0.0057** (0.0009)
Far-Left Faculty	0.0014** (0.0003)	0.0014** (0.0002)	0.0013** (0.0002)	0.0013** (0.0002)	0.0017** (0.0003)	0.0017** (0.0003)
<i>B. Aggregate Left-Liberal Faculty</i>						
Left-Liberal Faculty	0.0063** (0.0010)	0.0062** (0.0010)	0.0056** (0.0009)	0.0056** (0.0009)	0.0073** (0.0013)	0.0074** (0.0012)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Left-Liberal Faculty” is a simple aggregation of the share of faculty who self-identify as liberal or far-left. Data are imputed from UCLA’s HERI surveys using the method described in Section 4.

Table H.5: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Neighborhood Choice

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Census Block Characteristics</i>						
Median Education	0.0358 (0.0338)	0.0383 (0.0288)	-0.0090 (0.0297)	0.0031 (0.0250)	0.0953* (0.0421)	0.0848* (0.0355)
Median Income	157.39 (1185.33)	238.76 (1036.12)	-1156.06 (1041.74)	-709.47 (902.25)	2152.28 (1510.40)	1716.07 (1317.17)
<i>B. Local Partisanship</i>						
Republican Neighbors	0.0002 (0.0021)	0.0006 (0.0021)	0.0003 (0.0021)	0.0006 (0.0021)	-0.0019 (0.0031)	-0.0015 (0.0030)
Democratic Neighbors	0.0009 (0.0022)	0.0007 (0.0021)	0.0004 (0.0021)	0.0001 (0.0021)	0.0019 (0.0031)	0.0018 (0.0031)
No Party Neighbors	0.0001 (0.0009)	-0.0001 (0.0009)	-0.0007 (0.0008)	-0.0008 (0.0008)	0.0008 (0.0011)	0.0005 (0.0011)
Third Party Neighbors	-0.0005 (0.0003)	-0.0005 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.0000 (0.0003)	-0.0009* (0.0004)	-0.0008* (0.0004)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	Varies	Varies	Varies	Varies

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Median Education” refers to the median years of schooling within a Californian registrant’s census block. “Median Income” refers to the estimated median household income within a Californian registrant’s census block. “Neighbors” refer to the respective proportion of registered voters with a given party registration status within a Californian registrant’s local area. Data are from L2’s VM2 California voter file.




Figure H.1: RD Graphs of Peer Characteristics

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual’s high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table H.1.




Figure H.2: RD Graphs of Imputed Peer Ideology

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual’s high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table H.2.




Figure H.3: RD Graphs of Imputed Peer Religion

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table H.3.




Figure H.4: RD Graphs of Imputed Faculty Ideology

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual’s high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table H.4.




Figure H.5: RD Graphs of Neighborhood Characteristics

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual’s high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table H.5.

I Voter Turnout Appendix

Given the UC’s observed impact on partisanship and extant research on the civic externalities of education, it is important to test the university system’s effects on voter turnout (Firoozi and Geyn, 2025). Starting with Figure I.1, I plot eight different measures of voter turnout. First, I show the extensive margin of ever having participated in a regular election and a measure of the total ballots a student cast in regular elections.²⁶ Next, I decompose the total number of ballots a student cast between 2012 and 2020 by whether they were cast in a presidential or midterm election cycle as well as by whether they were cast in a primary or general election. Finally, the bottom two panels illustrate the number of ballots cast in Republican and Democratic presidential primaries between 2012 and 2020. I find clear visual evidence of an increase in primary ballots cast, particularly in Democratic presidential primaries, and note noisy, positive increases in all other margins of voter turnout beside Republican primary participation.

Table I.1 reflects the results for each of the eight voter turnout outcomes in the preceding figure. Following the same order, Panel A highlights total election participation, Panel B decomposes the number of ballots cast between 2012 and 2020 by the type of election cycle, Panel C decomposes the number of ballots cast by whether they were a primary or general election, and Panel D closes out the table with the number of ballots cast in Republican and Democratic presidential primaries. Each column represents a different specification, varying the RDD bandwidth, inclusion of covariate controls, and the order of a polynomial control for the running variable. Consistent with the visual evidence of discontinuities in Figure I.1, I find that the UC’s top percentile policy increases the number of ballots students eventually cast in primary elections by roughly 0.07 to 0.11 votes for each additional UC admission, with most of the effect accruing to Democratic presidential primaries (see Table C.3). Estimates of turnout effects in other elections are positive, with the exception of Republican presidential primaries, but too imprecisely identified to distinguish from zero.

For robustness checks and falsification tests I repeat the procedures used in Section 3.2.2. Tables I.2 through I.4 reflect my main estimates for these outcomes using bias-aware confidence intervals and with high dimensional high school-year fixed effects (Calonico et al., 2014; Kolesar and Rothe, 2018). I also demonstrate the robustness of my point estimates across the full range of potential bandwidths, varying both the order of a polynomial control for the running variable and the inclusion of covariate controls in Appendix Figures I.2 through I.9. For most outcomes, point estimates are fairly stable across bandwidth and

²⁶Regular elections in this context refers to all elections coinciding with primary or general elections for federal offices, excluding special elections.

specification but are less consistent than those of registration outcomes. I also reproduce the “synthetic threshold” falsification test for primary election ballots and Democratic presidential primaries in Appendix Figures [I.10](#) and [I.11](#), finding that 4 out of 8 specifications exceed the 95th percentile of synthetic t-statistics at other thresholds and all specifications exceed the 90th percentile of synthetic t-statistics.

Table I.1: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Voter Turnout Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>A. Total Voter Turnout Rates</i>						
Ever Voted	0.0088 (0.0077)	0.0079 (0.0076)	0.0077 (0.0069)	0.0069 (0.0069)	0.0140 (0.0101)	0.0130 (0.0100)
Total Votes Cast	0.0445 (0.0328)	0.0410 (0.0328)	0.0534 (0.0339)	0.0510 (0.0338)	0.0685 (0.0500)	0.0638 (0.0498)
<i>B. Presidential and Midterm Election Votes</i>						
Presidential Votes	0.0259 (0.0220)	0.0234 (0.0220)	0.0374 (0.0237)	0.0356 (0.0237)	0.0467 (0.0348)	0.0439 (0.0346)
Midterm Votes	0.0160 (0.0121)	0.0153 (0.0121)	0.0160 (0.0121)	0.0153 (0.0121)	0.0218 (0.0182)	0.0200 (0.0181)
<i>C. General and Primary Election Votes</i>						
General Votes	0.0074 (0.0207)	0.0047 (0.0206)	0.0215 (0.0221)	0.0199 (0.0221)	0.0215 (0.0325)	0.0188 (0.0323)
Primary Votes	0.0319* (0.0143)	0.0311* (0.0143)	0.0319* (0.0143)	0.0311* (0.0143)	0.0470* (0.0210)	0.0450* (0.0210)
<i>D. Partisan Primary Turnout Rates</i>						
Republican Primaries	-0.0032 (0.0034)	-0.0034 (0.0034)	-0.0021 (0.0033)	-0.0024 (0.0033)	-0.0022 (0.0049)	-0.0025 (0.0049)
Democratic Primaries	0.0170* (0.0084)	0.0168* (0.0083)	0.0185* (0.0087)	0.0184* (0.0087)	0.0263* (0.0128)	0.0258* (0.0128)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). “Voted” refers to the extensive margin of ever having cast a ballot in a regularly scheduled federal election and “votes” refers to the aggregate number of ballots cast by an individual in a regularly scheduled federal election. Republican and Democratic primaries refer to the total ballots cast in partisan presidential primary elections.




Figure I.1: RD Graphs of Voter Participation Outcomes

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual’s high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table I.1.

Table I.2: Effects on Voter Turnout with Bias-Corrected CIs

Outcome	(1)	(2)
<i>Ever Voted</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0106 (0.0084)	0.0098 (0.0084)
Robust 95% CI	[-.005 ; .033]	[-.006 ; .032]
Robust p-value	0.160	0.183
<i>Total Votes Cast</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0586 (0.0368)	0.0546 (0.0362)
Robust 95% CI	[-.023 ; .149]	[-.026 ; .143]
Robust p-value	0.151	0.175
<i>Presidential Votes</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0376 (0.0246)	0.0338 (0.0241)
Robust 95% CI	[-.018 ; .096]	[-.021 ; .091]
Robust p-value	0.183	0.218
<i>Midterm Votes</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0184 (0.0136)	0.0170 (0.0134)
Robust 95% CI	[-.012 ; .052]	[-.013 ; .05]
Robust p-value	0.223	0.253
<i>General Votes</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0199 (0.0233)	0.0166 (0.0227)
Robust 95% CI	[-.035 ; .073]	[-.038 ; .068]
Robust p-value	0.494	0.585
<i>Primary Votes</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0382* (0.0158)	0.0366* (0.0156)
Robust 95% CI	[.005 ; .078]	[.004 ; .076]
Robust p-value	0.027	0.032
<i>Republican Primary Votes</i>		
RD_Estimate	-0.0020 (0.0037)	-0.0023 (0.0037)
Robust 95% CI	[-.011 ; .006]	[-.012 ; .006]
Robust p-value	0.545	0.487
<i>Democratic Primary Votes</i>		
RD_Estimate	0.0206* (0.0092)	0.0202* (0.0091)
Robust 95% CI	[.002 ; .044]	[.002 ; .044]
Robust p-value	0.033	0.034
Bandwidth	MSE-Optimal	MSE-Optimal
Polynomial	1	1
Covariates	No	Yes

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Each row titled “RD Estimate” shows the conventional point estimate and standard errors in parentheses for a given outcome variable. These are calculated using a triangular kernel at the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). The rows “Robust 95% CI” and “Robust p-value” show the bias-corrected confidence interval and the bias-corrected p-value for the same outcome variable ([Calonico et al., 2014](#)). These outcomes correspond to those in Table I.1.

Table I.3: Effects on Voter Turnout with Honest CIs

Outcome	(1)	(2)
<i>Ever Voted</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0104 (0.0076)	0.0100 (0.0074)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0061; .0269]	[-.0064; .0265]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0035; .0243]	[-.0039; .0240]
<i>Total Votes Cast</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0582 (0.0367)	0.0588 (0.0373)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0213; .1378]	[-.0210; .1386]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0088; .1253]	[-.0084; .1259]
<i>Presidential Votes</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0407 (0.0259)	0.0139 (0.0074)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0156; .0970]	[-.0156; .0971]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0067; .0882]	[-.0067; .0882]
<i>Midterm Votes</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0154 (0.0123)	0.0181 (0.0134)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0113; .0421]	[-.0094; .0455]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0071; .0379]	[-.0050; .0411]
<i>General Votes</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0213 (0.0245)	0.0212 (0.0243)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0319; .0745]	[-.0320; .0744]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0236; .0661]	[-.0236; .0661]
<i>Primary Votes</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0329 (0.0140)	0.0376 (0.0156)
Robust 95% CI	[.0028; .0631]	[.0060; .0691]
Robust 90% CI	[.0075; .0583]	[.0110; .0641]
<i>Republican Primary Votes</i>		
RD Estimate	-0.0020 (0.0037)	-0.0022 (0.0036)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0100; .0060]	[-.0102; .0058]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0088; .0047]	[-.0089; .0046]
<i>Democratic Primary Votes</i>		
RD Estimate	0.0198 (0.0088)	0.0214 (0.0096)
Robust 95% CI	[.0008; .0389]	[.0018; .0411]
Robust 90% CI	[.0038; .0359]	[.0049; .0380]
Bandwidth	MSE-Optimal	0.3
Polynomial	1	1

Note: Each row titled “RD Estimate” shows the point estimate and standard errors in parentheses for a given outcome variable using a triangular kernel and the bounded seconded derivative method (Kolesar and Rothe, 2018). The rows “Robust 95% CI” and “Robust 90% CI” show the honest confidence intervals for the same outcome variable. These outcomes correspond to those in Table C.1.

Table I.4: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Voter Turnout Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>A. Total Voter Turnout Rates</i>				
Ever Voted	0.0074 (0.0069)	0.0073 (0.0069)	0.0113 (0.0102)	0.0115 (0.0101)
Total Votes Cast	0.0550 (0.0342)	0.0545 (0.0342)	0.0636 (0.0508)	0.0616 (0.0505)
<i>B. Presidential and Midterm Election Votes</i>				
Presidential Votes	0.0374 (0.0239)	0.0366 (0.0239)	0.0425 (0.0353)	0.0407 (0.0351)
Midterm Votes	0.0176 (0.0122)	0.0179 (0.0122)	0.0211 (0.0184)	0.0209 (0.0184)
<i>C. General and Primary Election Votes</i>				
General Votes	0.0228 (0.0223)	0.0224 (0.0223)	0.0170 (0.0329)	0.0160 (0.0327)
Primary Votes	0.0322* (0.0144)	0.0321* (0.0144)	0.0466* (0.0214)	0.0456* (0.0213)
<i>D. Partisan Primary Turnout Rates</i>				
Republican Primaries	-0.0022 (0.0034)	-0.0021 (0.0034)	-0.0020 (0.0049)	-0.0019 (0.0049)
Democratic Primaries	0.0190* (0.0088)	0.0187* (0.0088)	0.0293* (0.0130)	0.0284* (0.0130)
Bandwidth	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
HS-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample Size	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from [Calonico et al. \(2020\)](#). These outcomes correspond to those in Table I.1.




Figure I.2: Ever Voted

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.3: Total Votes Cast

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.4: Presidential Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.5: Midterm Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.6: General Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.7: Primary Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.8: Republican Primary Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.9: Democratic Primary Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.




Figure I.10: Primary Votes Cast

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsification tests described in Section 3.2.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.




Figure I.11: Democratic Presidential Primary Votes Cast

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsification tests described in Section 3.2.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.

J CIRP Entering Freshman Survey Appendix

Table J.1: Political Ideology of Californian Students by Type of College

How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.7	1.5	1.3	2.1	1.2
Conservative	14.6	24.8	17.5	18.6	19.2
Middle of the road	43.1	38.9	47.5	50.0	43.2
Liberal	38.4	31.8	30.8	25.5	33.3
Far left	3.2	3.1	2.9	3.7	3.1
N	120,552	139,172	125,714	9,993	395,431

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.2: Economic Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: A national health care plan is needed to cover everybody's medical costs	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	
Strongly Disagree	7.2	11.8	7.0	5.5	8.6
Somewhat Disagree	19.4	21.2	18.4	17.3	19.6
Somewhat Agree	43.9	39.8	42.4	42.7	42.1
Strongly Agree	29.5	27.2	32.2	34.5	29.7
N	59,400	55,756	54,829	2,707	172,692
View: Addressing global warming should be a federal priority	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	
Strongly Disagree	4.6	10.9	6.8	9.1	7.3
Somewhat Disagree	15.6	19.4	20.1	21.6	18.3
Somewhat Agree	41.9	36.7	42.0	44.6	40.3
Strongly Agree	37.8	33.0	31.1	24.7	34.1
N	25,510	22,801	22,122	287	70,720
View: Federal military spending should be increased	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	
Strongly Disagree	29.6	25.1	22.9	20.5	25.8
Somewhat Disagree	49.9	47.3	48.3	46.0	48.4
Somewhat Agree	17.5	23.5	24.2	26.8	21.8
Strongly Agree	3.0	4.1	4.6	6.7	4.0
N	87,181	88,685	79,958	5,558	261,382
View: The federal government is not doing enough to control pollution	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	
Strongly Disagree	2.0	3.4	2.8	2.8	2.7
Somewhat Disagree	12.3	16.6	16.0	16.9	14.9
Somewhat Agree	44.4	42.1	44.9	44.7	43.8
Strongly Agree	41.3	38.0	36.4	35.6	38.6
N	59,548	55,938	54,924	2,708	173,118

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.3: Economic Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: The federal government should raise taxes to reduce the deficit	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	15.4	19.6	20.8	24.5	18.5
Somewhat Disagree	49.0	48.8	51.2	51.5	49.7
Somewhat Agree	29.7	26.7	23.8	20.7	26.8
Strongly Agree	5.9	4.8	4.2	3.3	5.0
N	50,706	42,123	43,521	1,621	137,971
View: Through hard work, everybody can succeed in American society	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	4.7	5.3	3.8	3.5	4.6
Somewhat Disagree	19.8	21.1	15.5	13.9	18.8
Somewhat Agree	40.2	39.2	37.2	32.6	38.9
Strongly Agree	35.3	34.3	43.4	50.0	37.8
N	51,555	44,693	44,613	2,442	143,303
View: Wealthy people should pay a larger share of taxes than they do now	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	10.8	18.0	13.4	16.6	14.3
Somewhat Disagree	28.7	31.8	30.9	32.6	30.6
Somewhat Agree	40.9	34.9	38.5	34.2	37.9
Strongly Agree	19.5	15.3	17.1	16.6	17.2
N	110,887	132,583	120,352	8,420	372,242

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.4: Sociocultural Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: Abortion should be legal	Institution Type				Total %
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	
Strongly Disagree	15.5	27.6	21.3	30.1	22.0
Somewhat Disagree	15.8	14.5	17.6	19.7	16.0
Somewhat Agree	32.4	25.4	31.3	29.2	29.6
Strongly Agree	36.3	32.5	29.7	20.9	32.5
N	114,301	130,571	119,204	10,176	374,252
View: It is important to have laws prohibiting homosexual relationships	Institution Type				Total %
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	
Strongly Disagree	56.9	52.5	49.2	39.1	52.4
Somewhat Disagree	25.1	23.0	28.1	30.0	25.5
Somewhat Agree	11.6	12.4	13.7	16.8	12.7
Strongly Agree	6.4	12.1	8.9	14.0	9.4
N	103,144	121,853	110,066	8,179	343,242
View: Marijuana should be legalized	Institution Type				Total %
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	
Strongly Disagree	27.8	32.9	31.2	35.2	30.9
Somewhat Disagree	32.2	28.3	29.1	27.1	29.8
Somewhat Agree	27.7	26.4	26.7	24.1	26.8
Strongly Agree	12.3	12.3	13.0	13.6	12.5
N	113,751	130,050	118,662	10,133	372,596
View: Racial discrimination is no longer a major problem in America	Institution Type				Total %
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	
Strongly Disagree	38.0	37.0	35.8	35.5	36.9
Somewhat Disagree	45.5	45.4	43.9	40.5	44.8
Somewhat Agree	14.3	15.4	17.3	20.0	15.8
Strongly Agree	2.3	2.2	3.1	4.1	2.6
N	113,962	130,302	118,683	10,106	373,053

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.5: Sociocultural Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: Same-sex couples should have the right to legal marital status	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	12.5	23.3	16.7	23.2	17.9
Somewhat Disagree	16.4	16.4	18.7	20.9	17.2
Somewhat Agree	29.5	23.7	30.0	29.8	27.6
Strongly Agree	41.7	36.6	34.7	26.1	37.3
N	113,369	129,623	118,132	10,045	371,169
View: The activities of married women are best confined to the home and family	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	61.0	61.6	52.4	41.3	57.9
Somewhat Disagree	21.7	21.4	24.5	28.1	22.7
Somewhat Agree	12.8	12.5	17.1	22.5	14.4
Strongly Agree	4.6	4.4	6.0	8.1	5.1
N	59,179	89,497	75,205	6,681	230,562
View: The death penalty should be abolished	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	20.2	24.1	27.6	30.6	24.2
Somewhat Disagree	41.1	38.1	41.0	37.7	39.9
Somewhat Agree	24.8	22.3	20.6	20.9	22.5
Strongly Agree	13.8	15.4	10.7	10.8	13.3
N	102,917	121,422	109,820	8,147	342,306
View: The federal government should do more to control the sale of handguns	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	4.8	6.8	6.1	6.8	6.0
Somewhat Disagree	13.7	13.9	14.3	13.9	14.0
Somewhat Agree	42.5	38.2	39.2	33.9	39.7
Strongly Agree	39.0	41.1	40.4	45.5	40.3
N	110,705	132,563	119,936	8,438	371,642

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.6: Sociocultural Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: There is too much concern in the courts for the rights of criminals	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	7.9	8.5	6.8	7.7	7.8
Somewhat Disagree	37.5	35.7	30.7	25.8	34.4
Somewhat Agree	47.6	46.9	51.9	52.0	48.9
Strongly Agree	6.9	8.8	10.7	14.6	9.0
N	112,581	128,426	117,293	10,035	368,335
View: Undocumented immigrants should be denied access to public education	Institution Type				Total
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	29.8	24.9	32.0	38.4	29.1
Somewhat Disagree	36.3	34.9	30.4	28.3	33.9
Somewhat Agree	22.9	24.8	22.5	19.6	23.3
Strongly Agree	11.0	15.4	15.0	13.6	13.7
N	51,242	44,268	44,369	2,428	142,307

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.7: Descriptive Statistics on Californian Students by Type of College

Race/Ethnicity Group	Institution Type				Total %
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	
American Indian	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1
Asian	39.4	15.3	17.8	13.3	23.3
Black	2.5	3.3	4.2	5.0	3.4
Hispanic	14.6	10.4	24.8	45.5	17.2
White	30.1	55.5	38.3	21.8	41.4
Other	3.7	3.0	3.9	4.7	3.5
Two or more race/ethnicity	9.6	12.3	10.9	9.4	11.0
N	124,121	144,094	132,593	11,043	411,851
Citizenship status:	Institution Type				Total %
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	
Neither/None of the above	2.0	3.2	2.1	5.1	2.5
Permanent resident	7.1	2.9	5.4	8.4	5.1
U.S. citizen	91.0	93.9	92.5	86.5	92.4
N	127,474	145,738	136,435	11,304	420,951
Your religious preference	Institution Type				Total %
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	
Protestant	28.8	42.7	33.5	35.9	35.3
Roman Catholic	23.3	25.2	32.2	36.6	27.1
Jewish	3.7	3.3	1.7	0.6	2.8
Other	12.8	6.3	8.8	8.8	9.1
None	31.5	22.6	23.9	18.0	25.6
N	123,909	142,197	130,339	10,591	407,036

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table J.8: Political Ideology of American Students by Type of College

How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type			
	University	4-year	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%
Far right	1.5	1.8	2.5	1.7
Conservative	21.2	22.3	20.3	21.8
Middle of the road	43.8	45.8	51.9	45.0
Liberal	30.4	26.9	21.3	28.4
Far left	3.0	3.2	4.0	3.1
N	1,655,052	2,060,615	42,014	3,757,681

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among American institutions from 2000 to 2010. "University" refers to research university freshmen, "4-year" refers to teaching college freshmen, and "2-year" refers to community college freshmen.

Table J.9: Descriptive Statistics on American Students by Type of College

Race/Ethnicity Group	Institution Type			
	University %	4-year %	2-year %	Total %
American Indian	0.3	0.3	1.6	0.3
Asian	11.4	4.7	4.2	7.6
Black	6.5	8.2	16.8	7.6
Hispanic	5.7	5.1	21.7	5.6
White	68.0	74.1	47.0	71.1
Other	2.2	1.9	3.0	2.0
Two or more race/ethnicity	5.9	5.8	5.7	5.8
N	1,722,161	2,164,260	46,650	3,933,071
Citizenship status:	Institution Type			
	University %	4-year %	2-year %	Total %
Neither/None of the above	2.1	2.0	2.8	2.0
Permanent resident	3.2	1.8	5.7	2.5
U.S. citizen	94.6	96.2	91.5	95.5
N	1,765,970	2,199,465	47,923	4,013,358
Your religious preference	Institution Type			
	University %	4-year %	2-year %	Total %
Protestant	40.2	46.8	52.8	44.0
Roman Catholic	27.7	28.4	24.8	28.0
Jewish	4.6	2.3	0.5	3.3
Other	6.9	5.0	7.0	5.9
None	20.7	17.5	14.9	18.9
N	1,708,947	2,133,420	45,219	3,887,586

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among American institutions from 2000 to 2010. "University" refers to research university freshmen, "4-year" refers to teaching college freshmen, and "2-year" refers to community college freshmen.

K HERI Faculty Survey Appendix

Table K.1: Political Ideology of Californian Faculty by Type of College

How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.2
Conservative	8.4	14.8	12.3	20.8	13.2
Middle of the road	34.2	35.5	33.7	42.0	35.2
Liberal	50.4	43.8	46.3	34.0	45.1
Far left	6.9	5.6	7.6	2.8	6.3
N	1,632	2,768	2,640	712	7,752

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.2: Campus Views of Californian Faculty by Type of College

View: Racist/sexist speech should be prohibited on campus	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Disagree strongly	27.2	22.4	20.7	19.9	22.6
Disagree somewhat	24.0	23.6	25.1	19.5	24.0
Agree somewhat	24.2	23.9	24.7	25.2	24.3
Agree strongly	24.6	30.1	29.5	35.4	29.1
N	687	1,261	1,268	226	3,442

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.3: Political Ideology of Californian Faculty by STEM and Type of College

<i>Panel A. STEM Faculty</i>					
How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.2
Conservative	10.1	14.7	13.7	23.8	13.4
Middle of the road	42.2	38.7	38.7	45.4	40.2
Liberal	45.0	42.7	42.9	29.2	42.7
Far left	2.5	3.7	4.6	1.5	3.5
N	733	653	786	130	2,302
<i>Panel B. Non-STEM Faculty</i>					
How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.2
Conservative	7.0	14.9	11.7	20.1	13.1
Middle of the road	27.7	34.5	31.6	41.2	33.1
Liberal	54.8	44.2	47.7	35.1	46.2
Far left	10.5	6.2	8.8	3.1	7.5
N	899	2,115	1,854	582	5,450

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.4: Career Objectives of Californian Faculty by Type of College

Objective: Becoming an authority in my field	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	1.5	9.8	9.8	16.4	8.7
Somewhat important	11.5	23.2	25.1	26.5	21.6
Very important	33.2	34.0	34.3	32.0	33.7
Essential	53.8	33.0	30.9	25.1	36.0
N	1,680	2,818	2,685	737	7,920
Objective: Influencing the political structure	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	44.6	39.4	36.5	39.1	39.5
Somewhat important	37.6	40.4	38.5	37.1	38.8
Very important	13.6	15.9	18.1	17.3	16.3
Essential	4.2	4.2	6.9	6.5	5.4
N	1,672	2,809	2,673	734	7,888
Objective: Influencing social values	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	27.4	17.8	17.2	13.6	19.2
Somewhat important	41.1	33.9	38.7	33.5	37.0
Very important	24.0	35.3	31.8	36.5	31.8
Essential	7.5	13.0	12.4	16.5	12.0
N	1,670	2,807	2,676	735	7,888
Objective: Helping to promote racial understanding	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	8.4	6.1	5.8	5.3	6.4
Somewhat important	40.0	31.0	29.1	25.8	31.7
Very important	33.5	36.9	37.8	37.4	36.5
Essential	18.1	26.0	27.4	31.5	25.3
N	1,664	2,804	2,667	737	7,872
Objective: Obtaining recognition from my colleagues for contribution to my field	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	3.0	10.9	9.0	21.6	9.6
Somewhat important	21.9	34.3	34.3	43.7	32.6
Very important	42.1	35.9	37.6	23.6	36.6
Essential	33.0	18.9	19.1	11.1	21.2
N	1,669	2,803	2,675	737	7,884

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.5: Instructional Goals of Californian Faculty by Type of College

UG Goal: Develop moral character	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Not important	14.4	8.0	10.6	5.0	9.9
Somewhat important	41.0	28.7	36.5	26.9	33.8
Very important	29.6	34.5	33.5	37.0	33.4
Essential	14.9	28.9	19.4	31.2	22.9
N	1,569	2,671	2,627	722	7,589
UG Goal: Help students develop personal values	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Not important	12.9	6.4	8.2	4.6	8.2
Somewhat important	40.1	26.9	35.5	23.8	32.3
Very important	33.9	39.5	39.0	44.0	38.6
Essential	13.1	27.2	17.4	27.6	20.9
N	1,565	2,665	2,626	720	7,576
UG Goal: Enhance students' knowledge of and appreciation for other races	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Not important	14.6	10.9	4.6	8.7	9.3
Somewhat important	35.2	24.9	25.8	25.5	27.0
Very important	32.1	33.8	33.2	28.1	32.6
Essential	18.1	30.3	36.4	37.7	31.1
N	321	758	624	231	1,934
UG Goal: Prepare students for responsible citizenship	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Not important	10.5	9.4	6.9	4.8	8.3
Somewhat important	34.8	28.8	27.2	26.7	29.3
Very important	38.2	40.4	38.3	37.4	39.0
Essential	16.5	21.4	27.5	31.2	23.4
N	978	1,739	1,648	439	4,804
UG Goal: Develop ability to think clearly	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Not important	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1
Somewhat important	0.5	0.4	0.7	1.0	0.6
Very important	8.5	11.2	9.4	12.6	10.2
Essential	91.0	88.2	89.9	86.4	89.2
N	1,582	2,683	2,651	723	7,639

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.6: Institutional Goals of Californian Faculty by Type of College

Inst Priority: To promote the intellectual development of students	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	1.6	1.3	3.9	2.4	2.3
Medium priority	10.7	9.8	18.2	13.1	13.2
High priority	33.2	34.7	32.6	37.3	33.9
Highest priority	54.5	54.2	45.3	47.2	50.6
N	1,650	2,784	2,656	718	7,808
Inst Priority: To help students examine and understand their personal values	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	21.0	7.3	17.2	7.9	13.6
Medium priority	45.2	25.8	42.7	34.5	36.4
High priority	27.6	40.1	29.6	37.2	33.6
Highest priority	6.3	26.8	10.5	20.3	16.3
N	1,637	2,775	2,644	718	7,774
Inst Priority: To help students learn how to bring about change in society	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	38.9	23.4	32.1	22.5	29.5
Medium priority	41.8	40.6	40.6	42.7	41.0
High priority	15.8	26.7	20.1	24.7	22.0
Highest priority	3.4	9.3	7.3	10.1	7.4
N	1,616	2,755	2,630	712	7,713
Inst Priority: To maintain a climate where different opinions can be aired	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	5.9	9.6	8.5	8.1	8.1
Medium priority	25.5	27.1	25.4	27.8	26.2
High priority	41.7	40.5	40.4	42.6	41.0
Highest priority	26.9	22.8	25.8	21.5	24.6
N	573	698	733	270	2,274
Inst Priority: To develop among students and faculty multicultural appreciation	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	9.8	8.8	6.8	6.7	8.1
Medium priority	38.5	33.6	29.3	31.1	33.1
High priority	36.5	39.5	38.9	39.6	38.6
Highest priority	15.2	18.2	25.0	22.6	20.2
N	572	697	737	270	2,276

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.7: Teaching Methods of Californian Faculty by Type of College

Instructional Method: Class discussions	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	8.5	6.7	4.9	6.9	6.5
Some	34.2	21.7	25.8	22.4	25.7
Most	22.8	19.5	21.3	17.9	20.7
All	34.4	52.0	48.0	52.8	47.1
N	1,310	2,244	2,352	665	6,571
Instructional Method: Cooperative learning (small groups)	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	48.4	27.9	26.9	22.6	31.1
Some	35.3	33.8	39.4	34.8	36.2
Most	9.1	15.9	15.6	16.5	14.5
All	7.1	22.5	18.1	26.1	18.2
N	1,305	2,232	2,348	660	6,545
Instructional Method: Experiential learning/Field studies	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	60.9	46.5	48.7	52.4	50.7
Some	25.7	27.9	29.4	24.4	27.7
Most	7.0	11.7	11.7	9.6	10.6
All	6.4	13.9	10.2	13.6	11.0
N	1,294	2,223	2,341	655	6,513
Instructional Method: Teaching assistants	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	25.6	56.4	70.3	79.4	58.5
Some	39.7	22.3	21.6	13.1	24.2
Most	19.0	10.2	4.5	3.3	8.9
All	15.8	11.1	3.6	4.2	8.5
N	774	1,639	1,690	427	4,530

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.8: Teaching Methods of Californian Faculty by Type of College

Instructional Method: Group projects	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
None	56.2	35.8	37.1	48.0	41.5
Some	34.8	37.9	41.2	31.0	37.8
Most	5.5	13.5	12.2	10.7	11.2
All	3.5	12.8	9.4	10.3	9.5
N	1,297	2,229	2,344	662	6,532
Instructional Method: Extensive lecturing	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
None	8.1	20.6	15.3	23.8	16.5
Some	21.1	31.6	29.5	30.2	28.6
Most	38.0	27.8	32.5	26.4	31.4
All	32.8	20.1	22.7	19.6	23.5
N	1,304	2,228	2,347	663	6,542
Instructional Method: Readings on racial and ethnic issues	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
None	73.7	56.2	58.6	62.7	61.2
Some	15.5	25.4	23.5	21.4	22.3
Most	4.8	9.2	9.0	7.4	8.1
All	6.0	9.3	8.9	8.5	8.4
N	1,294	2,227	2,340	660	6,521
Instructional Method: Readings on women and gender issues	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
None	72.7	56.8	59.0	62.7	61.4
Some	16.6	25.4	24.7	22.4	23.1
Most	5.7	9.2	8.6	8.2	8.2
All	5.0	8.5	7.8	6.7	7.4
N	1,299	2,230	2,344	660	6,533

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.9: Research and Teaching Activity among Californian Faculty by Type of College

Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Very heavily in teaching	2.5	26.4	24.4	65.7	24.2
In both, but leaning toward teaching	16.0	33.3	38.2	25.4	30.6
In both, but leaning toward research	62.3	32.9	31.1	7.3	36.2
Very heavily in research	19.2	7.4	6.3	1.6	9.0
N	1,690	2,813	2,697	728	7,928
What is your principal activity in your current position at this institution?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Administration	10.7	19.2	16.1	20.5	16.5
Teaching	35.5	62.3	70.4	68.1	60.1
Research	47.7	15.3	10.8	0.4	19.1
Services to clients and patients	4.8	1.8	1.2	7.0	2.7
Other	1.3	1.3	1.5	4.0	1.6
N	1,633	2,817	2,683	753	7,886
Publish: Articles in academic or professional journals	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	2.4	18.7	12.7	66.1	17.6
1-2	2.8	15.1	14.7	19.6	12.8
3-4	4.0	13.4	14.8	8.2	11.4
5-10	10.4	15.9	18.1	3.7	14.4
11-20	16.4	11.6	15.1	1.2	12.8
21-50	27.9	11.5	13.5	0.8	14.7
51+	36.2	13.8	11.0	0.3	16.4
N	1,666	2,760	2,663	723	7,812

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.10: Descriptive Statistics on Californian Faculty by Type of College

What is your present academic rank?	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Professor	59.7	41.1	55.4	18.5	47.8
Associate Professor	18.3	21.5	15.1	4.6	17.1
Assistant Professor	18.5	17.1	11.9	1.8	14.2
Lecturer	2.3	8.2	13.5	3.4	8.3
Instructor	0.1	6.1	1.5	54.6	7.8
Other	1.1	5.9	2.6	17.3	4.8
N	1,703	2,846	2,720	742	8,011
Race/Ethnicity Group	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
American Indian	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.3
Asian	8.1	3.8	7.7	4.3	6.0
Black	1.4	1.5	2.6	3.3	2.0
Hispanic	2.7	1.7	5.2	7.2	3.6
White	83.8	88.6	78.7	77.0	83.1
Other	1.6	1.2	2.6	1.5	1.8
Two or more race/ethnicity	2.3	3.0	2.9	6.1	3.1
N	1,675	2,838	2,690	749	7,952
STEM	Institution Type				
	UC %	Priv %	CSU %	2-year %	Total %
Not STEM	55.1	76.4	70.5	82.0	70.4
STEM	44.9	23.6	29.5	18.0	29.6
N	1,717	2,895	2,740	760	8,112

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.11: Political Ideology of American Faculty by Type of College

How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type			
	University	4-year	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3
Conservative	13.5	19.2	24.3	16.8
Middle of the road	36.8	39.2	44.8	38.4
Liberal	44.5	37.4	28.2	40.2
Far left	5.0	3.8	2.3	4.3
N	39,220	33,702	6,533	79,455

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among American institutions from 1989 to 1998. "University" refers to research university faculty, "4-year" refers to teaching college faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table K.12: Career Objectives of American Faculty by Political Views

Objective: Becoming an authority in my field	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	16.3	11.6	10.1	9.8	11.4	10.3
Somewhat important	27.0	25.2	24.7	25.1	24.9	25.0
Very important	25.8	34.5	35.4	35.5	33.1	35.2
Essential	31.0	28.7	29.8	29.6	30.6	29.5
N	252	13,390	30,470	31,818	3,364	79,294
Objective: Influencing the political structure	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	44.8	49.4	46.1	33.2	12.7	40.0
Somewhat important	30.4	37.4	40.2	43.5	32.1	40.7
Very important	14.8	10.9	11.3	18.7	35.2	15.2
Essential	10.0	2.2	2.4	4.6	19.9	4.0
N	250	13,357	30,384	31,752	3,349	79,092
Objective: Influencing social values	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	26.0	22.8	21.2	15.2	7.4	18.5
Somewhat important	31.6	39.5	41.7	38.0	22.5	39.0
Very important	26.8	29.4	29.7	35.4	39.7	32.4
Essential	15.6	8.3	7.4	11.3	30.4	10.1
N	250	13,350	30,383	31,755	3,358	79,096
Objective: Helping to promote racial understanding	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	30.7	11.6	6.2	3.5	2.4	5.9
Somewhat important	39.8	43.3	36.8	27.9	14.7	33.4
Very important	18.7	33.3	39.3	41.0	37.2	38.8
Essential	10.8	11.8	17.7	27.6	45.7	21.9
N	251	13,334	30,314	31,699	3,359	78,957
Objective: Obtaining recognition from my colleagues for contribution to my field	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	20.1	16.1	11.2	8.8	10.4	11.0
Somewhat important	39.4	37.4	35.9	34.2	34.6	35.4
Very important	24.5	32.5	36.6	38.0	34.6	36.3
Essential	16.1	14.0	16.4	19.0	20.4	17.2
N	249	13,364	30,404	31,751	3,352	79,120

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.13: Career Objectives of American Faculty by Research Focus

Objective: Becoming an authority in my field	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	21.7	8.6	3.0	2.7	9.9
Somewhat important	31.9	31.2	15.3	11.2	24.7
Very important	29.4	37.5	38.9	31.1	35.2
Essential	16.9	22.7	42.8	55.0	30.1
N	21,304	25,874	25,227	6,210	78,615
Objective: Influencing the political structure	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	42.8	35.6	40.5	46.8	40.0
Somewhat important	40.0	43.0	39.7	35.8	40.5
Very important	13.8	17.1	15.4	13.1	15.3
Essential	3.4	4.3	4.5	4.2	4.1
N	21,247	25,795	25,119	6,190	78,351
Objective: Influencing social values	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	14.5	14.3	23.4	32.2	18.7
Somewhat important	37.2	38.2	40.9	39.5	38.9
Very important	36.9	35.8	27.4	21.0	32.2
Essential	11.5	11.8	8.4	7.3	10.3
N	21,276	25,797	25,103	6,178	78,354
Objective: Helping to promote racial understanding	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	5.2	4.2	6.9	12.5	6.0
Somewhat important	32.0	29.9	35.8	41.6	33.3
Very important	39.4	40.2	38.2	31.5	38.7
Essential	23.3	25.6	19.1	14.5	22.0
N	21,249	25,773	25,042	6,154	78,218
Objective: Obtaining recognition from my colleagues for contribution to my field	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	21.9	9.1	4.4	4.4	10.7
Somewhat important	43.7	41.0	25.3	21.1	35.1
Very important	26.2	37.0	44.5	39.0	36.6
Essential	8.2	12.9	25.8	35.5	17.5
N	21,272	25,823	25,123	6,183	78,401

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.14: Instructional Goals of American Faculty by Political Views

UG Goal: Develop moral character	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	11.2	5.1	6.6	10.7	17.4	8.4
Somewhat important	24.7	24.3	31.6	39.2	36.2	33.6
Very important	27.5	34.9	36.2	32.9	30.1	34.3
Essential	36.7	35.7	25.6	17.2	16.2	23.6
N	251	13,051	29,552	30,657	3,231	76,742
UG Goal: Help students develop personal values	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	13.3	6.3	6.6	7.8	12.4	7.3
Somewhat important	30.2	26.8	31.1	34.6	32.1	31.8
Very important	30.2	40.8	41.2	39.5	35.8	40.2
Essential	26.2	26.1	21.1	18.1	19.6	20.7
N	248	13,028	29,521	30,644	3,240	76,681
UG Goal: Enhance students' knowledge of and appreciation for other races	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	32.0	14.6	9.6	7.4	4.7	9.5
Somewhat important	38.0	37.4	32.3	25.7	18.0	30.1
Very important	18.0	32.3	35.2	37.4	32.1	35.4
Essential	12.0	15.8	22.9	29.5	45.2	25.1
N	50	3,237	7,389	7,330	701	18,707
UG Goal: Prepare students for responsible citizenship	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	13.2	7.1	7.3	7.7	9.5	7.5
Somewhat important	27.9	28.1	30.3	31.5	28.2	30.3
Very important	36.4	41.6	41.4	40.6	36.6	40.9
Essential	22.5	23.3	21.0	20.2	25.7	21.3
N	129	7,101	16,268	16,945	1,779	42,222
UG Goal: Develop ability to think clearly	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left	Total
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1
Somewhat important	3.2	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.5
Very important	11.2	15.7	13.7	10.9	7.2	12.6
Essential	85.2	83.6	85.7	88.6	92.2	86.8
N	250	13,059	29,664	30,823	3,257	77,053

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.15: Instructional Goals of American Faculty by Research Focus

UG Goal: Develop moral character	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
Not important	5.0	6.0	12.1	18.3	8.6
Somewhat important	27.1	32.5	39.9	38.1	33.8
Very important	37.1	36.6	31.1	27.4	34.2
Essential	30.9	24.9	16.9	16.2	23.3
N	20,826	24,955	24,272	5,911	75,964
UG Goal: Help students develop personal values	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
Not important	4.1	5.0	10.7	17.1	7.5
Somewhat important	25.3	29.3	38.7	40.9	32.1
Very important	43.2	42.7	37.0	30.3	40.0
Essential	27.5	23.0	13.7	11.8	20.4
N	20,828	24,954	24,233	5,876	75,891
UG Goal: Enhance students' knowledge of and appreciation for other races	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
Not important	7.2	6.5	13.3	19.0	9.7
Somewhat important	27.2	27.2	33.8	39.3	30.1
Very important	37.4	36.8	33.1	27.4	35.2
Essential	28.2	29.4	19.9	14.2	25.0
N	5,445	6,303	5,648	1,439	18,835
UG Goal: Prepare students for responsible citizenship	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
Not important	5.5	5.1	10.2	16.5	7.7
Somewhat important	26.3	27.8	35.7	37.8	30.6
Very important	43.2	42.9	37.7	33.4	40.6
Essential	25.0	24.2	16.4	12.4	21.1
N	11,722	13,715	13,372	3,147	41,956
UG Goal: Develop ability to think clearly	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
Not important	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1
Somewhat important	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.5
Very important	13.9	12.4	11.7	12.4	12.6
Essential	85.5	87.1	87.7	86.6	86.8
N	20,867	25,042	24,426	5,963	76,298

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.16: Teaching Methods of American Faculty by Political Views

Instructional Method: Class discussions	How would you characterize your political views?						Total
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
None	10.5	9.3	8.6	6.6	4.3	7.7	
Some	26.0	29.3	28.3	23.5	15.9	26.0	
Most	16.4	21.6	21.6	20.2	18.5	20.8	
All	47.0	39.9	41.5	49.7	61.4	45.4	
N	219	10,858	24,391	25,591	2,869	63,928	
Instructional Method: Cooperative learning (small groups)	How would you characterize your political views?						Total
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
None	40.2	33.2	31.1	29.6	27.9	30.8	
Some	28.8	37.6	37.6	35.9	35.3	36.8	
Most	16.0	14.0	15.1	15.4	14.9	15.0	
All	15.1	15.2	16.1	19.1	21.9	17.4	
N	219	10,793	24,239	25,414	2,847	63,512	
Instructional Method: Experiential learning/Field studies	How would you characterize your political views?						Total
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
None	54.4	54.3	51.8	51.6	53.6	52.2	
Some	23.5	26.6	28.1	26.8	27.1	27.3	
Most	10.6	9.9	10.3	10.6	9.1	10.3	
All	11.5	9.3	9.7	10.9	10.2	10.2	
N	217	10,764	24,129	25,314	2,850	63,274	
Instructional Method: Teaching assistants	How would you characterize your political views?						Total
	Far Right	Right	Middle	Left	Far Left		
	%	%	%	%	%	%	
None	77.8	71.8	66.6	61.7	59.9	65.3	
Some	12.3	17.8	20.5	23.9	26.6	21.6	
Most	4.7	5.4	6.7	7.6	7.6	6.9	
All	5.3	5.0	6.2	6.9	5.8	6.3	
N	171	7,846	17,141	18,299	1,993	45,450	

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.17: Teaching Methods of American Faculty by Political Views

Instructional Method: Group projects	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right %	Right %	Middle %	Left %	Far Left %	Total %
None	48.2	43.7	41.7	41.2	39.7	41.8
Some	29.4	35.8	37.6	37.2	38.9	37.2
Most	11.5	11.1	11.4	11.7	11.9	11.5
All	11.0	9.4	9.3	9.9	9.5	9.6
N	218	10,785	24,204	25,340	2,849	63,396
Instructional Method: Extensive lecturing	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right %	Right %	Middle %	Left %	Far Left %	Total %
None	13.6	18.5	19.1	20.5	20.6	19.6
Some	22.2	28.0	29.4	30.5	33.6	29.8
Most	29.9	30.4	30.5	28.5	26.3	29.5
All	34.4	23.0	21.0	20.5	19.4	21.1
N	221	10,791	24,240	25,399	2,848	63,499
Instructional Method: Readings on racial and ethnic issues	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right %	Right %	Middle %	Left %	Far Left %	Total %
None	74.9	78.6	69.1	54.1	30.7	63.0
Some	19.2	15.9	21.4	26.3	26.0	22.6
Most	3.2	2.8	5.1	9.5	16.6	7.0
All	2.7	2.7	4.4	10.0	26.7	7.4
N	219	10,740	24,135	25,344	2,854	63,292
Instructional Method: Readings on women and gender issues	How would you characterize your political views?					
	Far Right %	Right %	Middle %	Left %	Far Left %	Total %
None	77.6	79.9	70.5	54.1	29.7	63.7
Some	16.9	15.6	21.2	26.8	26.9	22.7
Most	2.7	2.4	4.7	9.7	17.4	6.8
All	2.7	2.2	3.7	9.4	26.0	6.7
N	219	10,717	24,111	25,341	2,859	63,247

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.18: Teaching Methods of American Faculty by Research Focus

Instructional Method: Class discussions	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	6.6	5.8	7.7	16.6	7.4
Some	23.5	23.1	30.6	31.3	26.1
Most	20.8	21.7	20.8	18.7	21.0
All	49.1	49.4	41.0	33.4	45.5
N	18,412	21,392	20,622	4,426	64,852
Instructional Method: Cooperative learning (small groups)	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	24.4	24.4	37.4	52.8	30.4
Some	36.3	38.0	38.2	29.4	37.0
Most	16.9	17.3	12.7	8.7	15.1
All	22.5	20.3	11.6	9.0	17.4
N	18,326	21,280	20,454	4,371	64,431
Instructional Method: Experiential learning/Field studies	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	51.4	46.2	55.8	65.5	52.0
Some	25.5	30.5	27.3	21.1	27.4
Most	10.5	12.2	9.2	6.5	10.4
All	12.5	11.2	7.6	6.9	10.1
N	18,225	21,186	20,391	4,366	64,168
Instructional Method: Teaching assistants	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T	Lean T	Lean R	Heavy R	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	83.0	70.1	47.1	45.9	65.1
Some	11.5	20.4	31.4	27.9	21.8
Most	2.6	5.1	11.5	13.3	6.9
All	3.0	4.3	10.0	12.9	6.3
N	13,404	15,207	14,438	2,999	46,048

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.

Table K.19: Teaching Methods of American Faculty by Research Focus

Instructional Method: Group projects	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
None	41.0	34.8	44.9	59.3	41.5
Some	35.2	40.7	37.8	28.2	37.4
Most	12.3	13.5	9.9	6.9	11.6
All	11.5	11.0	7.3	5.6	9.6
N	18,244	21,234	20,461	4,383	64,322
Instructional Method: Extensive lecturing	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
None	24.6	22.2	12.4	14.3	19.2
Some	32.9	33.4	26.0	19.0	29.9
Most	25.3	27.8	34.9	32.5	29.7
All	17.2	16.6	26.7	34.2	21.2
N	18,250	21,241	20,533	4,396	64,420
Instructional Method: Readings on racial and ethnic issues	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
None	62.9	55.4	67.2	76.7	62.7
Some	23.6	27.1	19.4	14.6	22.8
Most	6.5	8.6	6.6	4.1	7.1
All	7.1	8.9	6.8	4.6	7.4
N	18,208	21,208	20,412	4,360	64,188
Instructional Method: Readings on women and gender issues	Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?				
	Heavy T %	Lean T %	Lean R %	Heavy R %	Total %
None	64.2	56.8	66.7	76.7	63.4
Some	23.3	26.8	20.2	14.4	22.9
Most	6.3	8.2	6.7	4.7	6.9
All	6.2	8.3	6.3	4.2	6.8
N	18,179	21,190	20,416	4,363	64,148

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998.