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Teacher Labor Market Equilibrium and Student Achievement  
Michael D. Bates, Michael Dinerstein, Andrew C. Johnston, and Isaac Sorkin  
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ABSTRACT

We study whether reallocating existing teachers across schools within a district can increase student achievement, and what policies would help achieve these gains. Using a model of multi-dimensional value-added, we find meaningful achievement gains from reallocating teachers within a district. Using an estimated equilibrium model of the teacher labor market, we find that achieving most of these gains requires directly affecting teachers' preferences over schools. In contrast, directly affecting principals' selection of teachers can lower student achievement. Our analysis highlights the importance of equilibrium and second-best reasoning in analyzing teacher labor market policies.

Michael D. Bates  
3135 Sproul Hall  
Department of Economics  
University of California, Riverside  
Riverside, CA 92521  
United States  
michael.bates@ucr.edu  

Andrew C. Johnston  
Department of Economics  
University of California at Merced  
5200 N Lake Road  
Merced, CA 95343  
amjohnston@ucmerced.edu  

Michael Dinerstein  
Department of Economics  
University of Chicago  
1126 East 59th Street  
Chicago, IL 60637  
and NBER  
mdinerstein@uchicago.edu  

Isaac Sorkin  
Department of Economics  
Stanford University  
579 Jane Stanford Way  
Stanford, CA 94305  
and NBER  
sorkin@stanford.edu  

A data appendix is available at http://www.nber.org/data-appendix/w29728
Outcomes in matching markets depend on which agents match and to whom. In teacher labor markets, the literature has focused on the former, as large cross-sectional dispersion in estimated productivity naturally leads to proposals for replacing low-performing teachers (Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014b), see Jackson, Rockoff and Staiger (2014) for a review). Additional gains are possible on two margins through which within-district reassignments can produce aggregate gains: match effects and differential class sizes. If these two margins are quantitatively large, then changing where a teachers work could also be an important policy tool.

Yet reassigning teachers to achieve allocative gains is not easy because, unlike other inputs, teachers have preferences over assignments and may choose not to supply labor (Rothstein, 2015). Moreover, in most public school districts, salaries are set by rigid schedules (Biasi, 2021). Observed allocations therefore reflect an equilibrium of teacher preferences over amenities like student composition (Antos and Rosen, 1975), principal preferences, and market institutional features, including timing and equilibrium selection.

This paper explores the potential student achievement gains from within-district teacher reassignment and the effectiveness of combinations of different policy levers in achieving these gains. We have two central findings. First, because teachers vary in their absolute and comparative advantage, there is scope for meaningful gains from reallocating teachers within a district—the reallocation that maximizes achievement raises student test scores by 0.05 student standard deviations (s) per student. These gains are significant relative to several benchmarks. Second, the most effective policies directly affect teachers’ preferences over schools (using teacher bonuses). In contrast, directly affecting principals’ selection of teachers (Ballou, 1996) can lower student achievement by giving highly sought-after teachers the ability to choose positions where they have a comparative disadvantage. This asymmetry in the effect of seemingly symmetric policies highlights the importance of equilibrium reasoning in policy analysis in this setting.

We arrive at these findings using an equilibrium model of the teacher labor market combined with novel data on job vacancies and applications. In our model, teachers and schools meet and form matches. Reflecting the rolling timing of the labor market, teachers may only match with school openings that are active at the same time. Teachers have non-wage preferences over the set of positions, and principals serve as hiring intermediaries who use their preferences to rank teachers on behalf of the district. Each match generates student achievement based on the absolute and comparative advantage of teachers. To predict the equilibrium matches, we use the concept of pair-wise stability (Roth and Sotomayor [1992], Hitsch, Hortaçsu and Ariely, 2010, Banerjee et al., 2013, Boyd et al., 2013).

The model allows us to study several proposed or implemented policy interventions to increase student achievement. Policies that change the market’s timing enter the model as changes to the

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subset of teachers and schools that meet, and we model changes to the market’s institutions as selecting among the pair-wise stable equilibria. Teacher and principal bonuses change teacher and principal preferences over matches. Bonuses for match effects can be made large enough so that allocative efficiency perfectly shapes teacher and principal choice.

Even in the “best case” version of these policies, where all matches are available and teachers and principals only rank on output, there may still be unrealized gains from prices not being completely flexible. In a decentralized equilibrium, teachers are often assigned to schools based on absolute advantage, but the first-best allocation leans more heavily on comparative advantage. Hence, we also consider unrestricted wages in each match that implement the first-best allocation by giving teachers incentives to seek out positions that make the most of their comparative advantage.

Estimating an equilibrium model allows us to characterize a variety of policy effects, especially in cases that do not lend themselves easily to program evaluation because the policies tend to be implemented in isolation, on a small scale, and with limited variation in policy parameters. The complex equilibrium in the teacher labor market makes us cautious in extrapolating policy effects. In some cases, the sign of a simple policy’s effect may be ambiguous, depending on the other policies in place.

To make these counterfactual predictions, the model highlights the four empirical objects we need to estimate: teachers’ output from each potential assignment, teachers’ non-wage preferences over positions, principals’ non-wage preferences over teachers, and the timing of when teachers and positions are active. Inferring these objects from observed equilibrium allocations requires strong assumptions.

We therefore supplement data on actual assignments with novel data from the job application system of a school district in North Carolina. These data include the timing of all teacher application.

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2For example, some districts have focused on changing the algorithm that clears the market. Other districts allow some schools to hire first. Many districts, like New York City, have moved from teacher transfer priority based on experience to mutual consent where teacher and principal must each agree to the assignment.

3Examples of teacher-level output bonuses include Indiana and the ProComp policy in Denver. North Carolina implemented bonuses for teaching in hard-to-staff schools from 2001-2004, while South Carolina provides high poverty districts with funding for teacher bonuses. Examples of principal-level bonuses include North Carolina, which instituted principal bonuses as a function of the growth in student test scores, and New York City, which piloted a program giving principals information about their teachers’ performance.

4To see why the stable and first best allocations can be different, suppose that teacher 1 has output \( \{10, 9\} \) at schools 1 and 2, respectively, and teacher 2 has output \( \{8, 0\} \) at schools 1 and 2. Then in any stable equilibrium where both teachers and principals only value output, teacher 1 is assigned to school 1 and teacher 2 is assigned to school 2. In contrast, in the first best, teacher 1 is assigned to school 2 and teacher 2 to school 1. This assignment reflects teachers’ comparative advantage. If the comparative advantage of teacher 2 is strong enough, say, her output is \( \{11, 0\} \), then the decentralized and first-best allocations coincide.

5While a growing empirical literature evaluates the responsiveness of teacher labor supply to bonus or incentive schemes, it is hard to find analogues to the types of targeted policies we consider.
cations to open vacancies and the outcome of each application (including whether the teacher was hired and whether the hiring principal rated the application positively).

Importantly, we also link the applicant data to the classroom assignment and student achievement data in North Carolina. These data allow us to characterize each teacher’s (possibly multi-dimensional) value-added, and to estimate the joint distribution of preferences and value-added.

We start with the first empirical object: teachers’ output from each potential assignment. We specify a multi-dimensional value-added model where teachers may have absolute advantage and comparative advantage in teaching specific student types (Condie, Lefgren and Sims 2014; Delgado 2021; Bau Forthcoming; Biasi, Fu and Stromme 2021). We divide students based on whether they are economically disadvantaged, and we find robustness to other forms of heterogeneity. We estimate that teachers’ value-added across student types is highly dispersed across teachers and highly correlated within teacher. Nonetheless, we can reject a homogeneous value-added model.

We use these estimates to solve for the student achievement-maximizing allocation of teachers to positions and find gains of 0.054σ per student. Just under half of these gains are from sorting teachers based on comparative advantage (Delgado 2021), while the rest comes from assigning high absolute advantage teachers to larger classes. These gains are the equivalent of 39% of a standard deviation in teacher forecasted value-added, or an additional year of experience for a novice teacher, and larger than the 0.012σ gains we estimate from replacing the bottom 5% of teachers with the median teacher (Staiger and Rockoff 2010; Neal 2011).

Despite a negative correlation between teacher experience and student disadvantage (Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff 2002; Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor 2005), the actual allocation is close to equitable in value-added (similar to Mansfield (2015) and Angrist et al. (2021)). The allocation slightly favors economically disadvantaged students, with the potential gains for reallocation concentrated among advantaged students. The distributional consequences of gains from reallocation reflect two competing forces. First, high absolute advantage teachers tend to have comparative advantage in teaching economically disadvantaged students; and, second, advantaged students are in larger classes on average. The latter force dominates such that maximizing achievement sends more of the best teachers toward advantaged students.

We then turn to the second empirical object: teachers’ non-wage preferences over positions (Barbieri, Rossetti and Sestito 2011; Engel, Jacob and Curran 2014; Bonhomme, Jolivet and Lueven 2016; Fox 2016; Johnston 2021). Based on institutional features and analysis of application behavior, we argue that teachers apply non-strategically to positions they prefer relative to their outside option. We specify a rich characteristics-based model of teacher utility with observed and unobserved preference heterogeneity. Teachers prefer schools where they have comparative advantage (higher value-added), which might lead teachers to sort optimally if allowed to choose their positions. This pattern, however, is overwhelmed by teachers’ preferences against schools with more economically disadvantaged students. High absolute advantage teachers have the lowest
preferences for schools with more economically disadvantaged students, but we estimate a large random component to such preferences. In general, we find significant preference heterogeneity across teachers.

The third empirical object is principals’ preferences over teachers (Ballou 1996; Boyd et al. 2011; Jacob et al. 2018; Jatusripitak 2018). Using the observed set of applications to each position, we model whether principals give an application a positive outcome: a positive rating without an interview, an interview without a hire, or a hire. We combine these outcomes because principals might interview or offer strategically by passing on preferred teachers who are unlikely to accept an offer. As long as these teachers receive at least a positive rating, then we can model positive outcomes as non-strategic choices. We estimate that principals prefer teachers who would produce high value-added in the position. Principals consider a variety of other observed and unobserved factors such that the highest value-added teacher does not always receive a positive outcome.

Finally, we estimate market timing based on applicants’ and vacancies’ periods of activity in our administrative records.

With these four empirical objects, we use our model to evaluate how far various policies could move the teacher allocation from the status quo toward the first-best. To characterize potential gains, we start with the maximal form of each policy. There is little role for equilibrium selection since there is nearly always a unique stable equilibrium. Complete market coordination such that teachers can apply to any position in a cycle—not just those concurrently active—has a somewhat larger effect, moving student achievement 15% of the way toward the first-best.

Principal output bonuses, when added to the status quo, actually lead to lower value-added, while teacher output bonuses yield about 75% of the total potential achievement gains. The remaining gains come from completely flexible prices that vary with potential output at all matches, not just at the assigned ones.

The surprising negative effect of principal output bonuses reflects the theory of the second-best (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). We have documented that both principal and teacher preferences are not aligned with the planner. By standard intuition, aligning either one in isolation should improve outcomes. Instead, aligning principal preferences alone lowers student achievement. The reason is that principal bonuses lead to more homogeneous rankings of teachers so that the highest absolute advantage teachers have many options to choose from. When teachers rank schools according to their estimated preferences, in which output plays a small role relative to a school’s student body composition, increased choice leads to misallocation.

Of the policies we consider, only teacher bonuses have the potential to close most of the gap between the status quo and output-maximizing allocations. We end by considering realistic bonus schemes that pay teachers a piece rate bonus and a participation subsidy which guarantees that all teachers are weakly better off. We find that when teacher bonuses are added to the status quo, targeting value-added is, unsurprisingly, the most cost-effective way to produce value-added. When prin-
cipals also have output bonuses, teacher bonuses that target teaching economically disadvantaged students are more cost-effective in producing value-added because they more quickly counteract teachers’ preferences toward advantaged students. More generally, we find that teacher bonuses are considerably more costly than flexible prices that implicitly only pay more to teachers with the weakest preferences for their optimal assignment.

We show that our main results are robust to sensible permutations in the value-added model (what student characteristics matter for match effects, whether our model of match effects understates the total match component), the teacher preference model (smaller or larger empirical choice sets, the form of heterogeneity), and the principal preference model (modeling hires instead of positive outcomes, smaller or larger empirical choice sets).

Our paper fits in an emerging literature that uses teacher labor market equilibrium models to assess the gains in student achievement from various policies. These papers range in the allocation problem they consider from national [Combe, Terceux and Terrier Forthcoming; Bobba et al., 2021; Combe et al., 2021] to state cross-district [Biast, Fu and Stromme, 2021] to local within-district [Boyd et al., 2013; Laverde et al., 2021] to sectoral [Tincani, 2021]. Our unique combination of detailed data on teacher applications, principal ratings, and student-teacher classroom assignments allows us to identify a two-sided heterogeneous preference and multi-dimensional production model with straightforward assumptions on behavior.

1 An equilibrium model of the teacher labor market

We begin with an equilibrium model of the labor market for teachers. The model allows us to define the school district’s (first-best) allocation problem and the decentralized equilibrium. We then discuss how we use the model to consider the impact of various policies to affect the matching process. The model highlights the empirical objects that we estimate in Sections 3, 5, and 6.

We defer a full description of the empirical setting to Section 4, but we highlight a few features that inform the model. First, the teacher labor market operates on a rolling basis from April to August each year. This segments the market in time. Second, the market is decentralized such that teachers choose which positions to apply to, and principals choose whom to interview and then whom to offer jobs. Finally, a teacher’s wage does not vary based on the offer she accepts.

1.1 Set-up

We begin with specialized notation that we generalize in the next section. Denote teachers by \( j \), and schools and principals by \( k \) (for notational compactness, we consider single-position schools).

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6Bau (Forthcoming) studies an equilibrium model of school competition with school-student match effects. A broader literature considers non-education allocation problems with non-choice outcomes (Agarwal, Hodgson and So- maini, 2020; Ba et al., 2021; Cowgill et al., 2021; Dahlsrand, 2021).
Teachers and principals both receive quasi-linear utility from an assignment. Teacher $j$ derives utility $u_{jk}$ from teaching at school $k$:

$$u_{jk} = \tilde{u}_{jk} + w_{jk},$$

where $w_{jk}$ is the wage, and $\tilde{u}_{jk}$ is a match-specific amenity. School $k$ (or the principal who runs it) derives utility, $v_{jk}$, from hiring teacher $j$. This utility is linear in a non-wage component less the wage paid to teacher $j$:

$$v_{jk} = \tilde{v}_{jk} - w_{jk}.\quad (2)$$

A teacher-school assignment produces student value-added $VA_{jk}$. Below, we specify a functional form for $VA_{jk}$.

Finally, let $J$ be the set of teachers, $K$ be the set of schools, and assume for simplicity that the number of teachers and schools is the same. An assignment of teachers to classrooms is a one-to-one and onto function (bijection): $\phi: J \rightarrow K$ so that $\phi(j) = k$, the school $k$ to which teacher $j$ is assigned. Denote by $\Phi$ the set of all possible assignments.

### 1.2 First-best problems

We consider a school district’s first-best assignment problem, where the district values students’ outcomes and teachers’ preferences over assignment (non-wage utility):

$$\max_{\phi \in \Phi} \left\{ \omega \sum_{j \in J} VA_{\phi(j)} + \sum_{j \in J} \tilde{u}_{\phi(j)} \right\}. \quad (3)$$

To understand this allocation problem, note that the the first term ($\sum_{j \in J} VA_{\phi(j)}$) is the output achieved given an assignment $\phi$. The second term ($\sum_{j \in J} \tilde{u}_{\phi(j)}$) is the total amenity value that teachers gain from this allocation. Finally, $\omega$ is the weight that the district places on student achievement relative to teacher preferences.

We exclude principal preferences from the district’s value of an allocation to focus on the essential elements of the problem. Specifically, the district could plausibly bypass the intermediary of the principal and direct schools on whom to hire. In this sense, we do not commit to a utility interpretation of principals’ preferences, and could instead interpret them simply as a hiring rule.

We consider a range of district first-best problems where the relative weight on students varies. We refer to the resulting set of optimal allocations as the production possibilities frontier. The slope of the frontier captures the trade-off between student achievement and teacher utility.
1.3 Decentralized equilibrium

We have three agent types (teachers, principals, and students) with asymmetric roles. Teachers and principals/schools determine the allocation, and the district values the allocation based on teacher and student payoffs.

To characterize which allocations are implementable with different policy tools, we use a decentralized matching model. Schools meet with all teachers who are in the market at the same time. The equilibrium concept is pair-wise stability. Under a stable allocation, no teacher and school pair would prefer to jointly deviate and match (Roth and Sotomayor (1992), Definition 2.3).

To model the empirical status quo, we assume (1) teachers and principals have the preferences we estimate for them and (2) the timing of the market follows that which we observed in the administrative records, where not all matches are feasible. There is not necessarily a unique stable equilibrium. We model the status quo using the teacher-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm (DA).

1.4 Policies

We are interested in the effects of five policies, both by themselves as well as their combination. The first two policies affect market institutions. The first policy is equilibrium selection. The teacher-proposing DA is the teacher-optimal stable allocation (Roth and Sotomayor (1992), Corollary 2.14) meaning every teacher would (weakly) prefer their assignment to that in every other stable allocation. In contrast, the school-proposing DA (where schools only value output) is the best stable allocation in terms of student achievement. Thus, a policymaker might wish to shift the effective equilibrium. The second policy is market coordination. We model this policy by expanding each teacher’s (school’s) choice set to include all openings (candidates) available at any time during that cycle.

The next two policies affect the choices of agents over matches. The third policy provides teachers with output bonuses. We simulate the effect of an extreme version of this policy in which teachers’ only preference is to go where they maximize student achievement (in Section 8 we consider intermediate versions of this policy). Parallel to teacher bonuses, the fourth policy provides principals with output bonuses.

Finally, all four of these policies—even in combination—are not necessarily sufficient to achieve the first-best allocations described in the previous section. The reason is that even when teachers and principals only value output, the allocation sorts teachers based in part on absolute rather than comparative advantage. To achieve the first-best allocations, it is sufficient to have the following combination of policies: (1) districts compensate principals for output (so that principals rank teachers by match-specific value-added, $VA_{jk}$), (2) all teachers and schools are in the market simultaneously, and (3) wages may vary with each teacher-school pair. This last policy makes utility
transferable. Whereas output bonuses only let wages vary depending on the output in the assigned position, flexible wages would let wages depend on a teacher’s output in other assignments, teacher preferences, and the distribution of other teachers’ potential output and preferences. Having this flexibility guarantees that the district can implement any first-best allocation ([Shapley and Shubik, 1971]).

Other than for equilibrium selection, there is no theorem that the other policies in isolation necessarily improve output. The theory of the second-best states that when we are away from the first-best allocation because of multiple factors, then fixing any one factor can worsen outcomes.

1.5 Empirical plan

The model highlights the empirical objects we need to estimate to be able to simulate the impact of the above policies. We start by estimating the potential outcomes of teachers across schools, \( VA_{jk} \). We then estimate teachers’ amenity value across all assignments, \( \tilde{u}_{jk} \), and principals’ non-wage utility from hiring each teacher, \( \tilde{v}_{jk} \). Finally, we model which positions were available to each teacher in the observed equilibrium, which we read directly from administrative records.

2 Data

To estimate the objects of interest from the previous section, we use rich data on the labor market for teachers. The first type of data comes from the platform used to hire teachers in our focal district. We use this data to estimate teacher and principal preferences. The second type of data comes from staffing and achievement records from state accountability records. This data provides us with student-level test score data that we link to teachers and use to estimate value-added models. In addition, these records provide information about a variety of demographic characteristics of teachers and students as well as teachers’ education and experience in the district. In this section, we briefly describe the data. See Appendix A for further details and Appendix Table A1 for summary statistics across samples.

2.1 Job application and vacancy data

We obtained application records from our focal district’s system, which spans 2010 through 2019 and records 346,663 job applications. In the system, schools post job vacancies, and applicants apply for jobs. The system also records various actions that principals take.

For every posted position, the vacancy files indicate the school, position title, and whether the position is full-time or part-time. We use the detail on the position title to isolate non-specialized elementary school teacher jobs (i.e., we omit elementary school jobs such as “literary facilitator elementary”).
We use two features of the teacher file. First, the file records which vacancies the candidate applied to, and when she submitted the application. The timing information allows us to construct choice sets, which we detail in Section 4. Second, the file records the city, zip code, and, in some cases, exact address where the teacher lives. This feature allows us to construct the commute time for each teacher-position combination.

We also have data in which principals record their assessments of teachers. Principals record their interest in different applicants, the equivalent of a “good” and a “bad” pile. Principals also often record which candidates they invited to interview, which candidates were offered the position, and which candidates were hired.

2.2 Administrative data

We link the platform data to state administrative records on teachers and students. For teachers, we have their experience, salary, licensing, certification scores, class assignments, and the school where they work. For students, we have scores on standardized exams, grades, race, sex, and whether they qualify as disadvantaged based on Federal programs. Records on class assignments allow us to link teachers to students.

The North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC) matched the data from the job-market platforms to the state’s administrative data. They performed an interactive fuzzy match using names and birth year. For teachers who had a sufficiently good match (that is, a unique name-birth-year combination), we have a de-identified ID that allows us to connect their platform data to their staffing records and students’ achievement.

3 Production of student achievement

In this section, we first specify the production model, which generates a low-dimensional form of match effects between teachers and schools. Second, we describe our three-step estimation procedure and discuss parameter estimates. Third, we present a range of validation checks. Finally, we use our estimates to show that there are meaningful efficiency gains from reallocating teachers across schools.

3.1 Model

Our model needs to predict how teacher output would change depending on the teacher-school match. Given the heterogeneity of student compositions across schools and the quickly expanding literature documenting match effects, we allow for comparative advantage [Dec 2004, 2005, Jackson 2013, Aucejo et al. 2021, Delgado 2021, Graham et al. 2020, Biasi, Fu and Stromme 2021].
We specify a model of match effects that is identified with our data and allows us to make output predictions in unobserved matches. Since a teacher typically works in just a few schools during her career, we cannot identify fully flexible match effects. Instead, we use low-dimensional match effects where teachers have different value-added with students of different observable types; here, we focus on a single student characteristic—economic disadvantage. Thus, a teacher’s school-level match effect depends on the observable demographic composition of the school and the teacher’s comparative advantage with each type of student.

We use notation that follows Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014a) and Delgado (2021). Let $i$ index students and $t$ index years, where $t$ refers to the spring of the academic year, e.g., 2016 refers to 2015-2016. Each student $i$ has an exogenous type $m(i,t) \in \{0,1\}$ in year $t$ (whether the student is economically disadvantaged or not). Student $i$ attends school $k = k(i,t)$ in year $t$ and is assigned to classroom $c = c(i,t)$. Each classroom has a single teacher $j = j(c(i,t))$, though teachers may have multiple classrooms.

Student achievement depends on observed student characteristics, teacher value-added, school effects, time effects, classroom-student-type effects, and an error term. Formally, we model student achievement $A_{it}^*$ as:

$$A_{it}^* = \beta_s X_{it} + \nu_{it}$$

(4)

where $X_{it}$ is a set of observable determinants of student achievement and

$$\nu_{it} = f(Z_{jt}; \alpha) + \mu_{jmt} + \mu_k + \mu_t + \theta_{cm} + \tilde{e}_{it}.$$  

(5)

Here, $Z_{jt}$ is teacher experience (and $f$ maps experience into output) and $\mu_{jmt}$ is teacher $j$’s value-added in year $t$ for student type $m$, excluding the return to experience. As in Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014a), we allow a teacher’s effectiveness to “drift” over time. $\mu_k$ captures school factors, such as an enthusiastic principal, while $\mu_t$ are time shocks. $\theta_{cm}$ are classroom shocks specific to a student type, and $\tilde{e}_{it}$ is idiosyncratic student-level variation.

We make three assumptions, which are standard in the literature (see Appendix B for formal statements of these assumptions). The first assumption is that classroom-student-type shocks and idiosyncratic student-level variation are orthogonal to teacher and school assignments and follow a stationary process. We allow classroom shocks to be correlated across student types in the same classroom, but restrict all cross-classroom or cross-year correlations in shocks to be zero.

The second assumption is that the non-experience part of teacher value-added for each student type follows a stationary process that does not depend on the teacher’s school. We also assume that the covariances between the teacher’s value-added across student types depend only on the number of years elapsed.

The third assumption is that drift and school effects are independent. This assumption rules out teacher mobility (or initial assignments) related to the drift of the teacher’s effect. We still permit
teacher-school assignments to be non-random, and quite possibly related to a teacher’s comparative advantage in teaching different student types.

Our object of interest is a forecast of teacher \( j \)’s value-added from a hypothetical assignment to a new classroom (or set of classrooms) in school \( k \). Define \( p_{km} \) as the proportion of type-\( m \) students in school \( k \) in year \( t \). Given our low-dimensional model of match effects, a teacher’s predicted mean value-added at school \( k \) in year \( t \) is:

\[
VA_{jkt}^p = p_{k0} \mu_{j0t} + p_{k1} \mu_{j1t} + f(Z_{jt}; \alpha),
\]

such that a teacher’s total value-added for \( n_{jkt} \) students is \( VA_{jkt} = n_{jkt} VA_{jkt}^p \). We use data through \( t - 1 \) from the whole state to forecast \( VA_{jkt}^p \) for assignments we see in the data and for counterfactual assignments. For the observed assignments, we forecast the teacher’s value-added were she to receive a new draw of students and classrooms at that school. For the counterfactual assignments, we predict a teacher’s value-added for schools at which she did not teach.

### 3.2 Estimation

We estimate our model in three steps using math scores.\(^7\) In the first step, we estimate the coefficient on characteristics by regressing test scores (standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 in each grade-year) on a set of student characteristics and classroom-student-type fixed effects. In the second step, we project the residuals \( A_{jt} \) onto teacher fixed effects, school fixed effects, and the teacher experience return function. In the final step, we form our estimate of teacher \( j \)’s value-added (net of experience effects) in year \( t \) for type \( m \) \( (\mu_{jmt}) \) as the best linear predictor based on the prior data in our sample. Since in this final step we shrink the estimates, we understate the dispersion in match effects relative to the true dispersion. That said, using shrunken estimates and prior data means that we use the information available to policy-makers. See Appendix B.2 for estimation details and a discussion of what variation pins down parameters.

The first key parameter estimate is the significant dispersion in value-added for both student types of about 0.24\( \sigma \). The second key parameter estimate is the strong correlation of 0.86 between the teacher’s value added with the two types of students (Appendix Table A2). We find large returns to experience in the first year, and then a profile that flattens out after about four years of experience (Appendix Table A3). Appendix Figure A1 plots the drift parameters.

\(^7\)Focusing on a single subject allows us to rank all possible levels of output. We follow Biasi, Fu and Stromme (2021) in choosing math because it is typically more responsive to treatment (e.g., Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain (2005), Kane and Staiger (2008), and Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014) for evidence).
3.3 Validation of the match effects model

To test whether our estimates of teacher comparative advantage with different types of students simply reflect statistical noise, we perform three tests of our multi-dimensional value-added model versus a single-dimensional model. First, we estimate confidence intervals for the structural parameters in our production model. The 95 percent confidence interval allows us to reject a correlation coefficient of 1. Second, we perform a likelihood-ratio test comparing our model to a model with one-dimensional teacher value-added. We reject the homogeneous value-added model in favor of the heterogeneous model with a high degree of significance. Third, we test whether teachers who have previously been stronger with disadvantaged students see increases in estimated value-added when transferring to schools with greater shares of disadvantaged students. Similarly, we test the reverse relationship. If our comparative advantage estimates only reflected spurious relationships, then they would not predict changes in output upon transfer. In both cases, we find statistically strong evidence that this relationship indeed holds. See Appendix B.3 for further details on all three tests.

To validate our value-added model, we slightly modify Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014a)'s test for mean forecast unbiasedness. We predict a teacher $j$'s value-added in school $k$ in year $t$ ($\mu_{jkt}$) using data from all years prior to $t$. We then regress the realized mean student residuals in year $t$ ($\bar{A}_{jt}$) and test whether the coefficient on our prediction equals 1. Column (1) of Table 1 shows that the math value-added estimate is an unbiased predictor of residualized output, with a tight confidence interval around 1.05. Figure 1 shows that the forecast unbiasedness holds throughout the distribution of teacher value-added.

We conduct a similar test for the comparative advantage component of value-added, which will be important for the potential reallocation gains. If teachers’ heterogeneous effects by student type vary with the environment—for instance, teachers might target instruction toward the median student in the class—then our model may poorly forecast a teacher’s comparative advantage. In column (2) we compare our forecast of the difference in a teacher’s value-added across (economically) disadvantaged and advantaged students with the realized test score difference. Again, we find that our estimates are nearly forecast unbiased. Appendix Figure A2 shows that the forecast unbiasedness holds throughout the distribution.

We perform three tests of whether our measure of teacher value-added also forecasts output across the types of teacher moves that we consider in counterfactuals. Our motivation in specifying a low-dimensional model of match effects is that we do not observe a teacher’s potential outcomes at all schools, and so we cannot directly assess the quality of our model across all potential outcomes. What we can do, however, is look at the types of changes in the data that are closest to those that we contemplate in counterfactuals. First, we consider moving teachers across schools. Second, we consider moving teachers across classrooms (schools) with large changes in classroom composition in terms of advantaged and disadvantaged students. Third, we consider moving teachers across
classrooms (schools) with different numbers of students.

How well do our measures predict output when teachers switch schools? In column (3) of Table 1, we show how output changes when teachers change schools and find no systematic change in value-added after transferring. We also test how well our value-added estimates predict transfer effects in column (4). We find that our value-added measure is mean forecast unbiased, as we estimate a prediction coefficient of 0.97 (1.060 – 0.885), which is not statistically different from 1.

How well do our measures predict output when there are large changes in student composition? We split the data into three groups based on the size of the change between the estimation sample (before year $t$) and the prediction sample (year $t$) in the share of disadvantaged students. To examine the validity of our prediction in extreme reassignments, we look at changes below the 10th percentile, above the 90th percentile, and between the 10th to the 90th percentiles. For large negative changes (in Column (5) of Table 1), we find that our measure is forecast unbiased while, for large positive changes, we find a small forecast bias of 7%.

How well do our measures predict output when there are large changes in class size? We perform a parallel analysis for class size as we did for student composition and find similar answers. Specifically, in Column (6) of Table 1, we find that for large negative changes our measure is forecast unbiased, while for large positive changes we find slight evidence of forecast bias.

Our parsimonious model’s ability to predict value-added across settings with minimal bias instills confidence that we can predict the production effects from counterfactual allocations of teachers to schools.

### 3.4 Gains from alternate allocations

We solve the district’s problem in Equation 3 where the district only values student output. Table 2 shows that there are sizeable output gains from hypothetical re-allocations of all teachers in our district in 2016. To focus solely on gains from reallocating teachers across schools, we give each classroom within a school the same composition and number of students. The top panel shows per-student gains or losses (column 1) from movements to the output-maximizing (“best”) or output-minimizing (“worst”) allocations. The per-student gain of 0.054σ in the output-maximizing allocation reflects improved sorting of teachers to schools without changing the set of available teachers. The actual allocation is only slightly better than randomly assigning teachers to schools (row 2 of Table 2), and the range of annual output between the best and worst allocations is 0.11σ.

---

8In the same setting but in an earlier sample, Jackson [2013] estimates increases in output following transfers. In our later sample, we see zero or negative effects when estimating Jackson [2013]’s event study specification (Appendix Figure A3).

9The regressions assess forecast unbiasedness with a linear model. We show how our predictions perform nonparametrically in Appendix Figures A4a and A4b for large decreases and increases in class size, respectively. We see that our predictions are forecast unbiased throughout the quality distribution such that quality differences across teachers are likely to remain across schools with different class sizes. Note that we are not ruling out class size effects, but rather that these enter the school fixed effects, and we assume that class size effects do not interact with the teacher’s identity.
Are these gains large or small? One way of contextualizing these gains is to compare them with the cross-sectional standard deviation of predicted teacher value added in our district, which is about 0.14σ (see Appendix Figure A5 for the distribution). The effect of the first-best reallocation is to increase teacher output by about a third of a standard deviation.

Another way of contextualizing the size of the gains is to compare them to the impacts of two commonly-proposed policies or allocation rules. Re-allocations within schools—i.e., matching teachers based on within-school variation in classroom composition—would only achieve 28% of the gains from the cross-school gains (row 4). Replacing the bottom 5% of teachers with teachers of median quality (as in Hanushek (2009) and Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff (2014a)), would achieve 22% of the gains from better sorting of the existing teacher pool (row 5), where we rank teachers based on their forecasted value added in their actual assignment.

In our reallocation analysis, we move more than 5% of teachers, so this comparison to teacher replacement policies might seem unbalanced. In Appendix Figure A6, we show that even replacing all below median teachers would achieve per-student gains of less than 0.054σ. Going the other way, in Appendix Figure A7 we show that reassigning just 10% of teachers delivers gains of over 0.02σ per student and full gains are nearly realized once 80% of teachers are reassigned.

In terms of distributional consequences, the first-best allocation entails larger gains for “advantaged” students than for disadvantaged students. The top panel of Figure 2 shows that schools with more disadvantaged students have smaller class sizes, and thus the first-best allocation favors advantaged students who tend to be assigned larger classes. At the same time, the bottom panel shows that teachers with high absolute advantage also tend to have a comparative advantage for disadvantaged students, so there is also a reason to send the best teachers to disadvantaged students. Here, we find that the first data pattern (the relationship between advantaged students having larger classes) dominates so that non-disadvantaged students have larger gains in the first-best allocation.

These distributional consequences come from a policy where the district weighs student types equally. If the district cared only about a single student type, then it could achieve large gains for that type. The bottom panel of Table 2 shows that targeting non-disadvantaged students would yield a 0.137σ per-student gain. But the non-targeted group sustains significant losses such that overall per-student gains are 30-45% of the potential efficiency gains.

The overall gains come (1) from sorting teachers to schools based on comparative advantage and (2) from placing high absolute advantage teachers in schools with larger class sizes (see Appendix Figure A8). These assignments may be very different from the ones in the data, which introduces two concerns. First, if our “reassignments” are farther away than the in-sample variation we use to validate our value-added model, then we may be less confident in our output predictions. We find that while some teachers end up in classrooms with different composition or sizes from the ones where we observe them, this variation is still within the support of our data (see Appendix Figure
Second, by moving teachers across different student types, we are relying on the cardinality in the test score measures. As an alternative way to scale test scores, we express them in percentiles and find that the predicted gains from reallocation are nearly identical (see Appendix Table A4).

We include sorting based on class size for three reasons. First, it is a feature of the environment: there is class size dispersion and we show in Appendix C that this variation is persistent over time. Second, teachers differ in their absolute advantage such that reassignments based on class size have the potential to matter for student achievement. Third, our validation exercise found that our output measures were mean forecast unbiased across class size changes. But because some readers may prefer reassignments based solely on comparative advantage, in row (4) we present the potential gains where we impose constant class sizes across all schools (see Appendix Table A5 for the full set of constant class size results). We estimate gains of 0.021, which are nearly identical to Delgado (2021)’s estimates using race-based match effects. These gains are 38% as large as the gains that incorporate class size variation. Thus, the potential to sort solely on comparative advantage remains economically meaningful.

Our specification likely misses some match effects. We find similar results when we allow for match effects to vary with different student observable characteristics. In Appendix Table A7 we show the structural parameters we estimate from a model where student types are summarized by race (White or non-White) or lagged math achievement (above or below median). In Section 7.4 we show that our allocation conclusions are similar for these other forms of heterogeneity. Further, we conduct a simulation exercise where we allow our modeled form of match effects to be incomplete. Specifically, we add i.i.d. match effects and assess how the potential gains vary with the size of the unmodelled match effect. We present the result in the top panel of Appendix Figure A10 and find that the potential gains only increase, such that our results may be a lower bound. We also find that our results from Section 7 are qualitatively unchanged.

4 The vacancy posting, application, and hiring process

We focus on the market for elementary-school classroom teachers for two reasons. First, teachers in these positions are typically responsible for instruction in the tested subjects and thus we can infer their quality from systematic gains in their students’ test scores. Second, because these positions also have common certification requirements, we can reliably classify which teachers are eligible for the position.

10 In that Appendix, we also show that there are not systematic patterns of teachers “bargaining” over assignments within schools: i.e., we show that newly hired and more experienced teachers are not assigned smaller classes or fewer disadvantaged students within a school.

11 A form of potential match effects we have not included are same-race (between teacher and student) match effects (Dee, 2004, 2005; Gershenson et al., 2018) and same-gender match effects (Dee, 2005; Lim and Meer, 2017). In our data, we find minimal evidence of same-race or same-gender effects (see Appendix Table A6). A form of match effects we cannot test for in our data is that of teaching practices discussed in Aucejo et al. (2021) and Graham et al. (2020).
4.1 Market overview

Our district organizes a decentralized hiring and transfer process in which teachers choose where to apply and principals choose whom to hire. External and internal (transfer) applicants are pooled into one market. Here we describe the basic market structure.

**Market organization:** The school district runs a centralized online hiring platform. Each school posts its openings on the platform, and teachers choose whether to apply to each posting.

**Timing:** We examine the “on-cycle” part of the market, which dictates hiring and transfers between school years. It begins in the winter, when the district notifies each school of known and expected attrition among the school’s work force and of how many positions that school may hire. It ideally ends with filled positions by late August before the new school year. Similar to Papay and Kraft (2016), some schools are unable to fill all positions by the start of the new school year.

**Postings:** The number of postings at a school reflects a combination of enrollment, budget, and the number of teachers who leave. All three pieces of information are not necessarily known before the main hiring season starts. This information delay generates variation within and across schools in the timing of postings. For example, late information about enrollment or budget fluctuations often necessitate late posting. Or if there is mid-year attrition, then the school would know long before hiring season started that there would be a vacancy, which allows for early posting.

**Applications:** An application consists of a variety of documents including a teacher certification and a brief diversity statement. The same set of documents applies to all positions. Thus, a prospective teacher faces a fixed cost of applying.

**Evaluation and hiring:** When a teacher applies to a position, the hiring school receives her application materials through the platform. The school’s principal may then rate the applications and choose to interview applicants on a rolling basis. For known positions at the beginning of the hiring period, there is a short window during which only transfers from within the district are able to apply. Schools can either hire from this pool or wait and consider more applicants.

If the principal wants to hire the candidate, she extends a job offer. The candidate has 24 hours to accept the offer, and if the teacher accepts, she commits to not accepting an alternate offer in the same cycle.

4.2 Empirical features and implications for modeling teacher applications

We document eight empirical patterns (or features of the market) that inform how we model the labor market.
The first set of features leads us to treat teacher applications as non-strategic. The natural alternatives to non-strategic applications would be a portfolio choice problem (Chade, Lewis, and Smith, 2014), possibly involving a waiting strategy. A portfolio choice problem would arise through positive marginal costs of each application or other interactions across applications. The following two features are inconsistent with these rationales for modeling applications as a portfolio choice problem:

**Feature #1: The marginal cost of applications is essentially zero.** Applying amounts to clicking a button that sends the standardized materials to the particular position. Indeed, a teacher certifies that she will not dis-intermediate the process. The website asks a teacher to sign the following statement: “I understand that I should not send materials to individual hiring managers or principals.”

**Feature #2: Principals do not see what other applications a teacher submits.**

Some versions of waiting strategies amount to dynamic portfolio management, and so the previous two institutional features push against these being empirically relevant. More generally, a waiting strategy would be sub-optimal in the sense that a teacher could miss many potentially desirable vacancies because of the following feature:

**Feature #3: Posting, applications, and hiring happen on a rolling basis throughout the hiring season.** From April to August, both sides of the market operate on a rolling basis (Appendix Figure A1). The left columns in Table 3a show that the modal month for posting is June, with only 16% posting in April. The middle columns show that applications lag postings. The right columns show that hiring occurs on a rolling basis and tends to lag posting by about a month. Over half of hires are made by the end of June, even though over a quarter of positions have yet to be posted.

In practice, teacher application behavior appears inconsistent with a waiting strategy as the following feature shows:

**Feature #4: Teachers who are on the platform apply to vacancies very soon after they are posted.** To characterize the timing of applications, we construct a measure of a teacher’s wait time to apply to a vacancy. The wait time is the time elapsed between the first day a teacher could have applied to a vacancy and the day the teacher actually applied to the vacancy, where we assume that the teacher only learns that a vacancy is available on days she logs into the system and applies.12

12 More formally, let \( A_j^t \) denote the set of days where teacher \( j \) applied to at least one vacancy in year \( t \), with \( a_j^t \in A_j^t \) measured in calendar days. Let \( b_k^t \) be the (calendar) day that position \( k \)’s vacancy is posted, and let \( c_j^t \) be the day that teacher \( j \) applies to position \( k \). For every application \( j \) sent in year \( t \), we define wait time \( w_{jkt} \) as:

\[
w_{jkt} \equiv c_j^t - \min_{a_j^t \in A_j^t, a_j^t \geq b_k^t} a_j^t.
\]
Figure 3 shows that the wait time to apply for vacancies is typically very short. The top panel of Figure 3 shows that the median wait time to apply to vacancies that were already posted on the first day the teacher logged into the system (the “stock” of vacancies) is 0 days. Thus, the applicant’s first day likely includes searching for older vacancies. Indeed, the mean vacancy an applicant applies to on day one has been posted for 23 days (Appendix Table A8). The bottom panel shows that the median wait time to apply to vacancies that were posted after the first day the teacher applies (the “flow” of vacancies) is also 0 days.

This feature leads us to treat applications as non-strategic and teachers’ choice sets as all positions with postings active between a teacher’s first and last application. In a full information environment, we would interpret the applications as revealing that these vacancies were preferred to the vacancies that the teacher did not apply to. But if teachers were inattentive, then this inference would be mistaken. One empirical implication of inattention would be that teachers wait to apply to vacancies because they only notice the vacancy on the second or third (or nth) time that they use the platform. The absence of waiting is inconsistent with this implication of inattentiveness.

These assumptions imply very large applicant choice sets (Panel A of Figure 4), from which applicants apply to many positions (Panel B of Figure 4). These large choice sets and application sets allow us to precisely estimate heterogeneous preferences. For a case study of this heterogeneity, in Appendix D we present descriptive evidence of significant amounts of cross-teacher heterogeneity in application rates to Title I (high-poverty schools), which our model interprets as preference heterogeneity.

We now turn to principals’ choice sets, which we define as all of the applications they receive. Natural alternative assumptions include (1) due to rolling nature of the market, the position receives a meaningful number of applications after the principal has made a decision, or (2) because those teachers might still be in the market, the principal pays attention to the most recent applications. The following feature is inconsistent with both of these alternatives (and is evidence against another strategic motive for teachers to time their applications):

**Feature #5: The timing of applications that principals rate and do not rate is similar.** We view all applications to each position. Table 4 shows that we see a hire in 80% of the postings. In 12% of postings, we see a declined offer. In 18% of postings, we see further principal evaluations and outcomes. We classify these into five groups: (1) interviews, (2) positive assessments, (3) neutral assessments, (4) negative assessments, and (5) application withdrawals.

From the data on the subset of vacancies for which we have multiple outcomes, the applications that receive comments have similar timing to those that principals do not rate. Table 4 shows the day of application relative to the application date of the eventual hire. Applications with principals’ comments are received on average only 2.2 days earlier than applications without comments.

Our construction of choice sets implies that teachers and positions are not active for the whole
cycle. With respect to identifying preferences, the concern would be that there is some systematic correlation between teacher and position characteristics and the timing of when they are active. Naturally, we cannot rule out all forms of sorting. We can, however, explore various forms of sorting based on observables. The following features show that there is little evidence for such sorting:

Feature #6: The timing of postings is hard to predict based on school observables. Institutionally, we have already discussed why posting—even within a school—is likely spread out: the arrival of relevant information is spread out.

One key source of heterogeneity in the timing of vacancies is that the the district has traditionally allocated replacement positions only once it is aware that a teacher is leaving, rather than “in expectation” of the number of vacancies. Since most teacher attrition occurs over the summer, this policy necessarily generates spread out posting. There are many reasons why teachers would not notify the schools they are leaving early enough for the school to post the job in April. For example, teachers may not know that they will leave a given school until they have secured another position, setting up a vacancy chain in which schools that lose a transferring teacher must search later in the market. Or, teachers may withhold the information, particularly if they fear their leaving could negatively affect them.

While some of these factors suggest that there could be a systematic relationship between posting date and school type, we do not observe such patterns in the data. First, Table 3a shows that the months with highest shares of Title I postings occur early in the cycle (in April (62%) and May (52%)). This finding runs counter to a vacancy chain in which teachers systematically flee Title I schools as jobs in non-Title I schools become available. Second, there is vast variation in the timing of job postings within the same school. Table 3c pools posting dates across the years in our data and shows that 89% of schools that post jobs in July also post jobs in April. A similar pattern holds for schools with April postings.

Feature #7: The timing of applications is hard to predict based on teacher observables. We focus on one key observable: the value-added score of a teacher. In Table 3b we show that teachers with above-median value-added scores apply slightly earlier in the cycle, but that these differences are small.

Feature #8: Teachers’ application stopping behavior is hard to predict. In terms of applicants ending their search, many applicants’ final applications come early enough in the cycle (9% in April or before, 16% in May, 22% in June) that they are potentially forgoing many yet-to-be-posted vacancies (Appendix Table A8, panel C). While some teachers who stop searching may have accepted a job, we see similar patterns among teachers who do not transfer that cycle. Thus, the end of search
might be driven by shocks unrelated to accepting a job.\footnote{Teachers may continue searching after their final application day. The frequency of applications after the first application day is low enough that statistically we cannot rule out long periods of search without making an application. In Section 7.4, we report a robustness check of adding a seven day buffer to the end of the window.}

### 4.3 Modeling principals

Principals take three actions: rating applicants, interviewing applicants, and hiring applicants. While it is conceivable that the offer decision might reflect strategic considerations (e.g., is this teacher likely to accept the offer?), such considerations are not relevant in the principal rating. We therefore use the principal rating as our primary indicator of principal preferences. (In our data, there is only a single field that records the principals’ actions. If a positive assessment turns into an interview, then the field records an interview. Hence, we interpret the entry “interview” or “hired” as being an application that received a positive rating.)

In terms of the principal choice set, we view Feature #5 (the timing of applications that principals do and do not rate is similar) as suggestive that principals consider all applications. But we do not have additional evidence on the timing of principals’ actions that would allow a more precise characterization of the process. In Section 7.4, we pursue a variety of robustness checks around this assumption.

### 5 Teacher preferences

#### 5.1 Applications Model

We specify a model that formalizes the discussion of how to infer teacher utilities from application choices. The district’s labor market consists of a finite set of potential teachers, indexed by $j$, and a finite set of positions, indexed by $p$. Each position is associated with a specific school, $k = k(p)$, and may be assigned to at most one teacher. The exception is the outside option ($p = 0$), which is not part of any school and may be filled by an unlimited number of teachers. This outside option includes leaving the district or leaving teaching.

At the beginning of year $t$, each teacher may have an initial assignment, denoted by $c$. For teachers new to the district, this assignment is the outside option ($c = 0$), while for incumbent teachers, the assignment is $j$’s position in the prior year, $c = p(j, t - 1)$. Teachers may always keep their initial assignment as their final assignment. On an exogenous date $d = d(j, t)$, teacher $j$ enters the transfer system.\footnote{We treat the decision to enter the system as exogenous. We discuss selection into the system in Appendix E.} If she enters, then she is active in the transfer system until an exogenous end date, $d' = d'(j, t)$.

If the teacher enters the transfer system, then she may apply to any position $p$ that is active at some point between $d$ and $d'$. There is no marginal cost to applying and there is no limit on...
the number of applications she can submit. Let \( a_{jpt} \) be an indicator for whether teacher \( j \) applied to position \( p \) in year \( t \). Teachers’ application decisions are private information known only to the position \( p \) and the teacher \( j \).

These assumptions lead teachers to treat the application process non-strategically by applying to any position with utility higher than her current position and the outside option. \( ^{15} \) Slightly abusing notation (since \( c = 0 \) for teachers outside the district), a teacher submits an application to position \( p \) if:

\[
a_{jpt} = 1 \{ u_{jpt} > \max \{ u_{jct}, u_{j0t} \} \},
\]

where \( u_{jpt} \) is teacher \( j \)'s utility from working at position \( p \) in time \( t \).

### 5.2 Parameterization

We adopt a characteristics-based representation of teacher utilities over positions. By summarizing the position in terms of a lower-dimensional set of characteristics, we allow teachers to vary in their valuations of these characteristics.

We specify teacher utilities over positions as:

\[
u_{jpt} = -\gamma d_{jpt} + \pi_j VA_{jpt} + \beta_j X_{pt} + \eta_j + \epsilon_{jpt},
\]

\( d_{jpt} \) is the one-way commute time (in minutes) between the teacher and the position and will serve as a numeraire for exposition (Appendix Figure A12 shows a binscatter of application probabilities against distance, revealing a strong downward slope until about 40 minutes). \( VA_{jpt} \) is teacher \( j \)'s total value added at position \( p \) in year \( t \).

Value-added, \( VA_{jpt} \), combines absolute and comparative advantage. We define a teacher’s absolute advantage to be her predicted value-added at a representative school:

\[
AA_{jt} = n_{1t} \hat{\mu}_{j1} + n_{2t} \hat{\mu}_{j2},
\]

where \( n_{mt} \) is the average number of type \( m \) students in a classroom in the district. Comparative advantage, \( CA_{jpt} \), at a specific position is then the difference between predicted value-added at school \( k(p) \) and absolute advantage:

\[
CA_{jpt} = VA_{jpt} - AA_{jt}.
\]

Because we control for absolute advantage in the person-time effects, \( \eta_j \), the coefficient on \( VA_{jpt} \), \( \pi_j \), captures the strength of teachers’ preferences for schools where their comparative advantage is high, reflecting the alignment between teachers’ preferences and student output. We allow for preference heterogeneity by including a random coefficient in \( \pi_j \):

\[
\pi_j = \tilde{\pi} + \sigma^V A \nu^{VA}_j,
\]

\( ^{15} \) We assume that any post-application steps necessary to be assigned to a position – e.g., interviews – are costless. In our data, teachers with multiple interviews are so rare that even if interviews are costly, they are rare enough that it is unlikely teachers consider dependence across applications.
where $\nu_j^{VA} \sim iid N(0, 1)$. Since $\pi_j$ varies across teachers but we do not have random coefficients on absolute advantage, $\pi_j$ includes both the preference over comparative advantage and any cross-teacher heterogeneity in preference over output.

$X_{pt}$ is a vector of observed characteristics of positions: the fraction of a school’s students that are economically disadvantaged ($e$), the fraction that are Black ($b$), the fraction that are Hispanic ($h$), and the fraction with an above median prior year math test score ($s$). We allow teachers to have heterogeneous preferences over these school characteristics. Specifically,

\[ \begin{align*}
\beta_j^e &= \beta_j^{e0} + \beta_j^{e1} AA_{jt} + \sigma^e \nu_j^e \\
\beta_j^b &= \beta_j^{b0} + \beta_j^{b1} AA_{jt} + \beta_j^{b2} Black_j + \sigma^b \nu_j^b \\
\beta_j^h &= \beta_j^{h0} + \beta_j^{h1} AA_{jt} + \beta_j^{h2} Hispanic_j + \sigma^h \nu_j^h \\
\beta_j^s &= \beta_j^{s0} + \beta_j^{s1} AA_{jt} + \sigma^s \nu_j^s
\end{align*} \]

(10)

where $Black_j$ and $Hispanic_j$ are indicators for teacher race categories and $\nu_j$ is a vector of independent, standard normal random coefficients. Thus, the $\sigma$ parameters capture the standard deviation of idiosyncratic preferences over each school characteristic.

We follow Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1982) and model $\eta_j$ using correlated random effects. We model teacher-year unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for teaching in the district as the sum of several components:

\[ \eta_{jt} = \lambda Z_{jt} + \rho CM_{jt} + \sigma^\eta \nu_j^\eta, \]

(11)

$Z_{jt}$ are teacher-year characteristics – whether the teacher is in the district, whether the teacher is Black, whether the teacher is Hispanic, whether the teacher is female, the teacher’s predicted value-added for economically disadvantaged students, the teacher’s predicted value-added for non-economically disadvantaged students, and dummy variables for whether the teacher has 2-3 years of prior experience, 4-6 years of prior experience, or more than 6 years of prior experience. $CM_{jt}$ is a set of teacher-year averages of the variables that vary across the job postings within teacher-year (value-added, commute time, interactions of teacher and school characteristics). Thus, through $CM_{jt}$, we allow unobserved heterogeneity to be correlated with $CA_{jpt}$ and $X_{pt}$. Finally, $\nu_j^\eta$ is an independent standard normal random effect.

$\epsilon_{jpt}$ is an iid Type I extreme value error. Let $V_{jpt} = u_{jpt} - \epsilon_{jpt}$ be $j$’s representative value for position $p$ in year $t$. Then the distributional assumption on $\epsilon_{jpt}$ implies that:

\[ Pr(a_{jpt} = 1) = \frac{\exp(V_{jpt})}{1 + \exp(V_{jct}) + \exp(V_{jpt})} \quad \text{and} \quad Pr(a_{jpt} = 1) = \frac{\exp(V_{jpt})}{1 + \exp(V_{jpt})}, \]

(12)

for teachers already in the district and teachers new to the district, respectively.
5.3 Estimation and Identification

We estimate the teacher preference parameters using the teachers’ applications to positions. We define a teacher’s choice set, \( P_j \), to be the set of vacancies that were active at the same time as the teacher. We estimate a teacher’s start and end (search) date as the dates of her first and last application. Similarly, we estimate a vacancy’s start and end (active) date as the dates it receives its first and last application.

We estimate teacher preferences via maximum simulated likelihood, where we simulate from the normal distributions of the random coefficients. Let \( n \) index each simulation iteration and let \( A_{jp} \) be the model-predicted probability that \( j \) applies to position \( p \) in year \( t \) in simulation iteration \( n \) at parameter vector \( \theta \). For each teacher \( j \) in year \( t \), we construct the simulated likelihood as:

\[
L_{jt} = \frac{1}{100} \sum_{n=1}^{100} \prod_{p \in P_j} \left( a_{jp} A_{jp} + (1 - a_{jp})(1 - A_{jp}) \right),
\]

where \( a_{jp} \) is an indicator for whether \( j \) applied to \( p \) in the data. Our full simulated log likelihood function is:

\[
l = \frac{1}{J} \sum_j log L_{jt}.
\]

Variation within choice sets help us identify the model’s parameters. For mean coefficients, the relevant features of the data are the mean application rates to schools with certain characteristics. We use the variation in these application rates across teacher characteristics to identify observable teacher preference heterogeneity. Finally, if individual teachers have high correlations in the characteristics of the positions they apply to (relative to those they do not) beyond what we would predict based on observables, then we would infer unobservable preference heterogeneity for these position characteristics.

We seek to predict teachers’ valuations over positions rather than causal effects of changes in position characteristics on choices. As a convenient way to interpret magnitudes, we will sometimes convert utility to minutes of commute time, which requires the stronger assumption that commute time is exogenous. But because we primarily make relative comparisons of the costs of various policies, we do not rely on having consistently estimated the causal effect of commute time, unless noted.

5.4 Teacher Preference Estimates

Table 5 presents the teacher preference model estimates. First, teachers prefer positions with greater shares of advantaged students. Second, teachers dislike positions with longer commutes. Finally,
teachers have only slight preference toward positions where they have higher value-added.

Responsiveness to school and match characteristics varies with observable and unobservable heterogeneity. For example, teachers with higher absolute advantage have more negative preferences over the school’s fraction of students that are disadvantaged. We also find a large positive same-race premium for Black teachers and schools with large fractions of Black students. In terms of unobservables, we typically find substantial dispersion in the random coefficients. For example, a standard deviation of the random coefficients on comparative advantage and fraction disadvantaged are each about 1.5 times the mean valuation.

To help interpret the strength of some of these relationships, Panels (a) through (c) of Figure 5 show how the average rank of positions in teachers’ preferences change as single characteristics change. We do not hold fixed other characteristics so that, for example, when we study commute time, other characteristics of schools are potentially changing. The figure emphasizes that commute time is a powerful predictor of rankings: changing commute time from 5 minutes to 25 minutes decreases the average rank of a position (for the average teacher) from about the 80th percentile to the 50th percentile. Similarly, the fraction of students that are disadvantaged is a powerful predictor of ranking: across the support, the mean ranking moves by about 20 percentiles, and if teachers were given their top choice there would be oversupply toward economically advantaged students (Appendix Figure A13). In contrast, while teachers do pursue comparative advantage, this relationship is quite weak: across the support of the data, varying teachers’ comparative advantage only increases the rank of a position by a couple percentiles.

Teachers’ preferences are not particularly aligned with the first-best allocation that maximizes student achievement. Panel (d) of Figure 5 shows that the mean ranking of the first-best position in teachers’ preferences is the 48th percentile (we use the same sample as in Section 7). Even if on average teacher preferences do not align with the planner, stronger teachers having more aligned preferences could limit the misallocation resulting from teachers’ preferences. The figure shows that this possibility does not occur: for the average strong teacher, the first-best position remains below her 50th percentile ranking. Thus, giving teachers more choice might not produce achievement gains.

6 Principal preferences

6.1 Model and parameterization

Each position $p$ is associated with a principal with the same index. Principal $p$ derives non-wage utility $\bar{v}_{jpt}$ from teacher $j$ holding position in year $t$. Because principals in our empirical context do not have to pay teacher wages out of a school budget, we model a principal as giving teacher $j$ a positive rating ($b_{jpt} = 1$) if the non-wage utility is positive: $\bar{v}_{jpt} > 0$.

We adopt a characteristics-based model and parameterize $\bar{v}_{jpt}$ to be a linear function of position
and teacher characteristics, a random effect, and an idiosyncratic teacher-position error:

$$\tilde{v}_{jpt} = \alpha_p W_{jpt} + \sigma_k \kappa_{pt} + \nu_{jpt}.$$ 

To allow principal preferences to possibly align with output, $W_{jpt}$ includes $j$’s total value-added at school $k(p)$. We further include common teacher characteristics: teacher prior experience (in bins of 2-3 years, 4-6 years, and 7+ years), whether the teacher has a Masters degree, whether the teacher is Black, whether the teacher is Hispanic, and whether the teacher is female.\footnote{We also include indicators for whether each demographic covariate is missing.} Finally, we include a constant and interact whether the teacher is Black with the fraction of the school’s students that are Black and whether the teacher is Hispanic with the fraction of the school’s students that are Hispanic. We allow principals to have heterogeneous valuations over $W_{jpt}$ by letting $\alpha_p$ vary with whether the school has Title I status.

To capture principals’ heterogeneous outside options and variation in a principal’s propensity to assign ratings, we include a normally distributed random effect ($\kappa_{pt}$). Finally, $\nu_{jpt}$ is i.i.d. Type I extreme value.

### 6.2 Estimates

Table\footref{table:principal_preferences} shows that principals favor teachers with higher value-added.\footnote{See Appendix\footref{appendix:likelihood} for the likelihood, which closely parallels the one for teachers.} Principals in general rate non-novice teachers and those with Masters degrees more highly. Title I school principals rate Black and Hispanic teachers more positively than non-Title I teachers. Because Title I schools have a larger share of Black students, schools with higher fractions of Black students assign higher total valuations to Black teachers.

To help interpret the strength of the value-added relationship, Panel (e) of Figure\footref{figure:principal_preferences} shows how the average percentile of teachers in principals’ preferences changes as the teacher’s projected value added in the position changes. The figure shows that projected value-added meaningfully changes the principal’s ranking of a teacher: across the support, the mean percentile goes from about the 25th percentile to the 60th percentile. That said, there is clearly substantial noise in principal’s rankings since even the best teachers are on average only in the 60th percentile.

How aligned are principals’ preferences with the first-best allocation that maximizes student achievement? From the difference in the slope between Panels (c) and (e) in Figure\footref{figure:principal_preferences} we might expect that the principals’ preferences are more aligned with the first-best ranking than teachers’. This increased strength is quantitatively small: Panel (f) of Figure\footref{figure:principal_preferences} shows that the average percentile of the first-best teacher for a principal is the 52nd (compared to the 48th for teachers). Thus, schools’ preferences are not very aligned with the planner’s preferred allocation.
7 Main results

7.1 Simulation details

We make several choices in how we simulate allocations.

Sample: We restrict attention to the teachers for whom we can compute value-added. This restriction drops a large number of teachers: in the labor market for the 2015-2016 school year, we end up with 178 teachers and 296 positions. Because we do not want artificial imbalance in the number of agents on each side of the market to play a role in our estimates (as highlighted by Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno (2017)), in each simulation run we randomly drop positions so that there are the same number of teachers and positions.

Randomness: While we estimate a distribution of random coefficients, in simulations we use a single draw of the random coefficients per teacher. This draw is the one used in estimation that maximizes the likelihood for the teacher. We draw the errors in the teacher and principal preferences in an i.i.d. fashion.

Preferences: In using DA to find stable allocations, we have teachers and principals submit rankings according to their true preferences. If there are multiple equilibria, then for one side of the market it is not a dominant strategy to report truthfully. Below we show, however, that the equilibrium is essentially always unique.

To average over the randomness in both the errors and the random dropping of vacancies, we average over 200 simulation runs.

7.2 Model fit

We begin by considering the model’s fit under status quo policies. We model the status quo as the teacher-propose equilibrium with restricted timing, and estimated teacher and school preferences. Figure 6 shows that the model matches the basic qualitative patterns in the data: schools with a larger share of disadvantaged students have teachers (a) with stronger absolute advantage in teaching, (b) with comparative advantage in teaching economically disadvantaged students, (c) less likely to be experienced, and (d) more likely to be Black. Quantitatively, the model almost exactly matches the slope for teacher experience and whether teachers are Black. The model slightly underpredicts the slope in absolute advantage and misses the intercept on absolute and comparative advantage and experience. The difference in intercept comes from the data and model samples differing (see Appendix E).

To assess whether our model fits better than alternate equilibrium assumptions, we examine the fit of models where schools and teachers match according to serial dictatorships, as opposed...
to our pairwise stability assumption. We find that a teacher serial dictatorship ordered by absolute advantage (Appendix Figure A14) and experience (Appendix Figure A15) and a principal serial dictatorship ordered by fraction of students that are economically disadvantaged (Appendix Figure A16) each produce a much worse fit than our model.

7.3 Trade-offs and effects of idealized policies

Now that we have preference estimates and the estimates of student achievement for any teacher-position combination, we can carry out the exercises outlined in Section 1.

7.3.1 Trade-offs

Figure 7 presents our main results. The figure’s production possibilities frontier (PPF) comes from solving a set of first-best problems (equation (3)) where we place different relative weight on students’ achievement and teachers’ utility. The top-left point reflects the allocation of teachers to schools that maximizes student achievement. The bottom-right point reflects the allocation of teachers to schools that maximizes teacher utility. There are two notable features of these points. First, there is a large gap in student achievement between the teacher and school first-best: the difference is 0.03 standard deviations of test scores. Second, there is a large gap in teacher utility between these allocations: the difference is about 35 minutes of one-way commuting time a day. A sensible valuation of an hour of commute time is about half of the hourly wage [Johnston 2021]. Hence, this finding, plus a causal interpretation of the commute time coefficient, implies that the gap between the teacher and school first-best is worth about one-sixteenth of a teachers’ annual earnings.

The third feature of the PPF is the very favorable trade-offs available between teacher utility and student achievement implied by the PPF. Concretely, if we start from the teacher-preferred allocation, then there are large gains in student achievement that barely affect teacher utility. For example, starting from the teacher preferred allocation, we can achieve three-quarters of the gains in student achievement (0.03 standard deviation units) from moving to the student achievement maximizing output at about 8 percent of the cost in terms of teachers’ utility.

7.3.2 Effects of policies

Turning to the set of stable allocations, we have several findings about the effects of various policies, which we further summarize in Figure 8. First, we find essentially no role for equilibrium selection. Relative to the status quo, changing from teacher-proposing to school-proposing DA has essentially no effect on the allocation. Indeed, with combinations of preferences and choice sets other than those in the status quo, we almost always find that the allocations from the teacher-propose and school-propose DA are identical. Second, policies that complete choice sets achieve about 15% of the total allocative gains.
Third, we find that simply making principals only value output slightly reduces student achievement. This finding might appear counterintuitive as we are aligning principals’ preferences with those of the planner and in Panel (e) of Figure 5 we showed that estimated preferences left considerable room for alignment. Instead, the result reflects natural “theory of the second-best” reasoning and thus highlights important interactions between teacher and principal preferences. We elaborate on these reasons below, after discussing the remaining points.

Fourth, making teachers also only value output (for instance with large output bonuses—which would be a large change in preferences compared to Panel (c) of Figure 5) has large effects on student achievement. If teachers only value output, then we achieve 74% of the total allocative gains available in this sample.

Finally, once we complete choice sets and make both teachers and principals only value output, the remaining 26% gap in allocative gains is due exclusively to the absence of transferable utility. Prices play two possible roles in improving allocations. First, prices let the district change the agents’ value from a match to align with that of the planner. Second, a quarter of the potential gains from reallocation are achievable only by making utility transferable; that is, principals who only value output will rank teachers largely based on absolute advantage rather than comparative advantage, and flexible prices (“transferable utility”) allows the district to take into account comparative advantage. In this context, this amounts to flexible, position-teacher specific prices, where this specificity means that two teachers in the same position could potentially earn different wages because of the combination of their different preferences and different productivity (at all positions, not just the matched one).

**Teacher utility in various allocations:** Teacher utility increases as we move from the status quo and first expand choice sets and then make principals only value output. Each of these steps increases teacher utility on average by about 5 minutes of one way commute time. In contrast, if we make teachers only value output, but still evaluate the utility of the assignment using our estimated preferences, then we find that this change reduces teacher utility by about 20 minutes of one way commute time relative to the status quo.

**Teacher ability to choose:** Making principals only value output does not achieve better student outcomes because of second-best reasoning: when principals only value output, stronger teachers achieve more preferred assignments, and—as we saw in Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 5—the preferences of (stronger) teachers are not solely about maximizing output. Figure 9 illustrates this result. We sort teachers by their absolute advantage and plot the rank in the teacher’s own preferences of the position to which she is assigned. The top panel shows the results with principals having their estimated preferences, and the bottom panel shows results with principals instead only valuing output. The key similarity between these figures is the upward slope: under both sets of preferences,
principals value output, and so teachers who on average produce more output are assigned to schools that the teachers prefer more.

The key difference between these figures is the steepness of the slopes: the slope is much steeper when principals only value output. Intuitively, more weight on output means that higher-ability teachers get more choice because (a) all principals agree on the value of this characteristic and (b) the dispersion in absolute advantage is high enough that teachers who are effective at one school are likely effective at another. These strong teachers then go to their preferred schools, which are likely to have more economically advantaged students (Figure 5 Panel (b)), even though stronger teachers tend to have comparative advantage with economically disadvantaged students (Figure 2). Hence, the strong teachers are not likely to choose the assignments that maximize student achievement.

This emphasizes the importance of second-best reasoning: in the presence of teacher preferences that are not aligned with the achievement-maximizing planner’s objectives, aligning only principals’ preferences may lead to allocations that are further from the planner’s objectives. Indeed, Bates (2020) studies policies in the same state that increased principals’ information about teacher effectiveness and finds changes in teacher sorting consistent with this reasoning.

**Distributional considerations:** The bottom panel of Figure 7 shows the mean achievement of economically advantaged and disadvantaged students in the allocations depicted in the top panel. There are a few notable features. First, in the status quo allocation, we find that disadvantaged students have better teachers (the gap is slightly larger than 0.01 standard deviations). Second, in the student achievement maximizing allocation there is no gap in value-added between advantaged and disadvantaged students. Like in the full sample, in the transfer sample class size is negatively correlated with the fraction of economically disadvantaged students and teachers with absolute advantage tend to have comparative advantage with economically disadvantaged students (Appendix Figure A17). But in the transfer sample, these factors balance out such that the first-best allocation splits the strongest teachers (Appendix Figure A18) and produces equal value-added across student types.

Third, and most strikingly, when we give principals output maximizing preferences the distributional implications reverse: now, advantaged students receive (quite dramatically) higher value-added than disadvantaged students. The reversal reflects the same consequences, discussed above, from giving the strongest teachers more choice.

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18To see a simple example of this phenomenon, let us continue with the example in Footnote 14. We maintain the output structure: teacher 1 has output \( \{10, 9\} \) and 2 has output \( \{8, 0\} \) at schools 1 and 2, respectively. We now assume that teachers have identical preferences \( \overline{1} \sim \overline{2} \). If principals maximize output, then they both rank teacher 1 above 2, and we end up with teacher 1 at school 1 and teacher 2 at school 2. Suppose principals place weight on other characteristics and instead both rank teacher 2 above 1. Then the decentralized equilibrium corresponds to the first-best and teacher 2 ends up at school 1 and teacher 1 at school 2.
7.4 Robustness

In Table 7, we present a wide variety of robustness checks to our main analysis. First, we show that our results are quantitatively very similar when we use the other years in our data. Second, we show that our main results are quantitatively similar when we instead split students by race (white and non-white) and on lagged achievement (at the median), rather than on economic advantage.

We consider two alternative definitions of teachers’ choice sets. First, we add a seven day buffer on the end, and assume that a teacher also considered the vacancies that were active seven days after her last application. Second, we narrow the choice set to focus only on vacancies that were available on the first day the teacher applied. In both cases, we find that our results are quantitatively unchanged.

A non-trivial share of teachers in our analysis sample only submit one application. There are a variety of reasons why these teachers might be different, or their applications might reflect different considerations. The table shows that dropping such single-application teachers leaves our results quantitatively unchanged.

We also consider a wide variety of alternative preference models. First, we explore various combinations of teacher and school fixed and random effects. Second, we allow for correlation in random coefficients on a constant, value-added, and fraction of students that are economically disadvantaged. Our results are quantitatively unchanged across these alternatives.

Turning to principal preferences, we consider two alternative definitions of principal choice sets. First, we restrict to applications that were submitted within plus or minus two weeks of the application that was hired. Second, we look at the window in which teachers were submitting applications to the vacancy. We split the window into halves, and estimate principal preferences on each half separately. The table shows that our results are quantitatively unchanged.

We also consider alternative ways of using the information in the data. First, we estimate a rank order logit model where we allow, e.g., a “hire” outcome to be better than a “positive assessment” outcome. Second, we retain the rank order logit specification, but use only the applications where the principal actively supplied information; that is, we drop the applications that are not rated. Finally, we use a binary logit but use as the only positive outcome an indicator for whether the individual was hired. The table shows that our results are quantitatively unchanged across these three alternatives.

Finally, we explore two alternative set-ups. First, we redo all our analysis using constant class size. As with the full sample, we find smaller gains from reallocation with constant class size in the transfer sample. Here, though, the attenuation is stronger. Qualitatively, the conclusions about the types of policies that would be effective remain unchanged. Second, we show the subset of outcomes that we can compute on the full sample. A larger share of the gains from reallocation can be achieved with output bonuses in the full sample than in the transfer sample (see Appendix E for further discussion of selection into the transfer sample).
8 Teacher bonus counterfactuals

In the last section, we showed the effects of idealized policies on output. The most effective such policy—and the only one that attained more than 15% of the potential achievement gains—was aligning teacher preferences over schools with the output they would produce. Complete alignment may be difficult to implement. Therefore, we now consider the effect of more realistic teacher bonus policies, similar to those that some districts have piloted. The upper bound on the effects of policies that subsidize output is to reach the point where teachers and principals only value output.

8.1 Implementation details

The district offers a two-part bonus on the basis of a teacher-position characteristic, \( z_{jpt} \), where each teacher receives \( b_0 \), a lump-sum amount, and \( b_1 z_{jpt} \), a bonus \( b_1 \) per unit of \( z_{jpt} \). Teacher \( j \)'s utility for teaching at position \( p \) in year \( t \) thus becomes:

\[
\tilde{u}_{jpt} = \tilde{u}_{jpt} + \gamma (b_0 + b_1 z_{jpt}),
\]

(16)

where we multiply by the commute time coefficient (\( \gamma \)) to express bonus spending in minutes of commute time. We consider a range of \( b_1 \) for each \( z_{jpt} \), which allows us to trace out the effects of different bonus sizes. For each \( b_1 \), we solve for the teacher-optimal stable equilibrium assignments, where \( p^*(j) \) is \( j \)'s assigned position, given the bonus size and the object that generates the bonus.

To focus on policies that are likely to receive teachers’ support, we hold teachers harmless by making each teacher weakly better off than in the status quo equilibrium. Let \( \Delta u_{jpt}^{b_1} = (\tilde{u}_{jpt} - \tilde{u}_{jpt}) + \gamma b_1 z_{jpt} \) be the change in teacher \( j \)'s utility (excluding the transfer) between the zero-bonus and the \( b_1 \) bonus equilibria. We set the transfer such that the teacher with the worst change is indifferent:

\[
b_0 = -\min_j \Delta u_{jpt}^{b_1}.
\]

(17)

This lump-sum transfer can be either positive or negative, and so the district can pay teachers to enter this policy. Thus, the district’s total cost to the bonus scheme is \( b_0 + b_1 z_{jpt} p^*(j) \), which depends on both the choice of \( b_1 \) and how it changes the allocation.

We examine bonus schemes over three objects (\( z_{jpt} \)). We start with bonuses for output (\( \sum_m n_{k(p)m} \tilde{u}_{jm} \)). Then we look at bonuses based on the fraction of disadvantaged students the teacher has (\( p_{k(p)1} \)). These bonuses mimic the hard-to-staff school bonuses that some districts have piloted. Finally, we interact school and teacher characteristics by considering bonuses based on a teacher’s absolute advantage times the fraction of disadvantaged students (\( (p_{00} \tilde{u}_{j0r} + (1 - p_{0r}) \tilde{u}_{j1r}) p_{k(p)1} \)).
8.2 Results

The top panel of Figure 10 shows the effect of these three bonus schemes on overall achievement relative to the status quo. For reference, the top dashed horizontal line shows the level of achievement in the the first-best allocation (in the transfer sample), the middle dashed line shows the “best case” for bonuses when teachers and schools only value output, and the lower dashed line shows the gains from an institutional policy of simply changing market timing. To allow for comparisons across bonus schemes, the horizontal axis is the total realized spending (normalized to be in minutes of commute time per teacher).

The first notable aspect of this figure is that we can see that bonuses are more costly than the first-best policies depicted in Figure 7 where the difference in teacher utility between the non-price stable allocation and the student achievement maximizing allocation was about 20 minutes of commute time per teacher. Here, even at 100 minutes of (one way) commute time per teacher, bonuses still do not achieve the maximal student achievement. This large difference in cost is driven by the uniformity of the bonus scheme. Prices that implement the first best allocations take into account preference variation in a way that keeps costs down. For example, if a school is trying to convince a close-to-indifferent teacher to take a position, then the school only needs to increase the wage offer slightly for the teacher to accept the offer. We demonstrate the savings from flexible prices by allowing for separate lump sum payments to each teacher and plotting the gains in the dashed black line. We find that at the spending level where the full potential gains are realized, the uniform bonus schemes have barely increased achievement.

Second, paying directly for achievement is the most efficient bonus scheme. In the status quo, disadvantaged students already have slightly better (matched) teachers and so paying teachers to be at schools with more disadvantaged students hardly increases output.

Third, changing market timing to complete choice sets only achieves 15% of the overall gains from achievement. Interpreting the commute coefficient causally, Figure 10 shows that such a policy would be cheaper than bonuses if it cost less than about 40 minutes of one way commute time per teacher to implement.

The bottom panel shows that there are important interactions between principal preferences and the effectiveness of teacher bonuses. We conduct an identical exercise except that we pair the teacher bonuses with a bonus to principals such that principals only value output. As we have seen, when we pay principals for output, the distributional consequences change dramatically. Now, the fact that teachers have strong preferences against teaching at schools with larger shares of disadvantaged students means that there is a large range of spending where policies that target this issue directly are the most cost effective. As we saw in Section 7, achievement is higher when there is some force pushing back on teachers’ preferences toward advantaged schools. In the absence of principals’ heterogeneous valuations, bonuses targeted toward disadvantaged students serve this purpose.


9 Discussion

This paper studies the allocation of teachers to schools and its implications for student outcomes. We start by estimating the potential gains in student achievement from within-district teacher reassignment and find that they are large (0.05σ). In the achievement-maximizing allocation, the strongest teachers are split between economically advantaged students (because they are in larger classes) and the economically disadvantaged students (because stronger teachers tend to have comparative advantage with them). We consider how to achieve these gains, recognizing that the allocation of teachers across schools represents a labor market equilibrium.

To study equilibrium in the labor market, we estimate teacher and principal preferences over matches. We find that teachers prefer positions described by homogeneous characteristics (e.g., fraction of advantaged students) and heterogeneous characteristics (e.g., commute time), with only slight preference toward positions where they have higher value-added. Giving teachers the ability to choose their position leads to excess supply at schools with advantaged students and sorting based on non-output heterogeneity. Thus, if teachers have some degree of choice in their assignment, then the district may want to counteract the sorting by changing how teachers value positions (e.g., with bonuses).

On the principal side, we find preferences for teachers who produce more student achievement, but that differences in output only explains some of the variation in preferences. Thus, the district might consider changing how principals value teachers.

When we put teacher and principal preferences together in an equilibrium model, however, we find more complicated policy implications. When teachers receive bonuses for output, they sort toward positions closer to the first-best. When principals receive bonuses for output, they seek the best teachers. But because absolute advantage dispersion is large, a second consequence of principal bonuses is that it grants the strongest teachers more choice. More choice among the best teachers does not necessarily lead toward higher achievement.

Our analysis concludes that in the absence of flexible prices, teacher bonuses are the primary policy tool for realizing achievement gains because they align teachers’ preferences with the district’s. But the optimal form of bonuses depends on how principals value teachers. Flexible prices, however, would produce achievement gains at a much lower cost.

While we find that in our district teacher value-added is relatively balanced across student types, our data and framework could be useful in designing policies that go beyond equalizing achievement gains to try to close baseline gaps.

We have abstracted from various margins that are relevant to teacher allocation. By considering the within-district assignment to schools, we have abstracted from selection at higher levels—the extensive margin of which district to teach in (Biasi, Fu and Stromme, 2021) or whether to become a teacher (Tincani, 2021)—and at lower levels—within-school assignments. We have also held fixed
the assignment of students to schools (e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu, Agarwal and Pathak (2017)) and the distribution of class sizes (e.g., Angrist and Lavy (1999); Hoxby (2000); Leuven, Oosterbeek and Rønning (2008)). Finally, we have held teacher and principal non-wage utility fixed in counterfactuals. But changes in malleable school characteristics, either under direct policy control (e.g., principal’s support of teachers (Dizon-Ross, 2020; Johnston, 2021)) or that change in equilibrium (e.g., teacher peer effects (Jackson and Bruegmann, 2009)) may be a substitute or complement to the policies we consider.
References


Levin, Jessica, and Meredith Quinn. 2003. “Missed Opportunities: How We Keep High-Quality Teachers out of Urban Classrooms.”


Table 1: Forecast Unbiasedness Tests for Value-Added Predictions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Res</th>
<th>Mean Diff</th>
<th>Mean Res</th>
<th>Mean Res</th>
<th>Mean Res</th>
<th>Mean Res</th>
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<tr>
<td>VA (Heterog)</td>
<td>1.052</td>
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<td>1.060</td>
<td>0.00650</td>
<td>0.00681</td>
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<td>VA Diff</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Post Transfer</td>
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<td>(0.00367)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.0212)</td>
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<td>(0.000835)</td>
<td>(0.000843)</td>
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</table>

The table includes tests of whether a value-added estimate is forecast unbiased. In the first and third through sixth columns, the outcome (“Mean Res”) is the mean student math test score, residualized by student demographics including lagged scores, school fixed effects, and teacher experience measures. The mean is taken over all students for a given teacher-year. In the second column, the outcome (“Mean Diff”) is the difference in the mean residualized math scores between a teacher’s economically disadvantaged and advantaged students. The “VA” measures allow for match effects (“Heterog”). The measures predict mean student residuals using data from all prior years a teacher taught. “VA Diff” is the difference in predicted value-added between a teacher’s economically disadvantaged and advantaged students (i.e., the predicted comparative advantage). “Post Transfer” refers to years after a teacher switched schools. The interaction with “VA” multiplies the post-transfer indicator with the heterogeneous value-added measure. Column (4) splits the year \( t \) observations into bins as a function of the change in share of disadvantaged students relative to the data observed for the teacher before year \( t \). The split is based on percentiles of the change. Column (5) splits the year \( t \) observations into bins as a function of the change in classroom size relative to the data observed for the teacher before year \( t \). The split is based on percentiles of the change. For columns (4) and (5) the p-value comes from F-test that the three coefficients are equal. Standard errors are clustered at the teacher level.
Table 2: Potential Gains from Reassignment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Per-Student Gains ($\sigma$)</th>
<th>As a Fraction of (Best-Actual)</th>
<th>Non-Disadvantaged</th>
<th>Disadvantaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Best</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worst</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
<td>-0.053</td>
<td>-0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternate Policies</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best w/i School</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replace Bottom 5% of Teachers</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Targeting Student Types</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max Non-Disadvantaged VA</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Max Disadvantaged VA</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant Class Size</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows the potential gains from reassignments of teachers to different schools. The sample is all teachers with non-missing value-added forecasts in 2016 (based on prior data), along with their corresponding 2016 assignments. Gains come from better matching of teachers to students, as teachers’ effectiveness may differ across student types, and placing better teachers in schools with larger class sizes. The first column shows the per-student gains from various allocations relative to the actual allocation. Gains are measured in student standard deviations ($\sigma$). The second column shows the gain as a fraction of the full difference between the best (output-maximizing) and actual allocations. The third and fourth columns show the per-student gains, relative to the actual allocation, for non-disadvantaged and disadvantaged students. The best within school allocation only changes the teacher-classroom assignments within a school. “Replacing Bottom 5% of Teachers” refers to replacing the bottom 5% of teachers according to realized per-student output with teachers with median value-added for each student type. The allocations that target particular student types maximize per-student output for students of one type only. “Constant Class Size” imposes an equal number of students (but possibly different composition) across all classes, in both the best and actual allocations. We assign classrooms the mean student composition and class sizes in that school in 2016 in all allocations except the “Best w/i School” and “Constant Class Size” allocations.
Table 3: Timing of posting, applying, and hiring

(a) Monthly shares by position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Posting</th>
<th>Applying</th>
<th>Hiring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vacs</td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Share TI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>16.24</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>21.57</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>27.63</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>24.82</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>9.19</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1807</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>342667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Monthly shares by teacher value-added

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Has VA</th>
<th>Above median VA</th>
<th>Top decile VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Apps</td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Share TI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>3050</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>9662</td>
<td>19.75</td>
<td>0.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>16832</td>
<td>34.40</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>13673</td>
<td>27.95</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>5522</td>
<td>11.29</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>48739</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>21594</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Early vs. late posting times by school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Posts in April</th>
<th>Posts in July</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows the timing of posting, applying, and hiring during a cycle. Panel (a) shows the distribution of vacancy postings, applications, and hires by month, where hires correspond to the timing of the applicant who was hired to the position. For each type of action, we show the share that corresponds to Title I positions. Some of the vacancies produce multiple hires. In Panel (b) we show the distribution of applications by month, where we split the sample of applicants into those with a value-added forecast (i.e., had taught in tested grades and subjects in North Carolina prior to applying), those with above median value-added, and those in the top decile. Panel (c) shows the cross-tabulation of whether a school posts a vacancy in April and whether that school posts a vacancy in July (in the same cycle).
This table shows the frequency and timing of application outcomes. The data record a single outcome per application; as an example, “Interview” implies not hired as otherwise the “Interview” outcome would be replaced by “Hired.” The data record “Hired,” which we split into “Hired successfully” for teachers who taught in the position’s school the following year, “Hired but taught elsewhere” for teachers hired who taught in district but not at that position’s school, and “Hired but not in district” for teachers hired who did not appear in the district the following year. “Positive,” “Middle,” and “Negative” reflect the authors’ coding of different text categories. “No comment” includes applications without an updated status. Panel (a) shows frequencies at the application level and panel (b) shows frequencies at the position level for at least one outcome across all applications to that position (i.e., “Hired” indicates at least one application led to a hire). “Any Non-Hire Action” is a positive, middle, or negative assessment or an application withdrawal. In panel (c) we calculate the difference in timing (in days) between when an application was made and when the application that led to a hire was made. A value of 1 would indicate an application made 1 day after the one that led to a hire. In the last two rows, we split the sample into those with no notes (“No comment”) and those with an outcome.

### Table 4: Application evaluations, outcomes, and timing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hired successfully</th>
<th>Hired but taught elsewhere</th>
<th>Hired but not in district</th>
<th>Declined offer</th>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Withdrew</th>
<th>No comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>0.00051</td>
<td>0.00003</td>
<td>0.00017</td>
<td>0.00006</td>
<td>0.00000</td>
<td>0.00064</td>
<td>0.00029</td>
<td>0.00037</td>
<td>0.00002</td>
<td>0.07367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Count</strong></td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2,887</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,655</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>333,780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Outcomes at the application level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hired</th>
<th>Declined offer</th>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Withdrew</th>
<th>No comment</th>
<th>Any Non-Hire Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>0.799</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.985</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Count</strong></td>
<td>1,457</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1,797</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Outcomes at the position level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>10th</th>
<th>25th</th>
<th>50th</th>
<th>75th</th>
<th>90th</th>
<th>Std. dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All applications</td>
<td>343,161</td>
<td>-0.0</td>
<td>-15.6</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>14.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No notes</td>
<td>333,780</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-15.2</td>
<td>-5.6</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>14.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluated with notes</td>
<td>9,381</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-32.1</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>24.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) Timing relative to hired applicant
Table 5: Teacher preference estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.032</td>
<td>4.453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commute Time</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commute Time Missing</td>
<td>-1.660</td>
<td>0.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Added</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dev Value Added RC</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**School Characteristics and Interactions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fraction Disadvantaged</td>
<td>-1.188</td>
<td>0.136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction Black</td>
<td>-0.452</td>
<td>0.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction Hispanic</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction Above Median Achievement</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abs Adv x Fraction Disadvantaged</td>
<td>-0.797</td>
<td>1.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abs Adv x Fraction Black</td>
<td>-1.635</td>
<td>1.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abs Adv x Fraction Hispanic</td>
<td>2.487</td>
<td>1.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abs Adv x Fraction Above Median Achievement</td>
<td>-1.997</td>
<td>1.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black x Fraction Black</td>
<td>1.072</td>
<td>0.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Fraction Hispanic</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>0.771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dev Fraction Disadvantaged RC</td>
<td>1.591</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dev Fraction Black RC</td>
<td>1.296</td>
<td>0.054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dev Fraction Hispanic RC</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>0.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dev Fraction Above Median Achievement RC</td>
<td>1.397</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Teacher Characteristics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VA Non-Disadvantaged Students</td>
<td>0.746</td>
<td>0.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA Disadvantaged Students</td>
<td>0.937</td>
<td>0.331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In District</td>
<td>-0.509</td>
<td>0.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>1.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>6.017</td>
<td>3.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.284</td>
<td>0.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience 2-3</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience 4-6</td>
<td>-0.268</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience 7+</td>
<td>-0.141</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dev Random Effect</td>
<td>1.687</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chamberlain-Mundlak Device**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fraction Disadvantaged Mean</td>
<td>-1.903</td>
<td>3.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commute Time Mean</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commute Time Missing Mean</td>
<td>1.231</td>
<td>0.249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value Added Mean</td>
<td>-0.489</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction Black Mean</td>
<td>-2.786</td>
<td>2.707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction Hispanic Mean</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>2.457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraction Above Median Achievement Mean</td>
<td>-0.986</td>
<td>4.718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abs Adv x Fraction Disadvantaged Mean</td>
<td>-37.628</td>
<td>19.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abs Adv x Fraction Black Mean</td>
<td>36.183</td>
<td>18.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abs Adv x Fraction Hispanic Mean</td>
<td>15.838</td>
<td>19.942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abs Adv x Fraction Above Median Achievement Mean</td>
<td>-16.346</td>
<td>6.488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black x Fraction Black Mean</td>
<td>-2.200</td>
<td>2.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Fraction Hispanic Mean</td>
<td>-20.462</td>
<td>14.686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Students Mean</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows teacher preference coefficients, estimated using maximum simulated likelihood. We model the probability that a teacher applies to a position where the alternate options are not teaching in the district or keeping the current position. Random coefficients (“RC”) are independent and simulated from the standard normal distribution. We model unobserved teacher-year heterogeneity using a [Mundlak (1978)] and [Chamberlain (1982)] device, taking the mean of each covariate across an applicant’s choices. Commute time is measured in minutes, value added is total predicted output. Experience below 2 years is the omitted category.
Table 6: Principal preference estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.363</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St Dev Random Effect</td>
<td>1.531</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title I</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value-Added</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value-Added x Title I</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience 2-3</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience 2-3 x Title I</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience 4-6</td>
<td>0.271</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience 4-6 x Title I</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience 7+</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience 7+ x Title I</td>
<td>-0.344</td>
<td>0.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience Missing</td>
<td>-0.342</td>
<td>0.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience Missing x Title I</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters x Title I</td>
<td>0.124</td>
<td>0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-1.035</td>
<td>0.227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black x Title I</td>
<td>1.722</td>
<td>0.453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black x Fraction Black</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>0.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black x Fraction Black x Title I</td>
<td>-0.253</td>
<td>0.511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>-0.690</td>
<td>0.454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Title I</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Fraction Hispanic</td>
<td>2.259</td>
<td>2.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic x Fraction Hispanic x Title I</td>
<td>-1.833</td>
<td>2.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female x Title I</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Missing</td>
<td>-0.327</td>
<td>0.230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Missing x Title I</td>
<td>-0.197</td>
<td>0.277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race Missing</td>
<td>-0.530</td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race Missing x Title I</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA Missing</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VA Missing x Title I</td>
<td>-0.230</td>
<td>0.124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows principal preference coefficients, estimated using maximum simulated likelihood. We model the probability that a principal submits a positive outcome (hire, interview, positive rating) for an application. Random effects are simulated from the normal distribution. Experience below 2 years is the omitted category. Value-added is total predicted output.
Table 7: Robustness: output relative to status quo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Options</th>
<th>Principal Max VA</th>
<th>Teach Max VA</th>
<th>Both Max VA</th>
<th>First Best</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>0.0044</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>0.0216</td>
<td>0.0228</td>
<td>0.0309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Vary year: baseline is 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All Options</th>
<th>Principal Max VA</th>
<th>Teach Max VA</th>
<th>Both Max VA</th>
<th>First Best</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>0.0025</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
<td>0.0238</td>
<td>0.0228</td>
<td>0.0328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>0.0028</td>
<td>0.0017</td>
<td>0.0234</td>
<td>0.0225</td>
<td>0.0313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
<td>0.0217</td>
<td>0.0225</td>
<td>0.0312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
<td>-0.0091</td>
<td>0.0228</td>
<td>0.0243</td>
<td>0.0342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>0.0058</td>
<td>-0.0053</td>
<td>0.0244</td>
<td>0.0276</td>
<td>0.0363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Vary student type split: baseline is economic disadvantage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observable</th>
<th>All Options</th>
<th>Principal Max VA</th>
<th>Teach Max VA</th>
<th>Both Max VA</th>
<th>First Best</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achievement</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>0.0243</td>
<td>0.0277</td>
<td>0.0359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>0.0032</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0232</td>
<td>0.0275</td>
<td>0.0356</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Vary choice set construction for teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>All Options</th>
<th>Principal Max VA</th>
<th>Teach Max VA</th>
<th>Both Max VA</th>
<th>First Best</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7 day buffer</td>
<td>0.0046</td>
<td>-0.0021</td>
<td>0.0215</td>
<td>0.0227</td>
<td>0.0309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First day choice sets only</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
<td>0.0251</td>
<td>0.0263</td>
<td>0.0345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drop single app. teachers</td>
<td>0.0032</td>
<td>-0.0026</td>
<td>0.0205</td>
<td>0.0221</td>
<td>0.0303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Vary teacher preference specification to use binary logit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Teacher Preference Model</th>
<th>All Options</th>
<th>Principal Max VA</th>
<th>Teach Max VA</th>
<th>Both Max VA</th>
<th>First Best</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No REs or FEs</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
<td>-0.0011</td>
<td>0.0219</td>
<td>0.0232</td>
<td>0.0315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School FEs</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
<td>-0.0009</td>
<td>0.0231</td>
<td>0.0245</td>
<td>0.0328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School REs</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
<td>-0.0019</td>
<td>0.0215</td>
<td>0.0232</td>
<td>0.0312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher FEs</td>
<td>0.0045</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>0.0213</td>
<td>0.0225</td>
<td>0.0307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher REs</td>
<td>0.0037</td>
<td>-0.0004</td>
<td>0.0209</td>
<td>0.0225</td>
<td>0.0307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher REs, School FEs</td>
<td>0.0019</td>
<td>-0.0091</td>
<td>0.0239</td>
<td>0.0256</td>
<td>0.0337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher FEs, School FEs</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>-0.0110</td>
<td>0.0248</td>
<td>0.0261</td>
<td>0.0344</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Allow for correlated random coefficients in teacher preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corr. R.C.</th>
<th>All Options</th>
<th>Principal Max VA</th>
<th>Teach Max VA</th>
<th>Both Max VA</th>
<th>First Best</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0038</td>
<td>-0.0018</td>
<td>0.0230</td>
<td>0.0243</td>
<td>0.0324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Vary window in which we estimate principal preferences: baseline is all applications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Window</th>
<th>All Options</th>
<th>Principal Max VA</th>
<th>Teach Max VA</th>
<th>Both Max VA</th>
<th>First Best</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W/in 2 weeks of hire</td>
<td>0.0046</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0219</td>
<td>0.0231</td>
<td>0.0312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First half</td>
<td>0.0041</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>0.0215</td>
<td>0.0233</td>
<td>0.0314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second half</td>
<td>0.0044</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0214</td>
<td>0.0236</td>
<td>0.0316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Estimate principal preferences using rank order logit: baseline is binary logit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application Outcome</th>
<th>All Options</th>
<th>Principal Max VA</th>
<th>Teach Max VA</th>
<th>Both Max VA</th>
<th>First Best</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All data</td>
<td>0.0041</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.0210</td>
<td>0.0233</td>
<td>0.0315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active choices</td>
<td>0.0027</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>0.0194</td>
<td>0.0231</td>
<td>0.0313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hire outcome only</td>
<td>0.0048</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.0220</td>
<td>0.0241</td>
<td>0.0322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Hold class sizes constant: baseline uses class size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Size</th>
<th>All Options</th>
<th>Principal Max VA</th>
<th>Teach Max VA</th>
<th>Both Max VA</th>
<th>First Best</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.0005</td>
<td>-0.0029</td>
<td>0.0047</td>
<td>0.0045</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Some outcomes on full sample: baseline uses transfer sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>All Options</th>
<th>Principal Max VA</th>
<th>Teach Max VA</th>
<th>Both Max VA</th>
<th>First Best</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full sample</td>
<td>0.0473</td>
<td>0.0543</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows robustness checks for our main results. The columns correspond to the change in mean student achievement (in student standard deviation units) between the considered counterfactual and the estimated status quo. “All Options” expands teachers’ choice sets to all positions, “Max VA” corresponds to ranking positions (or teachers) by predicted value-added, and “First Best” is the output-maximizing allocation. In the first section, we vary the year in which we implement our main exercise. In the second section, we show results where teacher-school match effects depend on different student observable characteristics. In the third section we vary the assumptions around teachers’ choice sets or drop teachers who make single applications. In the fourth section, we vary the level of random or fixed effects in the teacher preference model, while in the fifth section we allow for correlated random coefficients on a constant, total value-added, and fraction of students who are economically disadvantaged. In the sixth section we vary principals’ choice sets while in the seventh we vary how we treat an application’s outcome in the principal preference model. In the eighth section we show results where preference estimation and counterfactual analysis use constant class sizes across all positions in the district. In the final section, we show outcomes for the full sample of teachers with value-added forecasts, not just the teachers who apply to transfer. Because we lack preferences for these teachers, we only estimate a few equilibria.
The figure is a binscatter, where an observation is a teacher-year and math value-added estimates are predictions using data from prior years. Units are student standard deviations. The y-axis is the mean student math test score, residualized by student demographics including lagged scores, school fixed effects, and teacher experience measures. The mean is taken over all students for a given teacher-year.
Figure 2: Features of classes and teachers

(a) Class size and fraction disadvantaged

(b) Comparative advantage for disadvantaged students, and absolute advantage

The figures show binscatters related to classroom characteristics and teacher characteristics. The top panel shows the relationship between a school’s (mean) disadvantaged share of students and a school’s (mean) number of students per teacher. The right-most point of the binscatter, with 100% of a school’s students economically disadvantaged, accounts for 36% of the sample. The bottom panel shows the relationship between a teacher’s absolute advantage (x-axis) and comparative advantage in teaching economically disadvantaged students (y-axis). For this figure, absolute advantage is the average value-added across students types (rather than the value-added at a representative school) to avoid mechanical correlations between absolute and comparative advantage.
The figures show the wait time for applicants to apply to vacancies. In Panel A, we look at vacancies that were “in stock” (already posted) on the day the teacher first applied on the platform. We plot the “leave one out” wait time, where we omit one job the teacher applied to on the first day. In Panel B we look at the wait time to apply to vacancies that were posted after the teacher first applied on the platform. We measure wait time as the time from when the teacher first applied to another job (once the focal position is posted) until they apply to the posted job. We place vertical dashed lines at the median wait time.
Figure 4: Choice and application set sizes

(a) Choice sets

The figures are histograms of the number of positions a teacher has in her choice set (Panel A) and the number of positions a teacher applies to (Panel B). An observation is an applicant-year. Choice sets comprise the set of vacancies that are active while at some point between the teacher’s first and last application in a given cycle.
This figure shows bivariate relationships between characteristics and preferences. In Panels (a)-(d), we estimate each teacher’s ranking over positions and order positions from a teacher’s most preferred (100) to least preferred (0). In Panels (e)-(f), we estimate each principal’s ranking over teachers and order teachers from a principal’s most preferred (100) to least preferred (0). Panels (a)-(c) show of bivariate relationships between characteristics in our teacher preference model and the position’s mean preference percentile from our teacher preference mode. Panel (e) shows the bivariate relationship between the teacher’s total value-added in the position and the mean preference percentile of the principal for the teacher in the principal preference model. For these bivariate relationships, we do not hold fixed other characteristics; for example, commute time may covary with other characteristics. For panels (d) and (f) we estimate the output-maximizing allocation of teachers to positions and then calculate the preference percentile for each assignment in this allocation.
This figure compares the allocations implied by the model to the allocations we observe in the data. The data refers to all teachers in the district. The model refers to the teachers who apply in the transfer system for whom we have value-added scores. Positions are sorted on the x-axis by share of disadvantaged students.
This figure simulates the trade-off between teacher preferences and student achievement (Panel A) and between student achievement for economically advantaged and disadvantaged students (Panel B). The “PPF” represents the solution to the social planner’s problem from placing different relative weights on teacher preferences and student achievement. The student-optimal point maximizes student achievement and is when the planner only weights students. The teacher-optimal point maximizes teacher preferences and is when the planner only weights teachers. The status quo (point 1) uses teacher and principal estimated preferences, restricted choice sets, and solves for the teacher proposing stable allocation. The status quo with school proposing allocation is the same as the status quo except it is the school-proposing solution. Point 2 takes the status quo and gives teachers and principals all options. Point 3 takes point 2 and gives principals preferences to maximize value-added. Point 4 takes point 3 and also gives teachers preferences to maximize value-added. The Figure plots averages over 200 simulations.
Figure 8: Summary of changes in output relative to status quo

This figure summarizes the mean student achievement from allocations presented in Figure 7. The status quo output has been normalized to 0. The status quo corresponds to point 1, all options to point 2, principals maximize VA to point 3, and principals and teachers maximize VA corresponds to point 4. The “max VA” point corresponds to the “student-optimal” point in Figure 7.
This figure presents the preference percentile of the position to which the teacher is assigned in two equilibria. We estimate a teacher’s ranking of all positions and express it in percentiles, where 100 is the teacher’s most preferred position. The top panel shows the status quo (point 1 in Figure 7). The bottom panel shows the same outcomes in point 3 in Figure 7, the status quo with the complete choice set, and principals maximize value-added. Teachers are ordered on the x-axis by their absolute advantage (predicted value-added at the district’s representative school).
This figure shows the effect of bonus schemes on achievement per student. In both panels, the x-axis shows the cost of the policy per teacher, which we express in minutes of commute time per teacher. The y-axis shows the benefits in terms of achievement per student. We consider three policies: subsidizing achievement directly, subsidizing the position based on the fraction of disadvantaged students in the position, and subsidizing the position based on fraction disadvantaged interacted with the teacher’s absolute advantage. In the top panel, we take as the baseline allocation the status quo, and the constant part of the bonus is chosen to make teachers weakly better off relative to this allocation. In the bottom panel we replace estimated principal preferences with preferences that maximize output. The dashed line in the top panel is the cost of the first-best policy and represents movements along the PPF. The three horizontal dashed lines correspond to the output in the first-best (top), the output in the allocation where teachers and principals each maximize value-added and choice sets are complete (point 4 in Figure 7 (middle)), and the output in the allocation where teachers and principals each maximize estimated preferences and choice sets are complete (point 2 in Figure 7 (bottom)).