Direct, indirect, and composition effects of monetary interventions

James S. Cloyne† Óscar Jordà‡ Alan M. Taylor§
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Abstract

Impulse responses trace the average effect of a policy intervention on a macroeconomic outcome over time. Using local projections, this dynamic average effect can be decomposed three ways as: (1) the direct effect of the intervention on the outcome; (2) the indirect effect due to changes in how other covariates affect the outcome when there is an intervention; and (3) a composition effect due to differences in covariates between treated and control subpopulations. This Blinder-Oaxaca-type decomposition of the impulse response provides convenient ways to evaluate the effects of policy, state-dependence, and balance conditions for identification.

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†Department of Economics, University of California, Davis; and CEPR ().

‡Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco; and Department of Economics, University of California, Davis (oscar.jorda@sf.frb.org; ojorda@ucdavis.edu).

§Department of Economics and Graduate School of Management, University of California, Davis; NBER; and CEPR (amtaylor@ucdavis.edu).
1. Introduction

An accurate measure of exogenous movements (or interventions) in monetary policy may not be enough to empirically evaluate its effects on economic outcomes. There are at least two reasons why this may be the case. First, in small samples, there can be differences in average economic conditions between the subpopulations implicitly defined by whether or not there is an intervention, even if in large samples these differences would vanish under appropriate identification. Failure to sterilize this lack of balance will bias estimates of the impulse response. Second, interventions can affect how other variables affect the outcomes. The impulse response will then conflate this indirect effect with the direct effect of the intervention itself. Traditional estimates of impulse responses, such as those based on vector autoregressions or VARs, implicitly assume that these two effects are zero. We show that this is far from being the case in the data and what to do about it. Our paper thus explains how to correct for these distortions and thus obtain an accurate measure of the effect of monetary policy interventions.

Empirical impulse responses are diagnostic statistics of those economic mechanisms most likely to explain the data. They are routinely used to evaluate alternative macroeconomic models of the business cycle. Not unlike medical trials, randomly assigned (unsystematic and unanticipated) interventions—the impulse—are the surest way to avoid confounding from alternative sources, whether observable or not. The literature has therefore dedicated considerable effort to obtaining such exogenous monetary interventions. Recent examples include Gürgaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005), Gertler and Karadi (2015), Miranda-Agrippino (2015), and Ramey (2016), among several others. Our particular focus here will be on an updated version of Romer and Romer (2004) constructed by Cloyne and Hürtgen (2016). The reason we use this series of monetary shocks is that they will provide for a well-accepted benchmark for our experiments.

Impulse responses can be interpreted as the dynamic counterpart of the ubiquitous average treatment effect reported in applied economics. In a typical randomized controlled trial, the average treatment effect compares the counterfactual expectation of the outcome variable under intervention (the treatment subpopulation) with the expectation absent intervention (the control subpopulation), both conditional on observable information. Impulse responses can similarly be seen as the difference between a counterfactual and its forecast—which is a conditional expectation. Thus, a natural and convenient way to compute impulse responses is via local projections (Jordà, 2005).

Specifically, the decomposition methods that we introduce take the local approach in Jordà (2005) and extends it to be able to carry out the well-known Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). This decomposition is standard in applied microeconomics (Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo, 2011), but until now had not found equivalent acceptance in applied macroeconomics.

Extending the local projections framework in this manner turns out to be trivially simple.
Estimation and inference can be obtained by standard linear regression methods. Yet the extension is sufficiently general to allow for a great deal of unspecified state-dependence. Given the current state of the economy, in our case simply characterized by interest rates, inflation and economic activity, a 25 basis point increase in the federal funds rate target can have very different effects. Using historical episodes to characterize states of interest, we reexamine long-standing explanations on the effectiveness of monetary policy.

We believe that although the new methods introduced here are an important refinement over long-standing views on how monetary economies work, they have their limitations. As Fortin et al. (2011), the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition inherently follows a partial equilibrium approach. For example, it is not correct to infer how much more or less effective monetary policy would be if, say, fiscal policy actively pursued a reduction of public debt to 30% of GDP. Instead, the decomposition measures differences in monetary policy effectiveness by averaging across alternative historical episodes whose make-up it takes as given. In that regard, it is not different than if one were to try to extrapolate from an impulse response what the appropriate course of action is for the monetary authority. Our analysis is not normative. That said, there may situations where external instruments are available to identify these alternative channels but they are not explicitly explored in this paper.

Using the new methods that we introduce here, we begin by replicating estimates of the responses of economic activity, inflation, and interest rates reported in Romer and Romer (2004) using local projections. These estimates serve as benchmarks and indeed confirm the findings in Romer and Romer (2004). Still within the traditional framework, we show that there exist differences in the treated and control subpopulations. These differences generate bias in traditional estimates of impulse responses and we show what the corrected responses look like.

Next we go one step further. Using a Blinder-Oaxaca specification, we extend the analysis and decompose these responses into composition, indirect, and direct effects of a monetary policy intervention. We show that composition effects attenuate the activity response to an increase in the funds rate, but accentuate the response of inflation. At the mean, the indirect effect is relatively small, perhaps explaining why studies based on VARs have usually found little evidence of neglected non-linearities. However, deviations from sample averages affect the shape of the responses greatly, as we show.

We pursue this question further by examining selected historical episodes. We examine the month following the stock market crash of 1987. The funds rate was lowered by 50 basis points in response to the crash. Yet we show that such a reaction would be expected to have a much more muted effect on economic activity than it did on average historically. In contrast, in 1996, about the half way point of a long expansion and with productivity on the upswing, we find, perhaps not surprisingly, that policy actions would have a smaller effect on prices despite affecting economic activity almost the same as historically.

To sum up, we view our paper as making two types of contribution, one methodological, the other furthering our understanding of how monetary economies behave. On the methodological front we show that with a relatively straightforward extension of the local projection approach, one
can gain tremendous insight from the data. We expect that these methods will be particularly useful in other applications and that they will be extended in a variety of ways.

2. Preliminary statistical discussion and intuition

When it comes to investigating causal relationships, randomized controlled trials are generally viewed as the gold standard of scientific research. We briefly discuss some basic ideas based on this paradigm to motivate the local projection decomposition that we introduce later on. We forgo being too precise about the assumptions needed here, instead preferring to focus on the intuition. Formal statements of any assumptions needed can be found in, e. g., Wooldridge (2001) and Fortin et al. (2011). For now assume that treatment \( s \in \{0, 1\} \) is randomly assigned, at least conditional on controls \( x \).

Suppose that we are interested in the response of an outcome variable, \( y \), to a randomly assigned intervention, \( s \). The observed data are therefore generated by:

\[
y = (1 - s) y_0 + s y_1 = y_0 + s (y_1 - y_0).
\]

That is, the observed random variable \( y \) is either the random variable \( y_0 \), which is observed when \( s = 0 \), or it is the random variable \( y_1 \) when \( s = 1 \). Note that \( y_0, y_1 \) are potential outcomes in the terminology of the Rubin causal model (Rubin, 1974). The random variables \( y_j \) with \( j \in \{0, 1\} \) have unconditional mean \( E(y_j) = \mu_j \). A natural statistic of interest is \( E(y_1 - y_0) = \mu_1 - \mu_0 \), that is, the average difference in the unconditional mean between the treated and the control subpopulations. Note that the data can be observed in one state or the other, but we never get to observe a realization of these random variables in both states simultaneously.

The potential outcomes notation can be somewhat new to applied macroeconomists. A few examples can help clarify basic notions. In a randomized controlled trial, a common (strong) ignorability assumption is that \( y_j \perp s \) for \( j = 0, 1 \). This assumption does not imply that \( y \) and \( s \) are unrelated to one another. We are not assuming that there is no treatment effect. Rather, the assumption means that the choice of intervention \( s \) is unrelated to the potential outcomes that may happen for a given choice of \( s \in \{0, 1\} \). For this reason, a quantity such as \( E(y_1 | s = 0) \) is well defined. It refers to the expected value that the random variable \( y_1 \)—from the treated subpopulation—would counterfactually take if it were not exposed to treatment. We will use such counterfactual expectations below.

2.1. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition

Without loss of generality, we can write \( y_j = \mu_j + v_j \) where \( E(v_j) = 0 \) since \( E(y_j) = \mu_j \) by definition. Any heterogeneity in the treated and control subpopulations is therefore relegated to the terms \( v_j \). Whenever covariates (explanatory variables or simply, controls) \( x \) are available, they are useful to
characterize heterogeneity across units (and later for us, across time) and we may assume additivity so that \( y_j = g(x) + \epsilon_j \). As a starting point it is natural to further assume that these covariates enter linearly, so that \( y_j = (x - E(x))\gamma_j + \epsilon_j \). We include the covariates in deviations from their unconditional mean to ensure that \( E[(x - E(x))\gamma_j] = 0 \), in which case unobserved heterogeneity is such that \( E(\epsilon_j) = 0 \). If observed heterogeneity is well captured by the vector of explanatory variables and the linearity assumption is correct, then it is also the case that \( E(\epsilon_j|x_j) = 0 \). That is, the projection of \( y_j \) onto \( x_j \) is properly specified.

Researchers are often interested in understanding the overall effect on the intervention on outcomes. The Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) is used often in applied microeconomics for this purpose. It is worth going through its derivation here before later using similar arguments on local projections. These derivations borrow heavily from Wooldridge (2001) and Fortin et al. (2011). The overall effect of the intervention can be written as:

\[
E(y_1|s = 1) - E(y_0|s = 0) = E[E(y_1|x, s = 1)|s = 1] - E[E(y_0|x, s = 0)|s = 0] \\
= \mu_1 + E[x - E(x)|s = 1]\gamma_1 + E(\epsilon_1|s = 1) \\
- \{\mu_0 + E[x - E(x)|s = 0]\gamma_0 + E(\epsilon_0|s = 0)\}. \tag{2}
\]

Adding and subtracting \( E[x - E(x)|s = 1]\gamma_0 \), expression (2) can be rearranged as follows:

\[
E(y_1|s = 1) - E(y_0|s = 0) = (\mu_1 - \mu_0) \\
+ E[x - E(x)|s = 1](\gamma_1 - \gamma_0) \\
+ \{E[x - E(x)|s = 1] - E[x - E(x)|s = 0]\}\gamma_0 \tag{3}
\]

Expression (3) contains three interesting elements. The term \( \mu_1 - \mu_0 \), refers to the difference in the unconditional means of the treated and control subpopulations and we refer to it as the direct effect of an intervention.

The term \( E[x - E(x)|s = 1](\gamma_1 - \gamma_0) \) reflects changes in how the covariates affect the outcome due to the intervention. We will refer to this term as the indirect effect of intervention. For example, a background in mathematics may translate into a higher salary for workers assigned to take additional training in computer science, but may not otherwise (or at least not to the same extent if there is a complementarity between both knowing mathematics and computer science). Notice that \( E[x - E(x)|s = 1]\gamma_0 \) explores the salary of workers with a given background in mathematics, had they been counterfactually assigned not to take the additional training in computer science. A natural hypothesis we will be interested in testing is \( H_0 : \gamma_1 - \gamma_0 = 0 \). Failure to reject the null suggests that the effect of the covariates on the outcome is not affected by the intervention. It turns
out that traditional estimates of impulse responses implicitly assume this to be the case. Later on we will see that such a hypothesis plays a critical role in evaluating impulse response state-dependence.

The final term, \( \{ E[x - E(x)|s = 1] - E[x - E(x)|s = 0]\} \gamma_0 \) indicates that, all else equal, the effect of intervention may be driven simply by differences in the average value of the explanatory variables between the treated and control subpopulations. We will call this term, the composition effect. A test of the null \( H_0 : E[x - E(x)|s = 1] - E[x - E(x)|s = 0] = 0 \) is useful to determine the balance of the distribution of covariates between treated and control subpopulations. In a randomized control trial, there should be no differences and the null would not be rejected. A rejection of the null instead indicates that selection into treatment could depend on the value of the covariates and hence introduce selection bias in the estimation. Thus, a test of this null can be used to detect potential failures of identification. In any case, small sample measurement of the composition effect can be used to sterilize the impulse response.

In practice, a natural way to obtain each term in the decomposition of expression (3) given a finite sample of \( N \) observations would be to estimate the following regression using expression (1) as the sprinboard:

\[
y_i = \mu_0 + (x_i - \bar{x})\gamma_0 + s_i\{\beta + (x_i - \bar{x})\theta\} + \omega_i
\]

(4)

where \( \hat{\beta} = \hat{\mu}_1 - \hat{\mu}_0 \) is an estimate of the direct effect; \( \hat{\theta} = \gamma_1 - \gamma_0 \) and hence \( (\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x})\hat{\theta} \) is an estimate of the indirect effect. The notation \( \bar{x}_1 \) refers to the sample mean of the covariates for the treated units. A test of the null \( H_0 : \theta = 0 \) is a test of the null that the indirect effect is zero and that the covariates affect the outcomes in the same way whether or not a unit is treated. Finally, the term \( (\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_0)\gamma_0 \) is an estimate of the composition effect and a natural balance test is a test of the null \( H_0 : E(x|s = 1) - E(x|s = 0) = 0 \). Note that the error term is \( \omega_i = \epsilon_{i,0} + s_i(\epsilon_{1,i} - \epsilon_{0,i}) \). Under the maintained assumptions, it has mean zero conditional on covariates.

3. Deconstructing the impulse response: Direct, indirect, and composition effects

The methods discussed in Section 2, while common in applied microeconomics research, have not permeated macroeconomics as much. In this section we show that local projections offer a natural bridge between literatures and hence offer a more detailed understanding of impulse responses, the workhorse of applied macroeconomics research.

In order to move from the preliminary statistical discussion to a time series setting in which to investigate impulse responses, we define the outcome random variable observed \( h \) periods since intervention as \( y(h) \) and a typical observation from a sample of \( T \) observations as \( y_{t+h} \). As before, we begin with a binary policy intervention (earlier, the treatment) denoted \( s \in \{0, 1\} \) with a typical observation from a finite sample denoted as \( s_t \). A vector of observable predetermined variables is
denoted $x$, and an observation from a finite sample as $x_t$. Note that $x$ includes contemporaneous values and lags of a vector of variables including the intervention, as well as lags of the (possibly transformed) outcome variable, among others. Moreover, define $y = (y(0), y(1), \ldots, y(H))$ or when denoting an observation from a finite sample, $y_t = (y_t, y_{t+1}, \ldots, y_{t+H})$.

A natural starting point regarding the assignment of the policy intervention is to follow Angrist, Jordà, and Kuersteiner (2016), whose selection on observable assumption we restate here for convenience:

**Assumption 1. Conditional ignorability or selection on observables.** Let $y_s$ denote the potential outcome that the vector $y$ can take on impact and up to $H$ periods after intervention $s \in \{0, 1\}$. Then we say $s$ is randomly assigned conditional on $x$ relative to $y$ if:

$$y_s \perp s | x \quad \text{for } s = s(x, \eta; \phi) \in \{0, 1\}; \phi \in \Phi.$$  

This assumption makes explicit that the policy intervention $s$ is itself a function the observables $x$, unobservables $\eta$, and a parameter vector $\phi$. The conditional ignorability assumption means that $y_s \perp \eta$, that is, the unobservables are random noise. Moreover, we assume that $\phi$ is constant for the given sample considered. In other words, we rule out variation in the policy rule assigning intervention.

Although such a general statement of conditional ignorability provides a great deal of flexibility (see Angrist et al., 2016), a simpler assumption can be made when considering a linear framework as we do in the analysis that follows. In particular, for our purposes, the following assumption will suffice:

**Assumption 2. Conditional mean independence.** Let $E(y_s) = \mu_s$ for $s \in \{0, 1\}$ so that, without loss of generality, $y_s = \mu_s + v_s$. As before, we now assume linearity so that $v_s = (x - E(x))\Gamma_s + \epsilon_s$. Because of the dimensions of $y_s$, notice that $\Gamma_s$ is now a matrix of coefficients with row dimension $H + 1$. Under conditional mean independence,

$$E(y_s|x) = \mu_s; \quad E(v_s) = 0; \quad E(\epsilon_s|x) = 0; \quad s \in \{0, 1\}$$  

(5)

Based on Assumption 2, local projections can be easily extended to have the same format as expression (4). Specifically:

$$y_{t+h} = \mu_0^h + (x_t - \bar{x})\gamma_0^h + s_t \hat{\rho}^h + s_t (x_t - \bar{x})\theta^h + \omega_{t+h}; \quad h = 0, 1, \ldots, H; t = h, \ldots, T.$$  

(6)

That is, relative to the usual specification of a local projection, the only difference is the additional term $s_t(x_t - \bar{x})\theta^h$. As a result of this simple extension, estimates of the components of an impulse response can be calculated in parallel fashion to Section 2.1. That is:
Direct effect:  
\[ \hat{\beta}_1^h - \hat{\beta}_0^h = \hat{\beta}^h \]

Indirect effect:  
\[ (\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x})(\hat{\gamma}_1^h - \hat{\gamma}_0^h) = (\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x})\hat{\theta}^h \]

Composition effect:  
\[ (\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_0)\hat{\gamma}_0^h \]

where \( \bar{x}_s \) refers to the sample mean of the controls in each of the subpopulations \( s \in \{0,1\} \).

In a time series context, one requires an assumption about the stationarity of the covariate vector \( x \). Without it, calculating means for the treated and control subpopulations would not be a well-defined exercise. In a typical local projection it is not necessary to make such an assumption because the parameter of interest is \( \hat{\beta}^h \) and all that is required for inference is for the projection to have a sufficiently rich lag structure to ensure that the residuals are stationary. Consequently, we now add the following assumption:

**Assumption 3. Ergodicity.** The vector of covariates \( x_t \)—which can potentially include lagged values of the (possibly transformed) outcome variable and the treatment as well as current and lagged values of other variables—is assumed to be a covariance-stationary vector process ergodic for the mean (see, e.g., Hamilton 1994).

Ergodicity ensures that the sample mean converges to the population mean. Assuming covariance-stationarity is a relatively standard way to ensure that this is the case. More general assumptions could be made to accommodate less standard stochastic processes. However, covariance-stationarity and ergodicity are sufficiently general to include many of the processes commonly observed in practice.

### 3.1. Beyond binary policy interventions

Policy interventions sometimes vary from one intervention to the next. Think of monetary policy and the different ways in which interest rates can be raised or lowered. Call it the problem of choosing the policy dose. When the set of alternative doses is finite and small, it is easy to extend the analysis from the Section 2 by defining \( s \in \{s^0, s^1, \ldots, s^J\} \) where \( s^0 \) refers to the benchmark case (e.g. \( s^0 = 0 \)) against which alternative treatments \( \{s^1, \ldots, s^J\} \) are compared. An example of such an approach in times series can be found in Angrist et al. (2016).

Investigating dose responses in this manner is advantageous. No assumption is made on possible non-linear and non-monotonic effects of the treatment on the outcome. We know that, for example, drugs administered in certain doses can be quite beneficial, but doubling the dose does not mean that the benefit doubles—in fact, most drugs become lethal at higher and higher doses!

When doses vary continuously, say \( -\infty < \delta < \infty \), extending potential-outcomes ignorability assumptions becomes impractical. There would be infinite potential outcomes (one for each value of the dose received) and hence, we would be unable to recover parameters from finite samples.
However, with little loss of generality, we can assume that variation in doses affect outcomes through a policy scaling factor $\delta = \delta(x)$. The dependence of $\delta$ on $x$ captures policy considerations and also allows for non-monotonic effects in the choice of dose.

Under this more general form of $\delta$, expression (1) now requires a further assumption regarding the choice of dose given policy intervention in order to be able to identify the policy effect. A natural assumption is conditional mean independence of the dose given assignment, which can be stated as follows:

**Assumption 4. Conditional mean independence of dose given assignment.** As in Assumption 2, let $y_s = \mu_s + v_s$ with $v_s = (x - E(x))\Gamma_s + \epsilon_s$. Define the scaling factor $\delta(x)$. Then we assume that:

$$E[\delta(x)y_1|x] = \delta(x)\mu_1,$$

that is, $E[\delta(x)\epsilon_1] = 0$ since $E[\delta(x)(x - E(x))\Gamma_s|x] = 0$ mechanically.

Notice that no further assumption is necessary regarding $y_0$. Thus, Assumption 4 is a useful reminder of the conditions required to explore impulse responses in general settings. Because this paper introduces a number of novel elements, we will henceforth restrict the analysis to the case where $\delta(x) = \delta$ and leave for a different paper a more thorough investigation of non-monotonicities in dose assignment. Such an assumption is no different than in standard VARs (e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1999)—doubling the dose, doubles the response. However, we think that given the typical policy interventions observed, and given that outcomes are usually analyzed in logarithms—so that policy interventions have proportional effects—this is a very reasonable starting point. Based on this simplification, expression (4) can now be extended as follows:

$$y_{t+h} = \mu_0^h + (x_t - \bar{x})\gamma_0^h + \delta_t \beta^h + \delta_t(x_t - \bar{x})\theta^h + \omega_{t+h}; \quad h = 0, 1, \ldots, H; t = h, \ldots, T.$$ (8)

using the convention $\delta_t = 0$ if $s_t = 0$. The parameters $\beta^h$ and $\theta^h$ have the same interpretation as in expression (6) in that scaling by the dosage allows one to interpret the coefficients on a per-unit-dose basis. In the monetary policy application, this would correspond, say, to a 1 ppt increase in the policy rate. Dividing by $-4$ would equivalently generate responses to a 0.25 bps decrease of the policy rate instead. A constant scaling factor also implies symmetry. Importantly, the direct, indirect, and composition effects can be estimated using estimates from the extended local projections in (8) in the same manner as in the case of a binary treatment as explained in expression (7).

### 3.2. Blinder-Oaxaca state-dependent responses

An interesting feature of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is that it allows us to evaluate the indirect effect of the policy intervention at a particular value of the controls. For example, Angrist
et al. (2016) show that monetary policy loosening is less effective at stimulating the economy than tightening. Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016) find asymmetric effects based on whether the economy is in a boom or a bust. Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor (2017) report similar results using a different approach and report that low inflation environments dull stimulative policy. These and many other scenarios can be easily entertained using the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition and the same set of parameter estimates.

In particular, notice that:

\[
E(y_1|x^*,\delta) - E(y_0|x^*,s = 0) = \delta \mu_1 + \delta [x^* - E(x)] \gamma_1 - \{\mu_0 + [x^* - E(x)] \gamma_0\}
\]

\[
= \beta + \delta [x^* - E(x)] \theta,
\]

since \(E(\delta \epsilon_1|x^*) = 0\) and where \(x^*\) refers to the specific value of \(x\) we wish to condition on.

Hence, based on the same estimates as those of the extended local projection in expression (8), given \(x^*\), the impulse response is:

\[
\delta \hat{\beta} + \delta (x^* - \bar{x}) \hat{\theta}
\]

for a given choice of \(\delta\) since the composition effect is zero as \([x^* - \bar{x}]\) is the same for the treated and control subpopulations. Notice that we rely on the residuals having mean conditional on \(x\) of zero. It is important to also note that because identification usually centers on treatment assignment rather than identification for the controls, conditioning on certain values of \(x\) can only be interpreted from a partial equilibrium perspective. Nevertheless, because in time series applications lagged values in \(x\) are pre-determined with respect to the policy intervention, they are a legitimate description of a state of the world in which we are interested in conducting a counterfactual experiment.

Several remarks are worth stating. First, although a convenient tool to investigate state-dependence, note that given the assumptions we have made, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition lacks enough information to evaluate how much more or less effective the impulse response indirect effect would be if, say, the control \(x_{jt}\) were to be made one unit bigger. The reason is that we have made no assumptions about the assignment of the controls. We cannot infer causal effects about them without further assumptions. The measured indirect effect for the \(j^{th}\) control could be polluted by any correlation with one or more other controls, for example.

Second, several hypotheses of interest underlie expression (7). Absence of direct effects can be assessed by evaluating \(H_0 : \beta^h = 0\); absence of indirect effects with \(H_0 : \phi^h = 0\); and absence of composition effects with \(H_0 : \gamma^h_0 = 0\). All of these null hypotheses only require standard Wald tests directly obtainable from standard regression output given our maintained assumptions. Thus formal tests of economically meaningful hypotheses can be easily reported as we do in our application.
4. The direct effect of monetary policy


In monetary economies, a natural question of interest is to characterize the dynamic response of economic activity, inflation and interest rates to an exogenous monetary intervention. Romer and Romer (2004) provide a good place to start. We refer to their paper as RR from this point forward. In their paper, they construct a series of exogenous monetary shocks by comparing actual changes in the funds rate target with changes predicted by Federal Reserve Board staff. This series has the advantage that it is directly observable and not the result of fitting any particular econometric model. When introducing new methods, it is helpful to benchmark new findings against results that have received wide acceptance in the literature.

The baseline regressions in RR are based on the following regression (and the same notation used in their paper):

\[
\Delta y_t = a_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{1} a_k D_{kt} + \sum_{i=1}^{24} b_i \Delta y_{t-i} + \sum_{j=1}^{36} c_j \delta_{t-j} + \epsilon_t \tag{11}
\]

where \(y\) is either the log of industrial production, the log of the producer price index, or the federal funds rate target; \(D_k\) are monthly dummies; and were \(\delta\) here refers to \(S\) in the original paper as the measure of a monetary policy shock to be consistent with the notation introduced here. The data are observed monthly from 1970:1 to 1996:12. Later we will extend this sample but for now we are content to replicate the main results of their paper.

An equivalent way to estimate impulse responses is by using local projections, which in this case correspond to the restricted version of expression (8) introduced earlier. Specifically:

\[
y_{t+h} - y_{t-1} = \mu^h + \sum_{k=1}^{1} a_k^h D_{kt} + (x_t - \bar{x}) \gamma^h + \delta_t \beta^h + \omega_{t+h} \quad h = 0, 1, \ldots, H. \tag{12}
\]

where \(x\) is a vector that includes the lags of the first difference of the log of industrial production, the log of the producer price index, the federal funds rate target, as well as lags of monetary policy shock, \(\delta_t\). For parsimony, we include up to three lags of each of these controls (we experimented with longer lags but the results remained mostly unchanged). In this setting, the impulse response is simply the vector \(\beta = (\beta^0, \ldots, \beta^H)'\). We display the impulse responses for industrial production, producer prices, and the federal funds rate in Figure 1.

The responses in Figure 1 are directly comparable with Figures 2 and 4 in RR as well as Figure 9, panels (b) and (c). Figures 2 and 4 are based on expression (11) whereas Figure 9 is based on a vector autoregression (VAR) using the monetary shock as one of the variables in the system.

Figure 1 replicates closely the findings in RR. The response of industrial production in panel (a), if anything, conforms better with economic intuition. Unlike RR, who find on impact a slightly
Figure 1: Local projection responses to Romer and Romer (2004) exogenous monetary shock

(a) Industrial production

(b) Producer prices

(c) Funds rate target

Notes: Vertical axes reported in percent change with respect to the origin. 95% confidence bands for each coefficient estimate shown as grey areas. Local projections as specified in expression (12) using three lags of each control described therein. Sample 1970:1—1996:12. See text.
positive response for the first four months, our response is negative right after impact. It bottoms out at around 3.8% (rather than 4.3%) and gradually returns to zero before the end of the third year. RR found that the response remains negative throughout the four years that they displayed.

The response of producer prices also matches well Figure 4 in RR. Panel (b) of Figure 1 shows that prices decline on impact almost linearly for the entire period. In contrast, RR find essentially no response in the first 2 years but then prices decline at about the same rate as they do for us. The response of the funds rate target, although not reported in RR, is consistent with responses reported in the literature (e.g. Christiano et al., 1999; Ramey, 2016).

4.2. Bias correction from composition effects

In this section we investigate composition effects (the balance condition in randomized controlled trials) using the same specification used to generate the impulse responses in Figure 1. If the RR shocks truly reflect exogenous interventions, the “treated” and “control” subpopulations of the explanatory variables should be the same. At a fundamental level, differences will emerge if identification has not been achieved. In that case treatment assignment is predictable by the explanatory variables. At a more practical level, identification may hold in large samples, but in small samples small differences between the subpopulations may remain. These small differences are not enough to argue against identification in a statistical sense, but they will bias estimates of the impulse response.

A simple way to explore any potential biases from composition effects using a standard local projection is to examine the difference in means between the treatment and control subpopulations, scaled by the coefficient estimates in the local projection. This is what we report in Figure 2, which is organized into the same three panels as Figure 1. Each panel now shows the original impulse response reported earlier in Figure 1, along with the bias corrected impulse response and the bias itself.

More specifically, consider the response of industrial production reported in panel (a) of Figure 2. The solid green line labeled “Total response” is the bias corrected impulse response and it is calculated as the sum of two parts. The first is the impulse response that corresponds exactly to that reported in panel (a) of Figure 1, displayed here as a dashed blue line and labeled “Direct effect.” The second is the purple-dashed line labeled “Composition,” which displays the nature of the bias. The sum of the “Direct effect” and the “Composition” lines is the “Total response.”

Thus, in panel (a), removing differences in the means of the covariates in the treated and control subpopulations alone would require making the response of industrial production to a funds rate shock be more negative than it is measured by a typical impulse response. At the year mark, this difference is about 1 percentage point so instead of a decline of about 3.5 percentage points (pps), the true decline is closer to 4.5 pps as shown by the solid green line.

Panel (b) shows that this bias has the opposite sign for producer prices and therefore tends to attenuate the negative response of prices to a funds rate shock. However, this bias is relatively
Figure 2: Local projection responses to Romer and Romer (2004) exogenous monetary shock: Bias corrected

(a) Industrial production

(b) Producer prices

(c) Funds rate target

Notes: Vertical axes reported in percent change with respect to the origin. Local projections as specified in expression (12) using three lags of each control described therein. Sample 1970:1—1996:12. See text.
small—about 0.5 pp at the year mark. The bias correction is also rather small for the funds rate, which is consistent with the RR shock being pretty close to being exogenous—about 25 bps at the year mark.

In summary, evidence of a violation of the balance condition is scant. The more noticeable bias happens for the response for industrial production but even then, the main conclusions in RR remain largely intact. That said, a correction of such biases is very simple to implement as Figure 2 shows.

4.3. Direct, indirect and composition effects

Now that we have established that our local projection-based responses match RR well—although even in this simple setting small sample biases can arise from composition effects—we show how the methods introduced earlier can be used to further decompose each response into its constituent elements: direct, indirect and composition effects. That is, we extend the results presented in Figure 2 using expression (8) and construct the terms delineated in expression (7). The result is displayed in Figure 3.

The three panels of Figure 3 are organized the same way as the three panels of Figures 1 and 2. Within each panel, we report four lines. The solid green line roughly corresponds to the response reported in Figure 1 and is the sum of the direct (the dashed blue line), indirect (the dashed orange line) and the composition (the dashed purple line) responses. Small differences are visible due to the richer specification.

Consider the response of industrial production reported in panel (a) of Figure 3. The total response largely duplicates that reported in panel (a) of Figure 1 even though it is calculated with the richer specification described in expression (8). The shape and even the magnitudes are qualitative and quantitatively very similar. Much like panel (a) in Figure 2, there is some bias coming from the composition effect, but essentially no correction is needed due to the indirect effect.

As we will show later, this does not mean that there are no indirect effects—quite the contrary. Recall that in expression (7), the indirect is obtained by comparing the mean of the covariates in the treated subpopulation relative to the overall mean, scaled by estimates of their slope coefficients. In a well balanced experiment (such as this one), that difference will be nearly zero at the mean so no matter the scaling, the indirect effect evaluated at the sample mean is usually close to zero. However, whether or not the indirect effect matters depends on the slope coefficient estimates themselves. These are significantly different from zero and give rise to interesting state-dependent effects, as we illustrate in the next section.

In sum, removing the indirect and composition effects leaves a more amplified response of industrial production (by about one percentage point more) than reported earlier. Indirect and composition effect corrections for prices and the funds rate target—reported in panels (b) and (c) of Figure 3—are much smaller, in the order of one half of a percentage point or less and generally induce responses that don’t differ materially from those originally reported in Figure 1.
Figure 3: Local projection responses to exogenous RR monetary shock: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition

(a) Industrial production

(b) Producer prices

(c) Funds rate target

Notes: Vertical axes reported in percent change with respect to the origin. Local projections as specified in expression (8) using three lags of each control described therein. Sample 1970:1—1996:12. See text.
5. State-dependence: historical episodes revisited

In this section we illustrate how the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition can be used to explore historical episodes. In particular, we will revisit expressions (9) and (10) using the same data and examples we used in the previous section. We focus on two particular episodes: November 1987 and February 1996. In October 19, 1987 the stock market crashed, not just in the U.S. but across several markets worldwide. By the end of October, stocks had lost about 23% of their value. The Federal Reserve responded by lowering the federal funds rate by 50 basis points. Given what the economy looked like in October 1987, we ask whether monetary policy would have been expected to be an effective tool in stimulating the economy.

The second episode, in contrast, is not attached to any significant event. Instead it sits approximately in the middle of a long expansion and in the middle of a period of relatively stable interest rates. That is, there were no significant policy actions before or after. On the other hand, the mid-1990s are often thought to coincide with a boost in productivity that would last until the mid-2000s, right before the Great Recession. We think that the relative calm of this episode provides a nice counterpoint to the 1987 episode.

In both episodes, given economic conditions in the lead in, the path that the federal funds rate would have expected to follow roughly coincided with the historical average. This is important. Any differences in the responses of prices or industrial production cannot be attributed to differences in the expected policy path. Importantly, note that we are not rationalizing the data ex-post. Rather, using the full sample and the data up to the date considered, we display the path of the funds rate, producer prices and industrial output expected to prevail.

Figure 4 displays the 1987 episode on the left-hand side and the 1996 episode on the right-hand side. The first row shows the responses of industrial production, the second row for producer prices and the third row for the funds rate. We show as a solid line the same responses displayed earlier in Figure 3 with a solid line as well, whereas the dashed line displays the impulse response conditional on the particular historical episode under consideration.

Consider 1987 first, displayed in panels (a), (c), and (e). As remarked earlier, the path of the funds rate displayed in panel (e) is nearly the same as the average path for the entire sample. Any differences appear at the very end of the horizon displayed. However, this is also when the coefficients are least precisely estimated. At a minimum, it can be said without fear of exaggeration that for the first two years, the funds rate paths are nearly identical. Are these paths therefore associated with similar responses in industrial production and producer prices?

Panel (a) in Figure 4 clearly shows this not to be the case. Even if we focus primarily on the first two years, the response of industrial production conditional on the outlook in October 1987 is considerably more muted. Note that all along we have assumed the responses to be symmetric. That is, we have implicitly restricted the specification so that an increase in the funds rate generates the same response (but with the opposite sign) on industrial production and producer prices. Thus, a surprise reduction in the funds rate in November 1987 would have been expected to
Figure 4: Local projection responses to exogenous RR monetary shock: Historical Episodes

Industrial production

(a) November 1987

(b) February 1996

Producer prices

(c) November 1987

(d) February 1996

Federal funds rate

(e) November 1987

(f) February 1996

Notes: Vertical axes reported in percent change with respect to the origin. Local projections as specified in expression (8) using three lags of each control described therein and then evaluated with data up to October 1987 in columns (a), (c), and (e); and January 1996 in columns (b), (d), and (f). Sample 1970:1—1996:12. See text.
stimulate industrial production by a much smaller amount (at the 2-year mark the difference is about 2-percentage points) than would have been the case historically.

Initially, producer prices would have reacted somewhat more strongly than the average although the differences are small throughout and by the two-year mark, the cumulative change in prices would have been nearly identical. Altogether these figures suggest that the Federal Reserve faced a more unfavorable trade-off in terms of economic activity versus inflation, than had been the case historically in our sample.

Turning to the 1996 episode, matters are quite different. Again, panel (f) of Figure 4 shows that the funds rate responses are quite similar. In fact, if anything, the funds rate path would have been expected to be slightly steeper initially. In contrast to the 1987 industrial production response displayed in panel (a) of the same figure, the 1996 response reported in panel (b) is nearly identical to the historical average. The only difference emerges with producer prices, as panel (d) makes clear. The response of prices is much more muted. By the 2-year mark, producer prices are essentially unchanged and only start declining thereafter.

It is an interesting juxtaposition, in both episodes we find a more unfavorable economic activity-inflation trade-off. In 1987 this is largely due to the much more muted response of industrial production relative to the historical average. In 1996 industrial production behaves no differently than on average, but the price response becomes significantly more muted.

6. Monetary policy asymmetries

Up to this point we have shown that with a trivial extension of the local projections framework, we gain much more clarity on how to interpret impulse responses used by a vast literature before us. We have seen how composition effects can crop up and attenuate or amplify an impulse response. Moreover, such composition effects provide for a natural way to evaluate identification. If the experiments are well designed and properly identified, there should be no composition effects.

The second latent element of a typical impulse response is the indirect effect, which may exist even in a properly identified setting. On average the indirect effect may appear to be small but as we have seen, there can be considerable differences lurking in the sample when one examines alternative historical episodes.

In this section we revisit the issue of symmetry, that is, the notion that an increase in the funds rate has the same effect (but with the opposite sign) than a decrease. Several authors before us have found evidence that this is the case, e.g. Angrist et al. (2016) and Tenreyro and Thwaites (2016). Here we show that a simple modification of our framework delivers the necessary tools to assess this symmetry hypothesis.

Return to expression (8), repeated here for convenience:

\[ y_{t+h} = \mu_0^h + (x_t - \bar{x})\gamma_0^h + \delta_t \beta^h + \delta_t(x_t - \bar{x})\theta^h + \omega_{1+h}; \quad h = 0, 1, \ldots, H; t = h, \ldots, T. \]
Now instead of two subpopulations, the control and treated subpopulations (the latter scaled by the dose $\delta_i$), we consider three. The control subpopulation stays the same, but the treated subpopulation gets divided into rate increases and rate decreases. We denote quantities for the treated subpopulation when the treatment consists in raising the funds rate using the subscript $\Delta$, and we use the subscript $\nabla$ when considering decreasing the funds rate instead. This extension poses no difficulty since we can recast expression (8) as:

$$y_{t+h} = \mu_0^h + (x_t - x)\gamma_0^h +$$
$$\delta^\Delta_t \beta^h_{\Delta} + \delta^\nabla_t \beta^h_{\nabla} +$$
$$\delta^\Delta_t (x_t - x)\theta^h_{\Delta} +$$
$$\delta^\nabla_t (x_t - x)\theta^h_{\nabla} + \omega_{t+h}; \quad h = 0, 1, \ldots, H; t = h, \ldots, T.$$  

where $\delta^\Delta$ is the change in the policy rate if that change is positive, and is zero otherwise; and $\delta^\nabla$ is symmetrically defined.

Estimates of expression (13) can then be used to construct an extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, similarly to expression (7), that is:

Direct effect of increases: $\hat{\beta}^h_{\Delta}$

decreases: $\hat{\beta}^h_{\nabla}$

Indirect effect of increases: $(x_\Delta - x)\hat{\theta}^h_{\Delta}$

decreases: $(x_\nabla - x)\hat{\theta}^h_{\nabla}$

Composition effect increases: $(x_\Delta - x_0)\hat{\gamma}^h_0$

decreases: $(x_\nabla - x_0)\hat{\gamma}^h_0$

As an illustration, Figure 5 provides impulse responses obtained by these methods when one stratifies the RR shocks into negative and positive shocks. Notice that, for example, if the experiment is well identified, an exogenous negative shock (a funds rate cut) during a recession is just as likely as a negative shock in the middle of an expansion. This observation is worth keeping in mind as we comment on our findings.

Note that both columns in Figure 5 report responses to the same experiment, meaning, an exogenous one percent increase in the funds rate. The common scaling facilitates the discussion. The results in Figure 5 may seem to contradict what has been reported in the literature at first blush. Negative RR shocks (reported on the left-hand column) appear to carry more of a bang: industrial production and prices respond by larger amounts relative to when there is a positive RR shock (reported on the right-hand column). Importantly, these differences do not crop up because the path of the funds rate is such that interest rates are kept higher for longer. On the contrary, as panel (c) of the figure make evident.
Figure 5: Local projection responses to exogenous RR monetary shock: Historical Episodes

(a) Industrial production

Negative RR shock

Positive RR shock

(b) Producer prices

(c) Federal funds rate

Notes: Vertical axes reported in percent change with respect to the origin. Local projections as specified in expression (13) using three lags of each control described therein. Sample 1970:1—1996:12. See text.
What makes the figure tricky to interpret is that we have no context to evaluate under what conditions an exogenous cut in interest rates takes place (or for that matter, an increase). This is where the allowance for state-dependence through the indirect effect terms in expression (14) will come in handy. First, notice that periods of expansion are more abundant than periods of recession. Thus a larger fraction of the sample for which an exogenous RR shock is observed take place in periods of expansion. In those periods, a cut in rates is likely to overstimulate the economy relative to other times.

In contrast, positive shocks (meaning increases in the funds rate) are also more likely to be observed in periods of expansion. But those are the periods where one expects that the funds rate will be endogenously increased and therefore may appear to have a lesser effect in that context.

Alas, the extra terms in the decomposition allow us to examine more closely for asymmetries during particular episodes that may make more economic sense from the point of view of a particular experiment. That is, consider negative RR shocks during periods of recession when interest rates are generally reduced or examine positive RR shocks during expansions when interest rates are generally increased.

7. Conclusion

Current thinking about impulse responses and their role in monetary economics has been greatly influenced by the tight link between vector autoregressions (or VARs) and the solutions to traditional linear or linearized models of monetary economies. These solutions tend to be of first order. Extending the lag length of the VAR was the natural first step toward generalizing the empirical analysis away from the necessary strictures of theory. Sims (1980) made that much clear in his seminal paper. The literature has made great strides since within this framework.

Rather than starting from the theory and moving toward the empirics, this paper moves in the opposite direction. It starts by taking the impulse response as a legitimate moment of interest, akin to a dynamic average treatment effect. And in doing so, it borrows the econometric tools from an extensive literature in applied microeconomics. Our contribution is thus to show the ways in which VARs impose constraints on impulse responses that are not supported by the data. By taking a less structural approach to the data generating process, we have shown simple ways in which to exploit the information in the sample that inform about the manner monetary economies work.

Local projections (Jordà, 2005) have facilitated the combination of the methods available in applied microeconomics and shown how they can help in applied macroeconomics. For example, we have shown that even when there is proper identification, small sample differences in the treated and control subpopulations of the explanatory variables can generate biases in the measured impulse response. We called these biases the composition effect.

Moreover, we have shown policy interventions can affect the manner explanatory variables affect outcomes, even when on average this effect is zero. The implication is that the same policy intervention will be expected to have a different effect depending on the conditions under which the
intervention is effected. We called this the indirect effect. Using this result, we have shown how
different historical episodes can be brought to bear on the monetary policy trade-offs a policymaker
could face in practice depending on the state of the economy.

These are some of the preliminary but important results that we have uncovered by using
relatively straightforward regression methods. Of course, several extensions of this framework
are possible and we have highlighted some of them in the text. Our hope is that the methods we
propose will be seen as complementary to existing methods and a useful building block for future
research.
References


