The Econometrics of Wage Decompositions

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I. BASIC DECOMPOSITIONS

Background reading:


For purposes of illustration only, the decomposition techniques and issues are applied to the case of decomposing (log) wage differentials between men and women into explained and unexplained differences. However, it is clear that the approaches described below apply to any attempt to decompose mean sample differences between any two categories of observations, e.g. union workers versus nonunion workers, manufacturing firms versus non manufacturing firms, public sector workers versus private sector workers, workers in York versus workers in Manchester.
From the properties of OLS we have $\bar{Y} = \hat{X}'\hat{\beta}$, where $\bar{Y}$ is $Tx1$, $\hat{X}'$is $1xk$, and $\hat{\beta}$ is $kx1$. A standard male/female wage decomposition is

$$\bar{Y}_m - \bar{Y}_f = (\hat{X}_m - \hat{X}_f)'\hat{\beta}_m + \hat{X}_f' (\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f).$$  

(1)

This decomposition assumes that the $m$ (male) structure is the norm. Accordingly, the term $(\hat{X}_m - \hat{X}_f)'\hat{\beta}_m$ represents the "explained" differential. Therefore, the term $\hat{X}_f' (\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f)$ represents the “unexplained” differential. In some circles and in some contexts this term is interpreted as a measure of discrimination.

We might think of $\bar{Y}_f^0 = \hat{X}_f' \hat{\beta}_m^0$ as the mean competitive, nondiscriminatory (log) wage for females. In this case $\bar{Y}_m^0 = \bar{Y}_m = \hat{X}_m' \hat{\beta}_m$ since the male wage structure is the norm. The decomposition can be equivalently stated as

$$\bar{Y}_m - \bar{Y}_f = (\bar{Y}_m^0 - \bar{Y}_f^0) + (\bar{Y}_f^0 - \bar{Y}_f)$$

$$= (\bar{Y}_m - \bar{Y}_f^0) + (\bar{Y}_f^0 - \bar{Y}_f)$$

Typically in wage regressions $Y$ is the log of the wage, so that

$$\bar{Y} = \left( \sum_{t=1}^{T} \ell n (w_t) \right) / T = \ell n (\bar{w}) ,$$

where $\bar{w}$ is the geometric mean. In this situation

$$\bar{Y}_m - \bar{Y}_f = \ell n (\bar{w}_m) - \ell n (\bar{w}_f)$$

$$= \ell n (G + 1)$$

where $G = \frac{\bar{w}_m}{\bar{w}_f} - 1$ is the gross (unadjusted) wage differential. Along these lines we can view the explained gap as the gap attributable to qualifications differences, i.e.

$$(\hat{X}_m - \hat{X}_f)'\hat{\beta}_m = \bar{Y}_m - \bar{Y}_f^0$$

$$= \ell n (\bar{w}_m) - \ell n (\bar{w}_f^0)$$

$$= \ell n (Q_m + 1)$$
where \( Q_m = \frac{\bar{w}_m}{\bar{w}_f} - 1 \) is the wage differential attributable to differences in qualifications when using the male wage structure as the norm. This leaves the unexplained differential, i.e.

\[
X_f' \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f \right) = \left( Y_f^0 - Y_f \right) \\
= \ln \left( \bar{w}_f^0 \right) - \ln \left( \bar{w}_f \right) \\
= \ln \left( D_m + 1 \right)
\]

where \( D_m = \frac{\bar{w}_m^0}{\bar{w}_f} - 1 \) is the wage differential that is unexplained (discrimination ?) when using the male wage structure as the norm. With this notation in hand, we arrive at the following accounting identity:

\[
\ln \left( G + 1 \right) = \ln \left( Q_m + 1 \right) + \ln \left( D_m + 1 \right).
\]

An alternative decomposition is given by

\[
Y_m - Y_f = (\hat{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \hat{\beta}_f + \hat{X}_m' \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f \right)
\]

This decomposition assumes that the f structure is the norm. Now the term

\[
(\hat{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \hat{\beta}_f
\]

measures the "explained" differential and

\[
\hat{X}_m' \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f \right)
\]

measures the "unexplained" differential. Here we can think of \( Y_m^0 = \hat{X}_m' \hat{\beta}_f \) as the mean competitive, nondiscriminatory (log) wage for males. In this case \( Y_f^0 = Y_f = \hat{X}_f' \hat{\beta}_f \) since the female wage structure is the norm. Equivalently

\[
Y_m - Y_f = \left( Y_m^0 - Y_f^0 \right) + \left( Y_m - Y_m^0 \right) \\
= \left( Y_f^0 - Y_f \right) + \left( Y_m - Y_m^0 \right)
\]

The accounting identity that results from this decomposition is given by

\[
\ln \left( G + 1 \right) = \ln \left( Q_f + 1 \right) + \ln \left( D_f + 1 \right)
\]
where

\[ \ln (Q_f + 1) = Y^0_m - Y_f = (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \hat{\beta}_f = \ln (\bar{\omega}_m^0) - \ln (\bar{\omega}_f). \]

and

\[ \ln (D_f + 1) = (Y_m - Y^0_m) = X_m' (\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f) = \ln (\bar{\omega}_m) - \ln (\bar{\omega}_m^0). \]

It is clear that \( Q_f = \frac{\bar{\omega}_m^0}{\bar{\omega}_f} - 1 \) is the wage differential attributable to differences in qualifications when using the female wage equation as the norm, and \( D_f \) is the wage differential that is unexplained.

The two sets of decompositions corresponding to the male wage structure as the norm or the female wage structure as the norm illustrate the index number problem with decompositions. In other words the separately calculated explained and unexplained components will in general differ depending on which structure is assumed to be the norm. Of course their sum will be the same.
II. IDENTIFICATION ISSUES

Background Reading:


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Separately estimated (log) wage equations for males and females evaluated at the sample means are given by

\[
\hat{Y}_m = \hat{\beta}_{mo} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \hat{X}_m^{(j)} \hat{\beta}_m^{(j)},
\]

\[
\hat{Y}_f = \hat{\beta}_{fo} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \hat{X}_f^{(j)} \hat{\beta}_f^{(j)},
\]

where \(\hat{\beta}_{io}\) is the estimated intercept term, \(\hat{\beta}_i^{(j)}\) is a column vector of estimated slope coefficients for the set of regressors comprising the \(j\)th variable, and \(\hat{X}_i^{(j)}\) is a row
vector of regressor means for the set of regressors comprising the $j$th variable. There are $N$ variables defined by $N$ sets of regressors, e.g. experience and experience squared would constitute the experience variable. If we adopt the $m$ wage structure as the norm, the gender wage gap is decomposed according to

$$
\hat{Y}_m - \hat{Y}_f = \left( \hat{\beta}_{mo} - \hat{\beta}_{fo} \right) + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \hat{X}_f^{(j)'} \Delta \hat{\beta}^{(j)} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \Delta \hat{X}^{(j)'} \hat{\beta}_m^{(j)},
$$

where $\Delta \hat{\beta}^{(j)} = \hat{\beta}_m^{(j)} - \hat{\beta}_f^{(j)}$ and $\Delta \hat{X}^{(j)'} = \hat{X}_m^{(j)'} - \hat{X}_f^{(j)'}$. The contributions of the $j$th variable to discrimination and endowments are $\hat{X}_f^{(j)'} \Delta \hat{\beta}^{(j)}$ and $\Delta \hat{X}^{(j)'} \hat{\beta}_m^{(j)}$, and the contribution of the intercept term to the discrimination component is $(\hat{\beta}_{mo} - \hat{\beta}_{fo})$.

Given the specification of the $X'$s, there is seemingly no ambiguity surrounding the decomposition. However, this is an illusion.

Consider the case in which a variable $V$ defined by a set of dummy variables is added to the wage regressions, e.g. marital status. The set of dummy variable mean values are denoted by $\{ \bar{V}_{ik} | k = 1, \ldots, K_1 \}$, where $\sum_{k=1}^{K_1} \bar{V}_{ik} = 1, i = m, f$. Without loss of generality the first dummy variable category ($\bar{V}_{i1}$) will initially serve as the left out reference group, e.g. married, spouse present. The separately estimated wage equations for men and women evaluated at the sample means can now be expressed as

$$
\hat{Y}_m = \hat{\beta}_{mo} + \sum_{k=2}^{K_1} \bar{V}_{mk} \hat{\theta}_{mk} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \hat{X}_m^{(j)'} \hat{\beta}_m^{(j)} = \sum_{k=1}^{K_1} \bar{V}_{mk} \hat{\theta}_{mk} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \hat{X}_m^{(j)'} \hat{\beta}_m^{(j)},
$$

$$
\hat{Y}_f = \hat{\beta}_{fo} + \sum_{k=2}^{K_1} \bar{V}_{fk} \hat{\theta}_{fk} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \hat{X}_f^{(j)'} \hat{\beta}_f^{(j)} = \sum_{k=1}^{K_1} \bar{V}_{fk} \hat{\theta}_{fk} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \hat{X}_f^{(j)'} \hat{\beta}_f^{(j)},
$$
where \( \delta_{ik} = \hat{\theta}_{ik} - \hat{\theta}_{i1} \), and our left out reference group choice implies the normalization \( \hat{\beta}_{io} = \hat{\theta}_{i1} \). Accordingly, the resulting wage decomposition is given by

\[
\bar{Y}_m - \bar{Y}_f = \left( \hat{\beta}_{mo} - \hat{\beta}_{fo} \right) + \sum_{k=2}^{K_1} \bar{V}_{f_k} \left( \hat{\delta}_{mk} - \hat{\delta}_{fk} \right) + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \bar{X}_j^{(j)'} \Delta \hat{\beta}^{(j)} 
\]

\[
+ \sum_{k=2}^{K_1} (\bar{V}_{mk} - \bar{V}_{fk}) \hat{\delta}_{mk} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \Delta \bar{X}_j^{(j)'} \hat{\beta}_m^{(j)} 
\]

\[
= \sum_{k=1}^{K_1} \bar{V}_{f_k} \left( \hat{\theta}_{mk} - \hat{\theta}_{fk} \right) + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \bar{X}_j^{(j)'} \Delta \hat{\beta}^{(j)} 
\]

\[
+ \sum_{k=1}^{K_1} (\bar{V}_{mk} - \bar{V}_{fk}) \hat{\theta}_{mk} + \sum_{j=1}^{N} \Delta \bar{X}_j^{(j)'} \hat{\beta}_m^{(j)} . 
\]

A number of things are immediately apparent from the decompositions described by \( (3) \). First, the estimated overall discrimination and the estimated overall endowment effect are invariant to the choice of left out reference group and to the suppression of the constant term in the absence of a left out reference group. That is, the alternative expressions for the estimated overall discrimination and endowment contributions in \( (3) \) are the same decompositions. Second, the contribution of the variable \( V \) to discrimination as estimated by \( \sum_{k=2}^{K_1} \bar{V}_{f_k} \left( \hat{\delta}_{mk} - \hat{\delta}_{fk} \right) \) is not invariant with respect to the choice of left out reference group. For example, designating the last dummy variable category \( (\bar{V}_{iK_1}) \) as the left out reference group (e.g. single, never married) would replace the immediately preceding measure of discrimination effects with \( \sum_{k=1}^{K_1-1} \bar{V}_{f_k} \left( \hat{\phi}_{mk} - \hat{\phi}_{fk} \right) \), where \( \hat{\phi}_{ik} = \hat{\theta}_{ik} - \hat{\theta}_{iK_1} \). These two sets of estimates will not be the same because the intercept term is altered by the renormalization, \( \hat{\beta}_{io} = \hat{\theta}_{iK_1} \). Third, it is possible to identify the contribution of \( V \) to discrimination
as \((\hat{\beta}_{mo} - \hat{\beta}_{fo}) + \sum_{k=2}^{K_1} \hat{V}_{fk} (\hat{\delta}_{mk} - \hat{\delta}_{fk}) = \sum_{k=1}^{K_1} \hat{V}_{fk} (\hat{\theta}_{mk} - \hat{\theta}_{fk})\), i.e. the intercept contribution is part of the contribution of \(V\) to discrimination. This interpretation requires a normalizing restriction that holds that in the absence of variable \(V\) there would be no constant term. Last, the contribution of \(V\) to endowments is invariant with respect to the choice of left out reference group, i.e. \(\sum_{k=2}^{K_1} (\hat{V}_{mk} - \hat{V}_{fk}) \hat{\delta}_{mk} = \sum_{k=1}^{K_1-1} (\hat{V}_{mk} - \hat{V}_{fk}) \hat{\phi}_{mk} = \sum_{k=1}^{K_1} (\hat{V}_{mk} - \hat{V}_{fk}) \hat{\theta}_{mk}\).

The analysis can be generalized to multiple sets of dummy variables. It is clear that if the constant term is suppressed in models with more than one set of dummy variables, all but one of the sets of dummy variables must have left out reference categories in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity. A number of implications follow from the generalization. First, alternative decompositions are equivalent in terms of the estimates of overall discrimination and the overall contribution of endowments. Therefore, the overall decomposition is invariant with respect to the choice of left out reference groups. Second, it can be shown that the combined estimated contributions of all sets of dummy variables to overall discrimination (inclusive of the constant term) and to overall endowment effects are invariant with respect to the choice of left out reference groups. Third, the separate contributions of sets of dummy variables to discrimination are not invariant with respect to the choice of left out reference groups. Fourth, unlike the case with only one set of dummy variables expressed by (3), there are no unique estimates of the separate contributions of the sets of dummy variables to overall discrimination.

**Empirical Examples**

The first example is based on gender salary decompositions for a sample of full time, full-year U.S. college and university professors. The model consists of variables to measure total experience as a professor, seniority at current institution, and a set of dummy variables to indicate highest degree held, along with continuous measures of publication activity (journal articles, books, and collections), and dummy variables...
for a 12 month contract, teaching field, and race/ethnicity. We specify the “highest degree” variable with respect to two different reference groups. In one case, the reference group is those who have no advanced degree; the other reference group is those with a Ph.D. degree. The unadjusted differential is 26.6 log points. That is, women’s salaries are about 25 percent less than men’s. The decomposition table below illustrates the identification problem.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>No ADV. Deg (Ref)</th>
<th>Ph.D. (Ref)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disc</td>
<td>Endow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree Type</td>
<td>-0.193</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cont length</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pub Activity</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/Ethnic</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences in average qualifications between men and women explain 17.6 log points, so the estimate of discrimination is 9 log points. When No Advanced Degree is the reference group, the partial contribution of degree type to discrimination
is -19.3 log points, and the contribution of constant term differences is 21.9 log points. For Ph.D. as the left out group, these contributions are -1.1 log points and 3.7 log points, respectively. The partial contribution of degree type to the endowment effect is 4.2 log points regardless of the left out reference group. This clearly demonstrates the identification problem—the choice of education category for the reference group is entirely arbitrary, yet the amount of discrimination that is attributed to degree type varies dramatically.

Second example: $G$ is an indicator variable for university graduate (non university graduate is the omitted reference group) and $T$ is work experience

$$
\tilde{Y}_m - \tilde{Y}_f = (\tilde{G}_m - \tilde{G}_f) \hat{\beta}_{1m} + (\tilde{T}_m - \tilde{T}_f) \hat{\beta}_{2m} \\
+ (\hat{\beta}_{0m} - \hat{\beta}_{0f}) + (\hat{\beta}_{1m} - \hat{\beta}_{1f}) \tilde{G}_f + (\hat{\beta}_{2m} - \hat{\beta}_{2f}) \tilde{T}_f,
$$

Suppose instead that the omitted reference group is non university graduate ($S = 1 - G$), the resulting decomposition is

$$
\tilde{Y}_m - \tilde{Y}_f = (\tilde{S}_m - \tilde{S}_f) \hat{\theta}_{1m} + (\tilde{T}_m - \tilde{T}_f) \hat{\beta}_{2m} \\
+ (\hat{\theta}_{0m} - \hat{\theta}_{0f}) + (\hat{\theta}_{1m} - \hat{\theta}_{1f}) \tilde{S}_f + (\hat{\beta}_{2m} - \hat{\beta}_{2f}) \tilde{T}_f.
$$

Unfortunately, $\hat{\beta}_{0m} - \hat{\beta}_{0f} \neq (\hat{\theta}_{0m} - \hat{\theta}_{0f})$, and $\hat{\beta}_{1m} - \hat{\beta}_{1f} \neq (\hat{\theta}_{1m} - \hat{\theta}_{1f})$ even though $\hat{\beta}_{0m} - \hat{\beta}_{0f} + (\hat{\beta}_{1m} - \hat{\beta}_{1f}) \tilde{G}_f = (\hat{\theta}_{0m} - \hat{\theta}_{0f}) + (\hat{\theta}_{1m} - \hat{\theta}_{1f}) \tilde{S}_f$.

Solutions: Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2004) and Yun (2005)

Force coefficients on a set of indicator variables to sum to zero

$$
Y_i = b_0 + b_1 G_i + c_1 S_i + \beta_2 T_i + \varepsilon_i
$$

$$
= b_0 + b_1 (G_i - S_i) + \beta_2 T_i + \varepsilon_i
$$

since $b_1 + c_1 = 0$, so that $c_1 = - b_1$. 

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The decomposition is now expressed by

\[
Y_m - Y_f = \left( \hat{b}_{0m} - \hat{b}_{0f} \right) + \left( \hat{b}_{1m} - \hat{b}_{1f} \right) (\bar{G}_f - \bar{S}_f) + \left( \hat{\beta}_{2m} - \hat{\beta}_{2f} \right) \bar{T}_f
\]
\[+ \hat{b}_{1m} \left[ (\bar{G}_m - \bar{G}_f) - (\bar{S}_m - \bar{S}_f) \right] + \hat{\beta}_{2m} (\bar{T}_m - \bar{T}_f).
\]

the choice of omitted reference group no longer matters, i.e.
\[
\left( \hat{b}_{1m} - \hat{b}_{1f} \right) (\bar{G}_f - \bar{S}_f) = -(\hat{c}_{1m} - \hat{c}_{1f}) (\bar{G}_f - \bar{S}_f).
\]
III. GENERALIZED WAGE DECOMPOSITIONS

Background Reading:


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The standard decomposition technique estimates only relative differences. In the case of discrimination estimates, we do not know how much of the unexplained (discriminatory) wage gap arises from favoritism toward one group of workers and how much arises from pure discrimination against the other group. If we let ‘o’ denote the absence of discrimination in a competitive labor market, the following relationships are implied by the log wage decompositions:

\[ G = W_m/W_f - 1 \] (the unadjusted male/female wage differential)

\[ Q = W_m^o/W_f^o - 1 \] (the male/female wage differential attributable to qualifications)

\[ D = (W_m/W_f - W_m^o/W_f^o) / (W_m^o/W_f^o) \] represents the discrimination differential.
In general we could write

\[
\ln(G + 1) = \ln(D + 1) + \ln(Q + 1) \\
= \ln(W_m/W_m^*) + \ln(W_f^*/W_f) + \ln(W_m^*/W_f^*) \\
= \ln(\delta_{mo} + 1) + \ln(\delta_{of} + 1) + \ln(Q + 1)
\]

where \( \delta_{mo} = W_m/W_m^* - 1 \) (favoritism toward males) and \( \delta_{of} = W_f^*/W_f - 1 \) (pure discrimination against females).

In log terms the nondiscriminatory wages for men and women could be expressed as

\[
\ln(\bar{W}_m) = X_m^t \hat{\beta}^* \\
\ln(\bar{W}_f) = X_f^t \hat{\beta}^*
\]

where \( \hat{\beta}^* \) is the estimated parameter vector in the absence of discrimination. An operational wage decomposition for a sample of workers can be expressed as

\[
\ln(G + 1) = \ln(\bar{W}_m/\bar{W}_m^*) + \ln(\bar{W}_f^*/\bar{W}_f) + \ln(\bar{W}_m^*/\bar{W}_f^*) \\
= X_m^t (\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}^*) + X_f^t (\hat{\beta}^* - \hat{\beta}_f) + (X_m - X_f) \hat{\beta}^* \\
= \ln(\delta_{mo} + 1) + \ln(\delta_{of} + 1) + \ln(Q + 1).
\]

We can quickly narrow down the possibilities for obtaining \( \hat{\beta}^* \) to an infinite number. Fortunately, we can confine our attention to a smaller number of plausible possibilities. Assume that in the immediate aftermath of a sudden cessation of labor market discrimination, \( \hat{\beta}^* \) would be a function of the currently estimated wage structures for males and females. A simple approximation would be to express \( \hat{\beta}^* \) as a matrix weighted average of the vectors \( \hat{\beta}_m \) and \( \hat{\beta}_f \):

\[
\hat{\beta}^* = \Omega \hat{\beta}_m + (I - \Omega) \hat{\beta}_f,
\]
where $\Omega$ is an arbitrary $k \times k$ matrix and $I$ is a $k \times k$ identity matrix. This still appears to admit an infinite number of possibilities. A reasonable choice for the weighting matrix is

$$\Omega = (X'X)^{-1}(X'_m X_m)$$

where $X'X = X'_m X_m + X'_f X_f$ is the cross product matrix for the combined sample of males and females. It is easily verified that $\hat{\beta}^*$ in this case is the OLS estimator applied to the combined sample:

$$\hat{\beta}^* = (X'X)^{-1}X'Y$$

$$= \hat{\beta}.$$

There are some interesting special cases to consider:

$$\Omega = I \Rightarrow \hat{\beta}^* = \hat{\beta}_m, \hat{\delta}_{mo} = 0, \hat{D} = \hat{\delta}_{of} = \tilde{W}_f / \tilde{W}_f - 1.$$

$$\Omega = 0 \Rightarrow \hat{\beta}^* = \hat{\beta}_f, \hat{\delta}_{of} = 0, \hat{D} = \hat{\delta}_{mo} = \tilde{W}_m / \tilde{W}_m - 1.$$

Cotton (1988): $\Omega = \ell_m I$, where $\ell_m$ is the male proportion of the labor force.

Suppose the sample proportion of male workers is used, $\ell_m = T_m / T$.

Cotton’s weighting scheme is equivalent to that of Oaxaca & Ransom in the following instance:

$$\Omega = (T_m / T)(X'X) = (X'_m X_m)$$

$$\Rightarrow T^{-1}(X'X) = T_m^{-1}(X'_m X_m).$$

This implies that the first and second sample moments for the regressors are identical for males and females. In particular this means that average characteristics are identical, so that all of the unadjusted differential is attributable to discrimination.
Reimers (1983): $\Omega = \frac{1}{2} I$. This is a special case of Cotton’s weighting scheme, i.e. $T_m/T = \frac{1}{2}$. 
IV. DECOMPOSITION STANDARD ERRORS

Background reading:


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We start with the variances of the log wage decomposition when adopting the male wage structure as the norm. Note

\[ E[\ln (Q_m + 1)] = (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' E(\hat{\beta}_m) \]

\[ = (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \hat{\beta}_m \]

when we condition on \( \bar{X} \). The true variance of \( \ln (Q_m + 1) \) is given by

\[ \text{var} [\ln (Q_m + 1)] = E \left\{ (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' (\hat{\beta}_m - \beta_m)' (\hat{\beta}_m - \beta_m)' (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f) \right\} \]

\[ = (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' E \left( (\hat{\beta}_m - \beta_m)' (\hat{\beta}_m - \beta_m) \right) (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f) \]

\[ = (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \Sigma_{\hat{\beta}_m} (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f) \]

where \( \Sigma_{\hat{\beta}_m} = \text{var} (\hat{\beta}_m) \) is the \( k \times k \) variance/covariance matrix of \( \hat{\beta}_m \). Next we seek an expression for the variance of \( \ln (D_m + 1) \). Note

\[ E[\ln (D_m + 1)] = \bar{X}_f' \left[ E(\hat{\beta}_m) - E(\hat{\beta}_f) \right] \]

\[ = \bar{X}_f' (\beta_m - \beta_f) . \]
Accordingly, the true variance of $\ln(D_m + 1)$ is given by

$$
var [\ln(D_m + 1)] = E \left\{ \left[ \bar{X}_f' \left( \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \beta_m \right) - \left( \hat{\beta}_f - \beta_f \right) \right) \right] \cdot \left[ \left( \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \beta_m \right) - \left( \hat{\beta}_f - \beta_f \right) \right)' \bar{X}_f \right] \right\} = \bar{X}_f' \left( \Sigma_\beta_m + \Sigma_\beta_f \right) \bar{X}_f
$$

where $\Sigma_\beta_f = var (\hat{\beta}_f)$ is the $k \times k$ variance/covariance matrix of $\hat{\beta}_f$. Note that $cov (\hat{\beta}_m, \hat{\beta}_f) = 0$. It is straightforward to show

$$
var [\ln (G + 1)] = \bar{X}_m' \Sigma_\beta_m \bar{X}_m + \bar{X}_f' \Sigma_\beta_f \bar{X}_f.
$$

The true standard errors of $\ln (G + 1)$, $\ln (Q_m + 1)$, and $\ln (D_m + 1)$ are simply the square roots of $var [\ln (G + 1)]$, $var [\ln (Q_m + 1)]$, and $var [\ln (D_m + 1)]$. In practice the variance and standard errors are estimated by using the estimated values of $\Sigma_\beta_m$ and $\Sigma_\beta_f$.

We next consider the variances and standard errors for the decomposition terms corresponding to the decomposition that assumes that the $f$ structure is the competitive, nondiscriminatory norm. In a parallel fashion to the above expressions, we obtain

$$
E [\ln (Q_f + 1)] = (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \beta_f
$$
$$
E [\ln (D_f + 1)] = \bar{X}_m' (\beta_m - \beta_f)
$$

$$
var [\ln (Q_f + 1)] = (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \Sigma_\beta_f (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)
$$
$$
var [\ln (D_f + 1)] = \bar{X}_m' \left( \Sigma_\beta_m + \Sigma_\beta_f \right) \bar{X}_m.
$$

The true standard errors of $\ln (Q_f + 1)$ and $\ln (D_f + 1)$ are simply the square roots of $var [\ln (Q_f + 1)]$ and $var [\ln (D_f + 1)]$. In practice the variance and standard errors are estimated by using the estimated values of $\Sigma_\beta_m$ and $\Sigma_\beta_f$. 

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Suppose we are interested in placing standard errors on the differentials $Q$ and $D$. As an example, consider the simple decomposition in which the $m$ structure is the competitive, nondiscriminatory norm. We know that

$$\ln (Q_m + 1) = (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f) \beta_m$$

implies

$$Q_m = e^{(\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f) \beta_m} - 1$$

which is a nonlinear function of $\beta_m$. In a simple case like this, one can apply the delta method which is a first order Taylor series approximation. In general $g(\hat{\theta}) \approx g(\theta) + g'(\theta)(\hat{\theta} - \theta)$, where $g'(\theta)$ is the first derivative of $g(\theta)$ with respect to $\theta$. An asymptotic approximation yields

$$E[g(\hat{\theta})] = g(\theta)$$

$$\text{var}[g(\hat{\theta})] = [g'(\theta)] \text{var}(\hat{\theta}) [g'(\theta)]'.$$

Under fairly general conditions

$$g(\hat{\theta}) \xrightarrow{a} N(g(\theta), [g'(\theta)] \text{var}(\hat{\theta}) [g'(\theta)]').$$

In practice $\theta$ is replaced by $\hat{\theta}$ for purposes of calculation. In our example

$$g(\hat{\theta}) = Q_m$$

$$\hat{\theta} = \beta_m$$

$$\text{var}(\hat{\theta}) = \text{var}(\beta_m) = \Sigma_{\beta_m}$$

$$g'(\hat{\theta}) = \frac{\partial Q_m}{\partial \beta_m} = e^{(\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f) \beta_m} (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' = (Q_m + 1) (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)'.$$

Accordingly,

$$\text{var}(Q_m) = (Q_m + 1)^2 (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \Sigma_{\beta_m} (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f).$$
In the case of $D_m$ we have

$$\ell n (D_m + 1) = \bar{X}_f' \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f \right)$$

which implies

$$D_m = e^{\bar{X}_f' (\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f)} + 1.$$ 

Application of the delta method yields

$$var(D_m) = (D_m + 1)^2 \bar{X}_f' \left( \Sigma_{\hat{\beta}_m} + \Sigma_{\hat{\beta}_f} \right) \bar{X}_f.$$ 

The construction of the variances for the decomposition differentials under the $f$ structure is quite similar. Note that

$$\ell n (Q_f + 1) = (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \hat{\beta}_f$$

implies

$$Q_f = e^{(\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \hat{\beta}_f} - 1$$

and

$$\ell n (D_f + 1) = \bar{X}_m' \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f \right)$$

implies

$$D_f = e^{\bar{X}_m' (\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f)} - 1.$$ 

It is straightforward to show

$$var(Q_f) = (Q_f + 1)^2 (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \Sigma_{\hat{\beta}_f} (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)$$

and

$$var(D_f) = (D_f + 1)^2 \bar{X}_m' \left( \Sigma_{\hat{\beta}_m} + \Sigma_{\hat{\beta}_f} \right) \bar{X}_m.$$ 

The estimated standard errors for these various differentials are obtained by taking the square roots of the variances and replacing the variance/covariance matrices for $\hat{\beta}_m$ and $\hat{\beta}_f$ with their estimated values. One can also obtain variances and standard errors for the favoritism and pure discrimination differentials for the generalized decomposition in an analogous fashion.
V. DECOMPOSITIONS WITH SELECTIVITY CORRECTIONS

Background reading:


In this section we consider how decompositions are affected by corrections for sample selection. For example, working men and women may not be a random sample of the working age population. This sample selectivity may impart biases in wage equations unless the sample selection effects are taken into account when estimating the wage equation. The simplest approach is to first model the probability of employment as a probit. A two equation model arises for each gender group:

\[
E_{ij}^* = Z_{ij}' \gamma_j + \varepsilon_{ij}
\]
\[
Y_{ij} = X_{ij}' \beta_j + u_{ij},
\]

where for individual ‘i’ in the jth gender group, \(E_{ij}^*\) is a latent variable associated with employment, \(Z_{ij}'\) is a vector of the determinants of employment, \(Y_{ij}\) is the market wage (in logs), \(X_{ij}'\) is a vector of determinants of market wages, \(\gamma_j\) and \(\beta_j\) are the associated parameter vectors, and \(\varepsilon_{ji}\) and \(u_{ji}\) are \(i.i.d\) error terms that follow a bivariate normal distribution \((0, 0, \sigma_{\varepsilon_j}, \sigma_{u_j}, \rho_j)\). For identification purposes, the variance of \(\varepsilon_{ji}\) is normalized to 1.
While $E_{ij}^*$ is unobserved as a continuous variable, market wages ($Y_{ij}$) are observed when $E_{ij}^* > 0$. The probability of being employed is given by
\[
\Pr (E_{ij}^* > 0) = \Pr (\varepsilon_{ij} > -Z_{ij}'\gamma_j)
\]
\[= \Phi(Z_{ij}'\gamma_j),\]
where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the standard normal C.D.F. (the variance of $\varepsilon$ is normalized to 1). The market wage equation is estimated for \( \{i \mid \varepsilon_{ij} > -Z_{ij}'\gamma_j\} \).

We have the familiar result that the expected wage of an employed worker is
\[
E \left( Y_{ij} \mid E_{ij}^* > 0 \right) = X_{ij}'\beta_j + E \left( u_{ij} \mid \varepsilon_{ij} > -Z_{ij}'\gamma_j \right).
\]
\[= X_{ij}'\beta_j + \rho_j\sigma_{u_j}\lambda_{ij}
\]
\[= X_{ij}'\beta_j + \theta_j\lambda_{ij},\]
where $\theta_j = \rho_j\sigma_{u_j}$, $\lambda_{ij} = \phi(Z_{ij}'\gamma_j)/\Phi(Z_{ij}'\gamma_j)$, and $\phi(\cdot)$ is the standard normal density function.

It is clear that correction for selectivity bias when comparing two demographic groups $m$ and $f$ requires a wage decomposition of the following sort (assuming the $m$ wage structure is the norm):
\[
Y_m - Y_f = \left( X'_m \hat{\beta}_m + \hat{\theta}_m \hat{\lambda}_m \right) - \left( X'_f \hat{\beta}_f + \hat{\theta}_f \hat{\lambda}_f \right)
\]
\[= X'_f \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f \right) + (\hat{X}_m - \hat{X}_f)'\hat{\beta}_m
\]
\[+ \left( \hat{\theta}_m \hat{\lambda}_m - \hat{\theta}_f \hat{\lambda}_f \right)
\]
The first two terms in the above decomposition are the familiar discrimination and endowment components, and the last term measures gender differences in the selection effects. A potentially critical issue is how to analyze and interpret this last term. One way to finesse the problem of what to do with the term $(\hat{\theta}_m \hat{\lambda}_m - \hat{\theta}_f \hat{\lambda}_f)$ is to
simply net out the estimated differences in conditional means from the overall wage differential so that one is left with the familiar decomposition terms:

\[
(Y_m - Y_f) - \left( \hat{\theta}_m \hat{\lambda}_m - \hat{\theta}_k \hat{\lambda}_k \right) = \hat{X}_f' \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f \right) + (\hat{X}_m - \hat{X}_f)' \hat{\beta}_m.
\]

On issue that arises is that this approach does not provide a decomposition of the observed wage differential \(Y_m - Y_f\).

Of particular interest is the question of whether or not the term \(\hat{\theta}_m \hat{\lambda}_m - \hat{\theta}_f \hat{\lambda}_f\) should be subject to further decomposition into discrimination and endowment components, and if so, how should this be done? It is important to understand what gives rise to gender differences in the selection terms. Consider the following decomposition of the gender difference in the conditional mean error terms for the wage equations for the employed:

\[
\hat{E}(u_m \mid \varepsilon_m > -Z_m' \hat{\gamma}_m) - \hat{E}(u_f \mid \varepsilon_f > -Z_f' \hat{\gamma}_f) = \hat{\theta}_m \hat{\lambda}_m - \hat{\theta}_f \hat{\lambda}_f
\]

\[= \hat{\theta}_m (\hat{\lambda}_f^0 - \hat{\lambda}_f) + \hat{\theta}_m (\hat{\lambda}_m - \hat{\lambda}_f^0) + (\hat{\theta}_m - \hat{\theta}_f) \hat{\lambda}_m,
\]

where \(\hat{\lambda}_j = \sum_{i,j} \hat{\lambda}_{ij} / N_j\) and \(\hat{\lambda}_{ij} = \phi(Z_{ij}' \hat{\gamma}_j) / \Phi(Z_{ij}' \hat{\gamma}_j)\) for \(j = m, f\), \(\hat{\lambda}_f^0 = \sum_{i,j} \hat{\lambda}_{ij} / N_f\), and \(\hat{\lambda}_{if}^0 = \phi(Z_{if}' \hat{\gamma}_m) / \Phi(Z_{if}' \hat{\gamma}_m)\). The term \(\hat{\lambda}_f^0\) is the mean value of the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) if females faced the same selection equation that the men face. The term \(\hat{\theta}_m (\hat{\lambda}_f^0 - \hat{\lambda}_f)\) measures the effects of gender differences in the parameters of the probit selectivity equation on the male/female wage differential. The effects of gender differences in the variables that determine professional employment are measured by the term \(\hat{\theta}_m (\hat{\lambda}_m - \hat{\lambda}_f^0)\). Finally, the effects of gender differences in the observed wage response to selection are captured by the term \((\hat{\theta}_m - \hat{\theta}_f) \hat{\lambda}_f\). Given that \(\hat{\theta}_j = \hat{\rho}_j \hat{\sigma}_{a_j}\).
and the parameters \( \hat{\rho}_j \) and \( \hat{\sigma}_{uj} \) are identified, further decomposition of \( \hat{\theta}_m - \hat{\theta}_f \) is possible:

\[
\hat{\theta}_m - \hat{\theta}_f = \hat{\rho}_m (\hat{\sigma}_{um} - \hat{\sigma}_{uf}) + (\hat{\rho}_m - \hat{\rho}_f) \hat{\sigma}_{uf} \quad (4)
\]

\[
= (\hat{\rho}_m - \hat{\rho}_f) \hat{\sigma}_{um} + \hat{\rho}_f (\hat{\sigma}_{um} - \hat{\sigma}_{uf}) \quad (5)
\]

The decompositions derived from (4) and (5) measure the effects of gender differences in wage error term variances and correlations between unobserved errors in the selection and wage equations. Decompositions (4) and (5) correspond to standardizing on the male correlation coefficient (female wage error variance) or on the female correlation coefficient (male wage error variance).

We can consider four alternative decompositions that in effect define labor market inequity with respect to how sample selection varies across demographic groups.

The most straightforward approach is imply to identify the overall selection component as a category apart from discrimination and endowment effects:

\[
\bar{Y}_m - \bar{Y}_f = \bar{X}_f' (\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f) + (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \hat{\beta}_m + (\hat{\theta}_m \hat{\lambda}_m - \hat{\theta}_f \hat{\lambda}_f). \quad (6)
\]

If one believed that gender differences in the probit selection parameters for employment represented discrimination and that gender differences in personal attributes that determine the probability of employment are simply endowment differences, the resulting decomposition would be:

\[
\bar{Y}_m - \bar{Y}_f = \underbrace{\bar{X}_f' (\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f)}_{\text{discrimination}} + \underbrace{(\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)' \hat{\beta}_m}_{\text{endowments}} + \underbrace{(\hat{\theta}_m \hat{\lambda}_m - \hat{\theta}_f \hat{\lambda}_f)}_{\text{selectivity}}. \quad (7)
\]
A second alternative is to add the effects of gender differences in $\rho$ to the estimated endowment (human capital) effects on the grounds that the gender difference in the error correlation coefficient is a justifiable structural source of gender wage gaps. It is difficult to know where to assign the wage gap effects of gender differences in the wage error variances. Differences in wage dispersion might or might not reflect direct labor market discrimination. Consequently, we include wage dispersion effects in the neutral category of selection effects. Upon standardizing on the male wage error variance, the overall wage decomposition becomes

$$
Y_m - Y_f = \begin{aligned}
\left[ X_f' (\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f) + \hat{\theta}_m (\hat{\lambda}_f^0 - \hat{\lambda}_f) \right] \\
+ (X_m - X_f)' \hat{\beta}_m + \hat{\theta}_m (\hat{\lambda}_m - \hat{\lambda}_f^0) + (\hat{\rho}_m - \hat{\rho}_f) \hat{\sigma}_{uf} \\
+ \hat{\rho}_m (\hat{\sigma}_{um} - \hat{\sigma}_{uf}) \end{aligned}
$$

(8)

The most encompassing view of discrimination is to regard both gender differences in the estimated $\gamma$ parameters from the probit selection equation for employment and gender differences in the wage effects of selectivity ($\theta$) as manifestations of discrimination. Gender differences in the values of the employment determining variables ($H'$) continue be treated as nondiscriminatory endowment effects. These assumptions lead to

$$
Y_m - Y_f = \begin{aligned}
\left[ X_f' (\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f) + \hat{\theta}_m (\hat{\lambda}_f^0 - \hat{\lambda}_f) + (\hat{\theta}_m - \hat{\theta}_f) \hat{\lambda}_f \right] \\
+ (X_m - X_f)' \hat{\beta}_m + \hat{\theta}_m (\hat{\lambda}_m - \hat{\lambda}_f^0) \end{aligned}
$$

(9)

$$
= \begin{aligned}
\left[ X_f' (\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f) + \hat{\theta}_m \hat{\lambda}_f^0 - \hat{\theta}_f \hat{\lambda}_f \right] \\
+ (X_m - X_f)' \hat{\beta}_m + \hat{\theta}_m (\hat{\lambda}_m - \hat{\lambda}_f^0) \end{aligned}
$$

endowments

selectivity

discrimination

24
An example taken from the Israeli 1995 Census illustrates how much difference it makes when selectivity is not taken into account and when it is taken into account, how much difference the chosen decomposition method makes.

### Wage Decomposition with Selectivity Correction

\[(\log) \text{ wage gap} = 0.2567\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decomposition Method</th>
<th>Endow</th>
<th>Disc</th>
<th>Select</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard (1)</td>
<td>0.0916</td>
<td>0.1651</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(35.68%)</td>
<td>(64.32%)</td>
<td>(0.00%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection (6)</td>
<td>0.0976</td>
<td>0.1730</td>
<td>-0.0139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(38.02%)</td>
<td>(67.39%)</td>
<td>(-5.41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection (7)</td>
<td>0.1595</td>
<td>0.1305</td>
<td>-0.0333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(62.13%)</td>
<td>(50.84%)</td>
<td>(-12.97%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection (9)</td>
<td>0.1595</td>
<td>0.0972</td>
<td>0.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(62.13%)</td>
<td>(37.87%)</td>
<td>(0.00%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decompositions are applied to a sample of male and female professional workers. The unadjusted (log) wage differential is 0.2567. The endowment effect accounts from 35.68% to 62.13% of the wage gap, and the discrimination effect accounts from 37.87% to 67.39% of the wage gap.
VI. ECONOMETRICS AND EQUITY SALARY ADJUSTMENTS

Background reading:

"Using Econometric Models for Intrafirm Equity Salary Adjustments" (with Michael R. Ransom), *Journal of Economic Inequality*, vol. 1, No. 1, December 2003, 221-249.


The Linear Salary Model

Let $\hat{D} = X'_f (\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f)$ represent an unbiased estimator of average discrimination or inequity.

Let $N_f$ denotes the number of female workers in the relevant job unit.

Then $N_f \hat{D}$ represents an unbiased estimator of the aggregate amount of salary inequity.

The salary predicted for the $i$th female according to the estimated male salary model is $\hat{Y}_f^m = X'_{fi} \hat{\beta}_m$.

Therefore, the predicted salary gap for the $i$th female can be calculated as $e_{fi}^m = Y_{fi} - \hat{Y}_f^m$. 


Method 1

A seemingly straightforward approach would be to let $A_{f_i}^{(1)} = -e_{f_i}^m$ define the salary adjustment algorithm.

The aggregate adjustment is given by

$$A_f^{(1)} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} A_{f_i}^{(1)}$$

$$= -\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} e_{f_i}^m$$

$$= N_f \hat{D}.$$  

The mean equity-adjusted salary for females is simply

$$\hat{Y}_f^{m} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \hat{Y}_{f_i}^m}{N_f}$$

$$= \hat{Y}_f + \hat{D}.$$  

Note that salary adjustment $A_{f_i}^{(1)}$ can be expressed equivalently as

$$A_{f_i}^{(1)} = X_{f_i}^t \hat{\beta}_m - \left( X_{f_i}^t \hat{\beta}_f + e_{f_i}^f \right)$$

$$= X_{f_i}^t \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f \right) - e_{f_i}^f,$$

where $e_{f_i}^f$ is the in-sample prediction error (residual) for the $i$th female:

$$e_{f_i}^f = Y_{f_i} - \hat{Y}_{f_i},$$

$$= Y_{f_i} - X_{f_i}^t \hat{\beta}_f.$$
Method 2

An alternative salary adjustment is one in which the own in-sample prediction error is added to the salary gap estimated on the basis of the male salary regression:

\[
A_{fi}^{(2)} = A_{fi}^{(1)} + e_{fi}^f
\]
\[
= -e_{fi}^m + e_{fi}^f
\]
\[
= \hat{Y}_{fi}^m - \hat{Y}_{fi}^f
\]
\[
= X_{fi}' \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f \right).
\]

The equity-adjusted salary implied by \((A_{fi}^{(2)})\) is

\[
\hat{Y}_{fi}^{(2)} = A_{fi}^{(2)} + Y_{fi}
\]
\[
= X_{fi}' \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f \right) + X_{fi}' \hat{\beta}_f + e_{fi}^f
\]
\[
= X_{fi}' \hat{\beta}_m + e_{fi}^f
\]
\[
= \hat{Y}_{fi}^m + e_{fi}^f.
\]

The aggregate salary adjustment \(A_f^{(2)}\) is identical to that yielded by \(A_f^{(1)}\):

\[
A_f^{(2)} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} A_{fi}^{(2)}
\]
\[
= -\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} e_{fi}^m + \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} e_{fi}^f
\]
\[
= A_f^{(1)} = N_f \hat{D}
\]

since \(\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} e_{fi}^f = 0\) by the property of OLS.
The method 2 adjustment implies that the mean adjusted salary for females is identical to that of $A_f^{(1)}$, i.e.

$$
\hat{Y}_f^{(2)} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \check{Y}_f^{(2)} + \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} e_f^i}{N_f} = \check{Y}_f^m + e_f^f.
$$

There is an invariance property for the effects of the adjustment algorithm on the salaries of the firm’s male employees when the algorithm is symmetrically applied to males.

**Method 3**

To avoid nominal wage cuts for women, salary adjustments could be implemented only for those women for whom $A_f^{(2)} = -e_m^f + e_f^f > 0$:

$$
A_f^{(3)} = \phi_f A_f^{(2)},
\phi_f = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } A_f^{(2)} = -e_m^f + e_f^f > 0 \\
0 & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
$$

The adjusted salary implied by $A_f^{(3)}$ is

$$
\hat{Y}_f^{(3)} = Y_f + \phi_f A_f^{(2)} = X'_{f, i} \hat{\beta}_f + e_f^f + \phi_f X'_{f, i} \left( \hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f \right) = X'_{f, i} \hat{\beta}_f^{(3)} + e_f^f,
$$

where $\hat{\beta}_f^{(3)} = \left[ \phi_f \hat{\beta}_m + (1 - \phi_f) \hat{\beta}_f \right]$ is a constrained nondiscriminatory wage structure for females and is a special case of the matrix weighted average wage structures developed in Oaxaca and Ransom (1994).
One potential difficulty with algorithm #3 is that if female salary adjustments are ruled out for those women for whom $A_{f_i}^{(2)} = -e_{f_i}^m + e_{f_i}^f < 0$,

there will be an upward bias to the total equity adjustment.

The aggregate salary adjustment under algorithm #3 is given by

$$A_f^{(3)} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} A_{f_i}^{(3)}$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \phi_{f_i} A_{f_i}^{(2)}$$

$$\geq \sum_{\phi_{f_i}=1}^{N_f} A_{f_i}^{(2)} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} A_{f_i}^{(2)} = A_f^{(2)}.$$
Method 4

Award only positive adjustments in proportion to each individual’s shadow contribution to the sum of the positive adjustments, $A_f^{(3)}$.

Each individual’s allotted share of the original adjustment is given by $\lambda_{f_i} A_f^{(2)}$, where

$$\lambda_{f_i} = \frac{A_f^{(3)} f_{f_i}}{A_f^{(3)}} = \frac{\phi_{f_i} A_f^{(2)}}{A_f^{(3)}}$$

for $0 \leq \lambda_{f_i} \leq 1$ and $\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \lambda_{f_i} = 1$.

The resulting constrained equity salary adjustment is given by

$$A_{f_i}^{(4)} = \lambda_{f_i} A_f^{(2)}.$$ 

The constrained equity adjusted salary is

$$\hat{Y}_{f_i}^{(4)} = Y_{f_i} + \lambda_{f_i} A_f^{(2)} = \hat{X}_{f_i} \hat{\beta}_{f_i} + e_{f_i} + \phi_{f_i} A_f^{(2)}$$

$$= \hat{X}_{f_i} \hat{\beta}_{f_i} + e_{f_i},$$

where $\hat{\beta}_{f_i} = \left[ \left( \frac{\phi_{f_i} A_f^{(2)}}{A_f^{(3)}} \right) \hat{\beta}_m + \left( 1 - \frac{\phi_{f_i} A_f^{(2)}}{A_f^{(3)}} \right) \hat{\beta}_f \right]$ is a constrained nondiscriminatory wage structure for females and is another special case of the matrix weighted average wage structures developed in Oaxaca and Ransom (1994).
Algorithm #4 constrains the total salary adjustment to equal the original discrimination estimate:

\[ A_f^{(4)} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} A_{fi}^{(4)} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \lambda_{fi} A_f^{(2)} = A_f^{(2)} = N_f \hat{D}. \]

Hence, there is no aggregate under- or over-compensation.

The mean constrained salary adjustment is calculated as

\[ \bar{Y}_f^{(4)} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} Y_{fi}^{(4)}}{N_f} = \bar{Y}_f + \hat{D} = \hat{Y}_f^m. \]
Satisfaction of all of our constraints is not without cost. Anyone who receives an adjustment can do no better than she would under the previous procedures and may possibly do worse.

Those entitled to an adjustment \( A_{f_i}^{(2)} > 0 \) would receive

\[
A_{f_i}^{(4)} = \frac{A_{f_i}^{(2)} A_{f_i}^{(2)}}{\sum_{\phi_{f_i}=1} A_{f_i}^{(2)}} \leq A_{f_i}^{(2)}.
\]

since \( A_{f_i}^{(2)} \leq \sum_{\phi_{f_i}=1} A_{f_i}^{(2)} \).
Method 5

For legal or other reasons it is sometimes the case that all females must receive a positive salary adjustment regardless of whether or not some are already overcompensated relative to the standard adopted.

Consider the following ordering of all of the provisional salary adjustment amounts from salary adjustment algorithm #2:

\[ A_{fh}^{(2)} \geq \ldots \geq A_{ft}^{(2)}, \]

where \( A_{fh}^{(2)} \) is the highest provisional award (\( A_{fh}^{(2)} > 0 \)), and \( A_{ft}^{(2)} \) is the lowest provisional award.

For simplicity we consider the case in which \( A_{ft}^{(2)} < 0 \).

Suppose \( A_{f}^{(2)} = N_f \hat{D} \) is allocated according to \( \psi_{fi} A_{fi}^{(2)} \) where

\[
\psi_{fi} = \frac{A_{fi}^{(2)} - A_{ft}^{(2)} + \gamma}{\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} (A_{fi}^{(2)} - A_{ft}^{(2)} + \gamma)}
\]

for \( 0 \leq \psi_{fi} \leq 1, \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \psi_{fi} = 1 \), and \( \gamma \geq 0 \).

In general if \( A_{min}^{(5)} < \hat{D} \) is the minimum allowed adjustment, then setting \( A_{fi}^{(2)} = A_{ft}^{(2)} \) implies \( \frac{\gamma}{\hat{D} - A_{ft}^{(2)} + \gamma} \hat{D} = A_{min}^{(5)} \). Therefore, the supplementary adjustment factor is calculated according to \( \gamma = \frac{A_{min}^{(5)} (\hat{D} - A_{ft}^{(2)})}{\hat{D} - A_{min}^{(5)}} \).

The implied post-adjustment salary is given by

\[
\hat{Y}_{fi}^{(5)} = Y_{fi} + \hat{A}_{fi}^{(5)} = X_{fi}^{'} \hat{\beta}_{f}^{(5)} + \frac{\gamma - A_{ft}^{(2)}}{\hat{D} - A_{ft}^{(2)} + \gamma} + e_{fi},
\]

where \( \hat{\beta}_{f}^{(5)} = \left( \frac{\hat{D}}{\hat{D} - A_{ft}^{(2)} + \gamma} \right) \hat{\beta}_{m} + \left( 1 - \frac{\hat{D}}{\hat{D} - A_{ft}^{(2)} + \gamma} \right) \hat{\beta}_{f} \) is a constrained nondiscriminatory wage structure for females, and is yet another special case of the Oaxaca/Ransom matrix weighted average wage structures.
The Log Salary Model

\[ \ell n (Y_{ji}) = X'_{ji} \beta_j + \varepsilon_{ji}, \quad j = m, f. \]

For log normal models \( E(Y | X' \beta) = \exp(X' \beta + 0.5\sigma^2_\varepsilon). \)

One’s actual and predicted salaries may be expressed in terms of the own estimated logarithmic salary regression by

\[ Y_{ji} = \exp(X'_{ji} \hat{\beta}_j + \hat{\varepsilon}_{ji}) \]
\[ \hat{Y}_{ji} = \exp(X'_{ji} \hat{\beta}_j + \hat{\theta}_j), \quad j = m, f, \]

where \( \hat{\varepsilon}_{ji} \) is the log salary residual for the \( ith \) individual in the \( jth \) gender group, and \( \hat{\theta}_j \) is an estimate of \( 0.5\sigma^2_\varepsilon \).

The variance parameter \( \theta_j \) can be estimated from the residual variance.

An alternative estimation method for \( \theta_j \) is to impose the restriction that the predicted mean salary equal the sample mean salary:

\[ \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_j} \hat{Y}_{ji}}{N_j} = \bar{Y}_j \]
\[ \Rightarrow \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_j} \exp(X'_{ji} \hat{\beta}_j + \hat{\theta}_j)}{N_j} = \bar{Y}_j \]
\[ \Rightarrow \hat{\theta}_j = \ell n \left( \frac{N_j \bar{Y}_j}{\sum_{i=1}^{N_j} \exp(X'_{ji} \hat{\beta}_j)} \right) \]

Define the own residual between the actual and predicted salaries of the \( ith \) individual as

\[ e^j_{ji} = Y_{ji} - \hat{Y}_{ji}. \]

It is clear that \( \sum_{i=1}^{N_j} e^j_{ji} = 0. \)
Log Salary Adjustment Algorithms

The predicted salary for the $i$th female from the estimated logarithmic salary regression for males is given by

$$\hat{Y}_{fi}^m = \exp(X'_{fi}, \hat{\beta}_m + \hat{\theta}_j).$$

By the same reasoning used for adjustment #2 in the linear model, we add one’s own salary residual to the individual conditional mean salary prediction to arrive at an equity adjusted salary.

Average and total inequity are estimated by $\hat{D} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} A_{fi}^{(2)}}{N_f}$ and $N_f \hat{D} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} A_{fi}^{(2)}$.

Post-Adjustment Salary Orderings

It follows from $A_{fi}^{(2)} = \sum_{\phi_{fi}=0} A_{fi}^{(2)} + \sum_{\phi_{fi}=1} A_{fi}^{(2)}$ that a cet. par. rise in the amount of overpayment of some women will reduce the aggregate amount of inequity. Under algorithm #4, this means that those receiving positive adjustments will receive smaller increases.

It is obvious that anyone for whom $A_{fi}^{(2)} \leq 0$ is no worse off under salary adjustment algorithm #5 than under algorithm #4 since $A_{fi}^{(5)} \geq A_{fi}^{(4)} = 0$.

Those with relatively higher provisional awards must subsidize those with lower provisional awards in order to hold the total adjustment constant at the best estimated value of $N_f \hat{D}$.

It is easily shown that

$$\frac{\partial \psi_{fi}}{\partial \gamma} \geq 0 \text{ as } A_{fi}^{(2)} \equiv \hat{D}.$$

Post Adjustment Convergence

Post-adjustment salary inequity for the $k$th adjustment algorithm would be measured by

$$N_f \hat{D}^{(k)} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \left( \hat{Y}_{fi}^m - Y_{fi}^{(k)} \right), \ k = 1, ..., 5.$$

$\hat{D}^{(k)} = 0$ for algorithms $k = 1, 2, 4, \text{ and } 5$ because $\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} Y_{fi}^{(k)} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \hat{Y}_{fi}^m.$
For method #3, post-adjustment salary inequity would be estimated by

\[ N_f \hat{D}^{(3)} = \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \left( \hat{Y}_{fi}^m - Y_{fi}^{(3)} \right) \]

\[ = \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \left( \hat{Y}_{fi}^m - Y_{fi} - \phi_{fi} A_f^{(2)} \right) \]

\[ = A_f^{(2)} - \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \phi_{fi} A_f^{(2)} \leq 0, \]

therefore, \( \hat{D}^{(3)} \leq 0. \)

Since overcompensated women cannot be subjected to nominal salary reductions, algorithm #3 will produce negative discrimination (favoritism) for women.

Log salary error variance

Let \( \varepsilon_i = \alpha v_i \), where \( v_i \sim i.i.d. (0, \sigma^2_v) \).

Then \( \varepsilon_i \sim i.i.d. (0, \alpha^2 \sigma^2_v) \), where \( \alpha^2 \sigma^2_v = 2\theta \).

Use \( \theta_f \) if \( \alpha_f = \alpha_m = \alpha \) and \( \sigma^2_{v_f} \neq \sigma^2_{v_m} \).

Use \( \theta_m \) if \( \alpha_f \neq \alpha_m \) and \( \sigma^2_{v_f} = \sigma^2_{v_m} = \sigma^2_v \).

If \( \alpha_f \neq \alpha_m \) and \( \sigma^2_{v_f} \neq \sigma^2_{v_m} \), the adjustment algorithms are not identified.
VII. SPECIFICATION BIAS IN WORK EXPERIENCE MEASURES

Background reading:


Our discussion of specification error will be framed in the simplest of models—a traditional (Mincerian) log wage equation,

\[
Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 S_i + \beta_2 X_i^* + \beta_3 X_i^{*2} + \sum_{i=1}^{K} \alpha_i H_i + \epsilon_i, \quad i = 1, ..., N,
\]

where \( Y \) is the natural log of the hourly wage, \( S \) is the schooling level, \( X^* \) is actual work experience, \( H \) is a set of \( K \) other control variables, \( \epsilon \) is a random error term, \( i \) indexes the individual, and \( N \) represents the sample size. More compactly, we can express (10) as,

\[
Y = W^* \gamma + \epsilon,
\]

where \( Y \) and \( \epsilon \) are \((N \times 1)\) vectors, \( W^* \) is the \((N \times (K + 4))\) observation matrix, and \( \gamma \) is the \(((K + 4) \times 1)\) coefficient vector. Taking the probability limit of the OLS estimator yields,

\[
\text{plim}(\hat{\gamma}) = \gamma + \Sigma_{W^*W^*}^{-1} \Sigma_{W^*\epsilon},
\]

which is consistent only if \( \text{plim}(N^{-1}W^*\epsilon) = \Sigma_{W^*\epsilon} = 0 \). Thus, the regressors, specifically schooling and experience, must be exogenously determined (i.e. uncorrelated with \( \epsilon \)).

Now suppose that actual work experience, \( X^* \), is unobserved. Instead one observes \( X \), which can be thought of as potential work experience (e.g age - education - 6).
For simplicity we can express the relationship between potential and actual work experience as,

\[ X_i = X_i^* + v_i, \]  

(11)

where \( v \) is the discrepancy between the experience measures. At this point we will allow that \( v \) may be correlated with \( X^* \) and that the mean of \( v \) may not be, and most probably is not, zero. As is traditionally the case we will, however, assume that there is no correlation between \( v \) and \( \varepsilon \).

The nature of the model misspecification problem we are considering can be seen by substituting (11) into (10) yielding,

\[ Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 S_i + \beta_2 X_i + \beta_3 X_i^2 + \sum_{i=1}^{K} \alpha_i H_i + \varepsilon^*_i, \]  

(12)

where \( \varepsilon^*_i = \varepsilon_i - \beta_2 v_i - 2\beta_3 X_i^* v_i - \beta_3 v_i^2 \).

More compactly, (12) can be expressed as,

\[ Y = W\gamma + \varepsilon^*, \]

where \( W \) is the \((N \times (K + 4))\) new observation matrix, and \( \varepsilon^* \) is the new \((N \times 1)\) error vector. The error vector \( \varepsilon^* \) may be expressed as,

\[ \varepsilon^* = \varepsilon - v \beta_2 - 2 [X^* \odot v] \beta_3 - [v \odot v] \beta_3, \]

where \( X^* \odot v \) and \( v \odot v \) are Hadamard products (i.e. element by element multiplication between \( X^* \) and \( v \) and between \( v \) and \( v \), respectively).

The probability limit of the OLS estimates is,
\[
\text{plim}(\hat{\gamma}) = \gamma + \Sigma_{WW}^{-1} \Sigma_{W\epsilon} - \Sigma_{WW}^{-1} \Sigma_{W\epsilon^2} - 2\Sigma_{WW}^{-1} \Sigma_{W, X^* \epsilon \beta_3} - \Sigma_{WW}^{-1} \Sigma_{W, \epsilon \beta_3}
\]

assuming \(\Sigma_{WW}^{-1} \Sigma_{W\epsilon} = 0\). Now, with specification error associated with substitution of \(X\) for \(X^*\), the asymptotic bias in \(\hat{\gamma}\) consists of three distinct terms.

Our approach to correcting for specification error consists of modeling actual experience as a stochastic regressor generated from a semi-log model:

\[
\ln (X_i^*) = Z_i \gamma_1 + \psi_{1i},
\]

where \(Z\) is a set of regressors that includes the regressors in (10) (i.e. \(S, H\)) and a set of identifying variables (i.e. a respondent’s age, a set of occupational dummy variables, and the number of children for females), and \(\psi_{1i}\) satisfies the standard assumptions without any particular distributional assumption.

The semi-log specification bounds \(X_i^*\) away from zero. Our proposed correction procedure uses a predicted measure of actual work experience constructed in the following fashion:

\[
\hat{X}_i^* = \hat{\delta}_1 \exp (Z_i \hat{\gamma}_1),
\]

where \(\hat{\gamma}_1\) is obtained from OLS estimation of (13), and \(\hat{\delta}_1\) is a scale factor that forces the predicted mean to match the sample mean: (see Oaxaca and Ransom, 2003 and Sarnikar et al., 2007)

\[
\hat{\delta}_1 = \frac{\sum_i X_i^*}{\sum_i \exp (Z_i \hat{\gamma}_1)}.
\]

While our procedure for predicting experience resembles instrumental variables, its motivation does not depend on endogeneity issues. Our motivation is simply to apply the correction model to data sets lacking information on actual experience.
Our empirical implementation of (12) includes completed schooling, marital status, industry dummies, regional dummies, and SMSA (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area) dummies as the set of control variables, \( H \).

Of particular interest are the implications of misspecification of work experience for gender wage gap decomposition. Without loss of generality, we will adopt the estimated wage structure for males as the comparison standard. Accordingly, the standard decomposition is expressed as,

\[
\bar{Y}_m - \bar{Y}_f = (\bar{X}^m_a - \bar{X}^f_a) \tilde{\beta}^m_a + \bar{X}^f_a \left( \tilde{\beta}^m_a - \tilde{\beta}^f_a \right)
\]

\[
= (\bar{X}^m_j - \bar{X}^f_j) \tilde{\beta}^m_j + \bar{X}^f_j \left( \tilde{\beta}^m_j - \tilde{\beta}^f_j \right),
\]

where \( m \) and \( f \) denote males and females, \( a \) denotes actual experience; \( j \) denotes predicted or potential experience, \( \bar{Y} \) is the mean log wage, \( \bar{X} \) is the mean characteristics vector, and \( \tilde{\beta} \) is the estimated parameter vector. The effects of experience specification bias on the endowment (explained) component of the wage decomposition can be decomposed into parameter bias and mean experience measure bias:

\[
(\bar{X}^m_a - \bar{X}^f_a) \tilde{\beta}^m_a - (\bar{X}^m_j - \bar{X}^f_j) \tilde{\beta}^m_j = (\bar{X}^m_a - \bar{X}^f_a) \left( \tilde{\beta}^m_a - \tilde{\beta}^m_j \right)
\]

\[
+ \left[ (\bar{X}^m_a - \bar{X}^f_a) - (\bar{X}^m_j - \bar{X}^f_j) \right] \tilde{\beta}^m_j. \tag{14}
\]

The first term on the rhs of (14) represents the difference in the explained wage gap component that arises because of differences in the estimated parameters. The second term on the rhs of (14) represents the difference in the explained wage gap component that arises because of mean differences in the measures of experience. The effects of experience specification bias on the discrimination (unexplained) component of the wage decomposition can also be decomposed into parameter bias and mean experience measure bias:

\[
\bar{X}^f_a \left( \tilde{\beta}^m_a - \tilde{\beta}^f_a \right) - \bar{X}^f_j \left( \tilde{\beta}^m_j - \tilde{\beta}^f_j \right) = \bar{X}^f_j \left[ \left( \tilde{\beta}^m_a - \tilde{\beta}^f_a \right) - \left( \tilde{\beta}^m_j - \tilde{\beta}^f_j \right) \right] \tilde{\beta}^m_j
\]

\[
+ (\bar{X}^f_a - \bar{X}^f_j) \left( \tilde{\beta}^m_a - \tilde{\beta}^f_a \right). \tag{15}
\]
The first term on the rhs of (15) represents the difference in the unexplained wage gap component that arises because of differences in the estimated parameters. The second term on the rhs of (15) represents the difference in the unexplained wage gap component that arises because of mean differences in the measures of experience. Note that the only differences in the mean characteristics vectors between actual and potential or predicted experience stem from the differences between mean actual experience and its square and mean potential or predicted experience and its square. On the other hand, all of the parameter estimates can differ between specifications that use actual experience and those using either potential or predicted experience.
VIII. JUHN-MURPHY-PIERCE DECOMPOSITION

Background Reading:


The original intent of the JMP decomposition was to account for changes in the unobserved prices and quantities that comprise the change in the unexplained wage gap over time.

The wage equation for a typical worker in period $t$ would be written as $Y_{it} = \beta_{it} + \sigma_{it}v_{it}$, where $\sigma_{it}v_{it} = \varepsilon_{it}$ and $v_{it}$ is a standardized residual with mean 0 and variance 1.

Adopting the male wage structure as the standard, the gender wage gap is decomposed as $\Delta Y_t = \Delta X_t' \beta_{mt} + \sigma_{e \epsilon} \Delta \hat{v}_t$, where $\Delta Y_t = Y_{mt} - Y_{ft}$, $\Delta X_t' = (X_{mt}' - X_{ft}')$, and $\sigma_{e \epsilon} \Delta \hat{v}_t$ represents the gender difference in standardized residuals (unobserved components).

It is easily seen that $\sigma_{e \epsilon} \Delta \hat{v}_t = X_{ft}' (\hat{\beta}_{mt} - \hat{\beta}_{ft})$.


$\sigma_{e \epsilon} \hat{v}_{mt} = X_{mt}' (\hat{\beta}_{mt} - \hat{\beta}_{ft}^*)$ and $\sigma_{e \epsilon} \hat{v}_{ft} = -X_{ft}' (\hat{\beta}_{t}^* - \hat{\beta}_{ft})$ so that

$\sigma_{e \epsilon} \Delta \hat{v}_t = \sigma_{e \epsilon} \hat{v}_{mt} - \sigma_{e \epsilon} \hat{v}_{ft}$

$= X_{mt}' (\hat{\beta}_{mt} - \hat{\beta}_{ft}) + X_{ft}' (\hat{\beta}_{t}^* - \hat{\beta}_{ft})$. 

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JMP decomposition of changes in the gender wage gap between period $t$ and period $t_0$,

$$
\Delta \bar{Y}_t - \Delta \bar{Y}_{t_0} = (\Delta \bar{X}'_t - \Delta \bar{X}'_{t_0}) \hat{\beta}_{mt_0} + \Delta \bar{X}'_t (\hat{\beta}_{mt} - \hat{\beta}_{mt_0}) \\
+ (\Delta \hat{v}_t - \Delta \hat{v}_{t_0}) \hat{\delta}_{\varepsilon mt_0} + \Delta \hat{v}_t (\hat{\delta}_{\varepsilon mt} - \hat{\delta}_{\varepsilon mt_0}).
$$

(16)

$(\Delta \hat{v}_t - \Delta \hat{v}_{t_0}) \hat{\delta}_{\varepsilon mt_0} + \Delta \hat{v}_t (\hat{\delta}_{\varepsilon mt} - \hat{\delta}_{\varepsilon mt_0})$ is the sum of the effects of changes in unobserved quantities and unobserved prices but can also be interpreted as the change in the unexplained or discriminatory gap.
IX. DECOMPOSITIONS WITH AN ENDOGENOUS SWITCHING TOBIT MODEL

Background Reading:

We define $y$ as the months in prison the defendant is sentenced to, $X$ as the vector of the individual’s characteristics, and $\beta$ as the vector of weights on the defendant’s characteristics in the respective regimes. Equation (17) represents sentencing outcomes when an individual pleads guilty or is convicted by trial:

$$
y_i = \begin{cases} 
X_i \beta_P + \varepsilon_P & \text{if defendant is in plea regime} \\
X_i \beta_T + \varepsilon_T & \text{if defendant is in trial regime.}
\end{cases}
$$

(17)

In order to more formally take account of the regime outcome conditional upon conviction, let $\pi_p$ represent the probability of a guilty plea, $\pi_{T&K}$ represent the probability of going to trial and being convicted, and $\pi_{T&A}$ represent the probability of going to trial and being acquitted. Conditional upon prosecution, these probabilities sum to 1. Because we do not have observations on those who went to trial and were acquitted, we can only estimate the following conditional probabilities:

$$
\pi_{PC} = \frac{\pi_p}{\pi_p + \pi_{T&K}} \quad \text{and} \quad \pi_{TC} = \frac{\pi_{T&K}}{\pi_p + \pi_{T&K}},
$$

which sum to 1 and where $\pi_{PC}$ is the probability that one’s conviction was from a guilty plea and $\pi_{TC}$ is the probability that one’s conviction was by trial. Let the variable $s^*$ represent the conditional latent variable corresponding to a defendant’s conviction by trial. The variable $s$ takes on a value of 1 if the defendant’s conviction is by trial, and a value of 0 if the defendant enters a guilty plea. The vector index variable $Z_i$ is a set of variables affecting this probability. Accordingly, the binary regime determination model may be expressed as
Correlation between unobservables in the plea decision stage and unobservables in the sentencing stage will create non random selection that will prevent us from obtaining consistent estimates of the parameters if they are estimated by OLS or Tobit. To account for this self-selection, we model the sentence determination process using a switching regression model with endogenous switching. We assume that the error term from each regime’s sentence determination equation follows a bivariate normal distribution with the error term from the selection equation. The nature of this model requires that an explicit distributional assumption be made. The structure of the error terms is given in the following variance-covariance matrix, where $T$ denotes the trial regime, $P$ denotes the plea regime, and $s$ denotes the binary selection equation (the variance of which is normalized to 1):

$$V = \begin{pmatrix}
1 & \sigma_{Ps} & \sigma_{Ts} \\
\sigma_{Ps} & \sigma_{Ps}^2 & \sigma_{PT} \\
\sigma_{Ts} & \sigma_{PT} & \sigma_{P}^2
\end{pmatrix}$$

(20)

The likelihood function of the model is then:

$$L = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \left\{ \frac{1}{\sigma_T} \phi \left( \frac{y_i - X_i\beta_T}{\sigma_T} \right) \Pr(u_i > -Z_i\gamma|\varepsilon_{Ti}) \right\}^{s_i} \left\{ \frac{1}{\sigma_P} \phi \left( \frac{y_i - X_i\beta_P}{\sigma_P} \right) \Pr(u_i \leq -Z_i\gamma|\varepsilon_{Pi}) \right\}^{1-s_i}$$

(21)

This expression is simplified once we take account of the conditional distribution of $u$ on $\varepsilon$:

$$s_i^* = Z_i\gamma + u_i$$

(18)

$$s_i = \begin{cases} 
1 \text{ if } s_i^* > 0 \\
0 \text{ if } s_i^* \leq 0.
\end{cases}$$

(19)
One additional econometric problem we face is the non-continuous distribution of the dependent variable. Because sentence length cannot be negative, and nearly 25% of our sample receives no prison time, it may be necessary to account for this mass point at 0 in order to obtain consistent estimates. In the context of our switching regression model, we treat the dependent variable as a mixed discrete continuous variable, with limit observations at 0. The sentence outcome is now represented as

\[ y_{\Pi_i} = X_{i\beta_P} + \varepsilon_{\Pi_i} \] if defendant is in plea regime \hspace{1cm} (23)  
\[ y_{P_i} = \begin{cases}  
  y_{P_i}^* & \text{if } y_{P_i}^* > 0 \text{ and } s_i = 0 \\
  0 & \text{if } y_{P_i}^* \leq 0 \text{ and } s_i = 0
\end{cases} \] \hspace{1cm} (24)  
\[ y_{T_i}^* = X_{i\beta_T} + \varepsilon_{T_i} \] if defendant is in trial regime \hspace{1cm} (25)  
\[ y_{Ti} = \begin{cases}  
  y_{Ti}^* & \text{if } y_{Ti}^* > 0 \text{ and } s_i = 1 \\
  0 & \text{if } y_{Ti}^* \leq 0 \text{ and } s_i = 1
\end{cases} \] \hspace{1cm} (26)  

The likelihood for the switching regression with endogenous switching and censoring allows four different types of entries to the likelihood function: limit and non-limit observations in both of the regimes. The likelihood function is

\[ L = \prod_{i=1}^{N} \left\{ \frac{1}{\sigma_T} \phi \left( \frac{y_i - X_i\beta_T}{\sigma_T} \right) \Phi \left( \frac{Z_i\gamma + \frac{\rho_T}{\sigma_T}(y_i - X_i\beta_T)}{1 - \rho_{Ts}} \right)^{s_i} \right\} \left\{ \frac{1}{\sigma_P} \phi \left( \frac{y_i - X_i\beta_P}{\sigma_P} \right) \Phi \left( \frac{-Z_i\gamma - \frac{\rho_P}{\sigma_P}(y_i - X_i\beta_P)}{1 - \rho_{Ps}} \right)^{1-s_i} \right\} (27) \]
where $l = 1$ for limit observations and $\Phi_2$ represents the cumulative bivariate normal distribution.

Decomposing Sentencing Differentials

To examine how much of the gender difference in sentences is due to leniency toward one sex or the other, we apply empirical methods developed in the labor economics literature to estimate gender bias in criminal sentencing outcomes. Our decomposition is achieved by a three-step analysis. The first step typically involves estimation of our empirical model for males and females where the dependent variable is the length of the prison sentence. Here, instead of estimating the empirical model separately for both males and females, we estimate the model for males only. This approach is consistent with viewing the unexplained gap as a residual. It is also necessary in our case, as the relatively small number of female observations in the trial regime means that we are unable to identify a number of parameters in an estimation of the model for females only. This approach allows us to decompose the differential without estimating the female weights, thus circumventing the problem.

In the second step, we predict the average sentence length for females if they faced the male weights. In the third and final step, we use results from the first two steps and decompose the differences in length of sentences for males and females into two components: one attributable to male-female differences in circumstances and a second attributable to unobserved differences in attitudes of judges towards the sexes and unobserved differences in circumstances.

In addition to the problems with identifying the female weights, we face two additional challenges which force us to expand beyond the decomposition. The issue of selection bias in decompositions is addressed by in the context of a Heckit model. We are able to build off of this work in the decomposition we develop, as the Heckit is essentially a special case of an endogenous switching regression model. Finally, we must account for the existence of the limit observations in our data set.
Decomposing Sentencing Outcomes by Regime

First, consider the sentence determination equation for the trial regime:

\[ y^*_T = X_i^T \beta_T + \varepsilon_i^T \]  

if defendant is in the trial regime \( (28) \)

\[ y_{Ti} = \begin{cases} y^*_{Ti} & \text{if } y^*_{Ti} > 0; \ s_i = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } y^*_{Ti} \leq 0; \ s_i = 1 \end{cases} \]  

\( (29) \)

The expected value of a sentence in the trial regime is derived in Appendix 1. Define the sample average sentence in the trial regime as \( \bar{y}_{Tm} \) for males and \( \bar{y}_{Tf} \) for females. The sample is composed of \( N_{Tm} \) men and \( N_{Tf} \) women. The average predicted value of sentences for males is defined as:

\[ \hat{y}_{Tm} = \frac{1}{N_{Tm}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{Tm}} y_{Tmi}, \]  

(30)

where \( \hat{y}_{Tmi} \) is the predicted sentence for the \( i \)th male in the trial regime. However, in a finite sample the predicted mean and the sample mean terms will not necessarily be equal, i.e.

\[ \hat{y}_{Tm} = \frac{1}{N_{Tm}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{Tm}} \hat{y}_{Tmi} \neq \bar{y}_{Tm} = \frac{1}{N_{Tm}} \sum_{i=1}^{N_{Tm}} y_{Tmi} \text{ in general.} \]

Assuming that the underlying model can be consistently estimated, we would have

\[ \text{plim}(\hat{y}_{Tm} - \bar{y}_{Tm}) = 0 \]  

(31)

\[ \text{plim}(\hat{y}_{Tf} - \bar{y}_{Tf}) = 0. \]  

(32)

When the predicted mean outcome does not match the sample mean outcome, we have sample mean prediction error. The proportionate sample mean prediction errors for males and females can be expressed as
\[
\hat{\delta}_{Tm} = \frac{\overline{y}_{Tm}}{\bar{y}_{Tm}} \quad \text{(33)}
\]
\[
\hat{\delta}_{Tf} = \frac{\overline{y}_{Tf}}{\bar{y}_{Tf}} \quad \text{(34)}
\]

It follows from consistency that

\[
\text{plim}(\hat{\delta}) = \text{plim} \left( \frac{\bar{y}}{\bar{y}} \right) = 1.
\]

The average value of sentences for females in the trial regime using male weights is defined as:

\[
\hat{y}_{Tf} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \hat{y}_{Tfi}^0}{N_{Tf}}
\quad \text{(35)}
\]

where \( \hat{y}_{Tfi}^0 \) is a fitted value of the \( i^{th} \) female sentence had they faced the male weights.

We decompose the difference in average sentences in the trial regime as follows:

\[
\overline{y}_{Tm} - \overline{y}_{Tf} = \hat{\delta}_{Tm}(\overline{y}_{Tm} - \hat{y}_{Tf}) + (\hat{\delta}_{Tm} - \hat{\delta}_{Tf})\overline{y}_{Tf} + \hat{\delta}_{Tf}(\hat{y}_{Tf} - \overline{y}_{Tf}) .
\quad \text{(36)}
\]

The first term in eq (36) measures the explained sentencing gap while the unexplained gap is the sum of the last two terms. Note that the second term measures the contribution of gender differences in the sample mean prediction error while the last term measures the contribution of gender differences in the estimated parameters of the model. It is therefore possible to separate out the effect of gender differences in \( \hat{\delta}_T \) if the econometrician estimates both \( \hat{\delta}_{Tm} \) and \( \hat{\delta}_{Tf} \). While we are able to decompose the difference in outcomes into the portion caused by differences in weights and differences in characteristics, we will be unable to isolate the difference caused by weights into a portion caused by different \( \hat{\delta}_T \) terms. However, if it is the case that \( \hat{\delta}_{Tm} - \hat{\delta}_{Tf} \approx 0 \), the unexplained gap is totally captured by \( \hat{\delta}_{Tf}(\hat{y}_{Tf}^0 - \overline{y}_{Tf}) \approx \).
\( \tilde{\delta}_{Tm} \left( \tilde{y}_{Tf}^0 - \tilde{y}_{Tf} \right) \). Under these circumstances one could identify the predicted mean outcome for females as 
\[
\hat{y}_{Tf} \approx \tilde{y}_{Tf}^0 - \left( \frac{1}{\tilde{\delta}_{Tm}} \right) \left[ (\bar{y}_{Tm} - \bar{y}_{Tf}) - \tilde{\delta}_{Tm} (\tilde{y}_{Tm} - \tilde{y}_{Tf}^0) \right].
\]

The decomposition of sentences in the plea regime follows closely that of the trial regime. Now using male weights from the plea regime, the fitted value of the length of sentence in the regime becomes \( \hat{y}_p \), which differs slightly in form from \( \hat{y}_T \).

**Decomposing Regime Choice**

Now consider a decomposition of regime choice. Consider the regime determination model given in (18) and (19) where a positive outcome indicates conviction by trial. The observed proportion of females and males going to trial are, respectively

\[
\bar{p}_{Tf} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_f} s_{fi}}{N_f} \quad \text{(37)}
\]

\[
\bar{p}_{Tm} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_m} s_{mi}}{N_m} \quad \text{(38)}
\]

We define the difference in outcomes for males and females as the observed differences in proportions of males and females in the trial regime, \( \bar{p}_{Tm} - \bar{p}_{Tf} \).

Recall that we do not estimate the model separately for females. However, we are still able to decompose the difference in male and female outcomes into the portion caused by differences in characteristics and the portion caused by differences in weights. We go about these *single model decompositions* by decomposing differentials using only the estimated weights for males.

Here, we decompose the difference in the propensity of males and females to be convicted by trial regime using only male weights. Consider the regime determination model estimated for males:
The estimated weights in this model allow us to obtain a predicted probability of conviction by trial for each individual in the sample:

\[ \hat{p}_{Tmi} = \Phi(Z_{mi}\gamma_m) \]  

We compute the average predicted probability by averaging the individual predicted probabilities:

\[ \hat{p}_Tm = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_m} \Phi(Z_{mi}\gamma_m)}{N_m} \]  

Note that in the probit model, unlike the logit model, the average predicted probability of entering the trial regime will not necessarily equal the proportion of the sample who do in fact enter the regime (for further work on the decomposition of differentials in the context of a probit model.

In practice the difference is typically negligible. However, the selection probability parameters in our model are obtained from FIML applied to the joint estimation of the selection probability and sentencing equations. Hence, there is a need to scale the mean predicted probabilities when conducting a decomposition of gender differences in the propensity to be convicted via the trial regime. As above for the sentencing outcomes, the sample mean (probability) prediction errors for males can be expressed as follows:

\[ \hat{\delta}_{sm} = \frac{\hat{p}_{Tm}}{\hat{p}_{Tm}} \]  

The same consistency argument applies here as in the case of sentencing outcomes.

We estimate the average predicted probability of females being in the trial regime had they faced the same weights as the males:
\[
\hat{p}_{Tf}^0 = \frac{1}{N_f} \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \frac{\Phi(Z_{fi} \hat{\gamma}_m)}{N_f} = \frac{1}{N_f} \sum_{i=1}^{N_f} \frac{\hat{p}_{Tf}^0}{N_f} \tag{44}
\]

The difference in the average probability of conviction via the trial regime can then be decomposed as follows:

\[
\hat{p}_{Tm} - \hat{p}_{Tf} = (\hat{p}_{Tm} - \hat{\delta}_{sm} \hat{p}_{Tf}^0) + (\hat{\delta}_{sm} \hat{p}_{Tf}^0 - \hat{p}_{Tf}) \tag{45}
\]

where the first term on the right hand side represents the difference in probabilities that can be attributed to differences in characteristics, and the second term represents the part of the difference that can be attributed to differences in weights.

**Total Decomposition**

Consider an algebraic decomposition of sentencing differences by regime. Define \(\bar{y}_m\) as the average sentence for males in our sample, and \(\bar{y}_f\) as the average sentence for females. Each gender’s average sentence will be a weighted average of the average sentence in the two regimes:

\[
\bar{y}_m = \bar{y}_{Tm} \bar{p}_{Tm} + \bar{y}_{Pm} (1 - \bar{p}_{Tm}) \tag{46}
\]

\[
\bar{y}_f = \bar{y}_{Tf} \bar{p}_{Tf} + \bar{y}_{ Pf} (1 - \bar{p}_{Tf}) \tag{47}
\]

The difference in average sentences can then be expressed as

\[
\bar{y}_m - \bar{y}_f = \bar{y}_{Tm} \bar{p}_{Tm} + \bar{y}_{Pm} (1 - \bar{p}_{Tm}) - \bar{y}_{Tf} \bar{p}_{Tf} - \bar{y}_{Pf} (1 - \bar{p}_{Tf})
\]

Adding and subtracting the terms \(\bar{y}_{Tf} \bar{p}_{Tm}\) and \(\bar{y}_{ Pf} (1 - \bar{p}_{Tm})\), and collecting terms appropriately yields

\[
\bar{y}_m - \bar{y}_f = (\bar{y}_{Tm} - \bar{y}_{Tf}) \bar{p}_{Tm} + (\bar{y}_{Pm} - \bar{y}_{ Pf}) (1 - \bar{p}_{Tm})
\]

\[
+ (\bar{y}_{Tf} - \bar{y}_{ Pf}) (\bar{p}_{Tm} - \bar{p}_{Tf}). \tag{48}
\]
The first two terms in (48) can be interpreted as a weighted average of the differences in mean sentence outcomes for men and women (weighted by the probability of being in each of the two regimes). The final term can be interpreted as the difference in mean sentence outcomes that can be attributed to gender differences in the propensities of being in the trial regime (weighted by the differences in mean outcomes among females in the two regimes).

Recall how we decomposed each of the single decomposition terms. Denote the portion of the difference attributed to differences in characteristics (the explained portion) as $E$. The portion of the difference attributed to gender differences in the parameters (the unexplained portion) is denoted as $U$. Each portion also contains a subscript denoting the part of the estimation from which it originates:

\begin{align*}
\bar{y}_{Tm} - \bar{y}_{Tf} &= \left[ \hat{\delta}_{Tm} (\bar{y}_{Tm} - \hat{\gamma}_{Tf}^0) \right] + \left[ (\hat{\delta}_{Tm} - \hat{\delta}_{Tf}) \hat{\gamma}_{Tf}^0 + \hat{\delta}_{Tf} (\hat{\gamma}_{Tf}^0 - \hat{\gamma}_{Tf}) \right] \\
 &= E_T + U_T \\
\bar{y}_{Pm} - \bar{y}_{Pf} &= \left[ \hat{\delta}_{Pm} (\bar{y}_{Pm} - \hat{\gamma}_{Pf}^0) \right] + \left[ (\hat{\delta}_{Pm} - \hat{\delta}_{Pf}) \hat{\gamma}_{Pf}^0 + \hat{\delta}_{Pf} (\hat{\gamma}_{Pf}^0 - \hat{\gamma}_{Pf}) \right] \\
 &= E_P + U_P \\
\bar{p}_{Tm} - \bar{p}_{Tf} &= (\bar{p}_{Tm} - \hat{\delta}_{sm} \hat{\gamma}_{Tf}^0) + (\hat{\delta}_{sm} \hat{\gamma}_{Tf}^0 - \hat{\gamma}_{Tf}) \\
 &= E_s + U_s \\
\end{align*}

The decomposition of the overall gender sentencing gap can then be expressed as

\begin{align*}
\bar{y}_m - \bar{y}_f &= [(E_T + U_T) \bar{p}_{Tm} + (E_P + U_P) (1 - \bar{p}_{Tm})] \\
&\quad + (\bar{y}_{Tf} - \bar{y}_{Pf}) (E_s + U_s) \\
&= \underbrace{E_T \bar{p}_{Tm} + E_P (1 - \bar{p}_{Tm}) + E_s (\bar{y}_{Tf} - \bar{y}_{Pf})}_{E} \\
&\quad + \underbrace{U_T \bar{p}_{Tm} + U_P (1 - \bar{p}_{Tm}) + U_s (\bar{y}_{Tf} - \bar{y}_{Pf})}_{U},
\end{align*}

where $E$ is the total amount of the overall gender sentencing gap that is explained.
by differences in characteristics, and $U$ is the total unexplained gap associated with differences in weights.

We note that a more straightforward total decomposition of the mean sentencing differences between men and women can be calculated as

$$
\bar{y}_m - \bar{y}_f = \left( \bar{y}_m - \hat{\delta}_m \hat{y}_f^0 \right) + \left( \hat{\delta}_m \hat{y}_f^0 - \bar{y}_f \right)
$$

(53)

where

$$
\hat{y}_f^0 = \frac{\sum_i \left[ \hat{p}_{Tfi} \hat{y}_{Tfi}^0 + (1 - \hat{p}_{Tfi}) \hat{y}_{Pfi}^0 \right]}{N_f}
$$

and

$$
\hat{\delta}_m = \left\{ \frac{\sum_i \left[ \hat{p}_{Tmi} \hat{y}_{Tmi} + (1 - \hat{p}_{Tmi}) \hat{y}_{Pmi} \right]}{N_m} \right\} \left\{ \frac{1}{\bar{y}_m} \right\}.
$$

In this decomposition $\hat{y}_f^0$ is the mean fitted overall sentence for females using the male weights. Empirically, it turns out that both (52) and (53) yield virtually identical values of the total explained and unexplained portions of the overall gender sentencing gap. However, a shortcoming of the decomposition given by (53) is that it obscures the sources of the overall gender sentencing gap revealed by the more detailed decomposition given in (52).