University of California, Riverside

Economics



David A. Malueg


David A. Malueg

Contact Information

3136 Sproul Hall
Phone: (951) 827-1494
Fax: (951) 827-5685
Email: david.malueg@ucr.edu

Curriculum Vitae  

 

Research Interests

  • Microeconomics
  • Industrial Organization
  • Public Economics
  • Environmental Economics

Professor Malueg joins us after teaching at both the University of Iowa and Tulane University. Between these two appointments he worked five years in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. His research interests include microeconomics, game theory, industrial organization, and environmental economics. Current projects study the efficiency of private provision of public goods, changes in the European Union Emission Trading System to improve efficiency, and the consequences of strategic behavior in network industries. Professor Malueg’s recent research has been published in journals including Economic Theory, The Journal of Industrial Economics, The International Journal of Industrial Organization, and The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Recent Publications

"Equilibrium and Revenue in a Family of Common-Value First-Price Auctions with Differential Information,” with Ram Orzach, forthcoming in the International Journal of Game Theory.

“Threshold Uncertainty in the Private-Information Subscription Game,” with Stefano Barbieri, Journal of Public Economics 94 (2010), 848–861.

“Testing Contest Theory: Evidence from Best-of-Three Tennis Matches,” with Andrew Yates, Review of Economics and Statistics 92 (2010), 689–692.

“Profit-Maximizing Sale of a Discrete Public Good via the Subscription Game in Private-Information Environments,” with Stefano Barbieri, B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 10 (2010) (Contributions), Issue 1, Article 5 (29 pages), available at http://www.bepress.com/bejte/vol10/iss1/art5.

“Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in the Nash Demand Game,” Economic Theory 44 (2010), 243–270.

“Revenue Comparison in Common-Value Auctions: two examples,” with Ram Orzach, Economics Letters 105 (2009), 177–180.

“Bilateral Oligopoly, Private Information, and Pollution Permit Markets,” with Andrew Yates, Environmental and Resource Economics 43 (2009), 553–572.

“Strategic Behavior, Private Information, and Decentralization in the European Union Emissions Trading System,” with Andrew Yates, Environmental and Resource Economics 43 (2009), 413–432.

 

More Information 

General Campus Information

University of California, Riverside
900 University Ave.
Riverside, CA 92521
Tel: (951) 827-1012

Department Information

Department of Economics
4128 Sproul Hall

Tel: (951) 827-3266
Fax: (951) 827-5685
E-mail: damaris.carlos@ucr.edu

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