David A. Malueg
Contact Information
3136 Sproul Hall
Phone: (951) 827-1494
Fax: (951) 827-5685
Email: david.malueg@ucr.edu
Research Interests
- Microeconomics
- Industrial Organization
- Public Economics
- Environmental Economics
Professor Malueg joins us after teaching at both the University of Iowa and Tulane University. Between these two appointments he worked five years in the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. His research interests include microeconomics, game theory, industrial organization, and environmental economics. Current projects study the efficiency of private provision of public goods, changes in the European Union Emission Trading System to improve efficiency, and the consequences of strategic behavior in network industries. Professor Malueg’s recent research has been published in journals including Economic Theory, The Journal of Industrial Economics, The International Journal of Industrial Organization, and The Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.
Recent Publications
“Revenue Comparison in Common-Value Auctions: two examples,” with Ram Orzach, forthcoming in Economics Letters.
“Mixed-Strategy Equilibria in the Nash Demand Game,” forthcoming in Economic Theory.
“Bilateral Oligopoly, Private Information, and Pollution Permit Markets,” with Andrew Yates, Environmental and Resource Economics 43 (2009), 553–572.
“Strategic Behavior, Private Information, and Decentralization in the European Union Emissions Trading System,” with Andrew Yates, Environmental and Resource Economics 43 (2009), 413–432.
“Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous-Strategy Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game,” with Stefano Barbieri, Journal of Public Economic Theory 10 (2008), 529–545.
“Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Efficient Equilibria in the Private-Information Contribution Game,” with Stefano Barbieri, Economic Theory 37 (2008), 51–80.