THE XVIIIth SOUTHWEST ECONOMIC THEORY CONFERENCE
University of California, Riverside
March 4–5, 2016

Thursday, March 3, 2016
Reception 6:00–8:00 pm
Marriott Riverside at the Convention Center
The Imperial Room (1st floor)

Friday, March 4, 2016
All sessions are held at
Glen Mor J315 on the UCR campus
(Arrive between 8 and 10 am and park on the top floor of the adjacent garage.
During this time a traffic officer will provide needed parking permits.)

Breakfast—8:30 am
SESSION I: 9:00–10:30 am
Joel Watson, UCSD, "Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: General Definitions and Illustrations"
Igor Kopylov, UCI, “Canonical Utility Functions and Continuous Preference Extensions”
Tomasz Sadzik, UCLA, "Robust Mechanism Design of Exchange"

Coffee Break—10:30–11:00 am
SESSION II: 11:00 am–12:30 pm
Snehal Banerjee, UCSD, “Conceal to Coordinate”
Derek Lemoine, Arizona, "Age and Perspective: Dynamic Consistency with Time-Varying Discount Rates”
Sean Inoue, Arizona, “Lacunae in Contracting with Private Information”

Lunch—12:30–2:00 pm
SESSION III: 2:00–3:30 pm
Natalia Lazzati, UCSC, “A Revealed Preference Theory of Monotone Choice and Strategic Complementarity”
Sevgi Yuksel, UCSB, "Media Competition and the Source of Disagreement”
Lining Han, Hawaii, "Money-Sharing and Intermediation in Networks"
Coffee Break—3:30–4:00 pm

SESSION IV: 4:00–6:00 pm

Jay Lu, UCLA, “A Bayesian Theory of State-Dependent Utilities”

Tatiana Mayskaya, Caltech, "Selective Exposure to Information (Confirmation Bias) in Dynamic Choice of Information Sources Model”

Yilmaz Kocer, USC, “Experimentation and Competition in Contests: A Mean Field Approach”

Fanis Tsoulohas, UCM, “Why Are IMF Programs Delayed?”

Conference Dinner—6:30 pm
Cafe Sevilla, 3252 Mission Inn Ave.

Saturday March 5, 2016

Breakfast—8:30 am

SESSION V: 9:00–10:30 am

Craig McLaren, UCR, “Dynamic Model of the Individual Consumer”

Qiaoxi Zhang, Caltech, "Vagueness in Multi-Issue Proposals”

Omer Ali, UCLA, “An Informed Principal Problem with Imperfect Information”

Coffee Break—10:30–11:00 am

SESSION VI: 11:00 am–12:30 pm

Asaf Plan, Arizona, ”The Finite-Horizon Paradox with Impatient Players“

Marcelo Fernández, Caltech, “Deferred Acceptance and Regret-free Truth-telling”

Seung Han Yoo, Korea U, "Mechanism Design with Two Types of Information"